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Abstract 
In this work I use autoethnography to explore my business practices in the construction 
company I own and manage. I draw on postmodern ethics and Lévinas’ thoughts to 
contribute to, first, the pursuit of autoethnography as practitioner research, second, the 
understanding of trust’s nature and role in the light of Lévinas’ philosophy and, third, its 
implications for managerial practice. Lévinas’ thought about the relationship between self 
and Other and his notions of Saying and Said assisted me while reflecting on trust in my 
business environment. 
Writing fieldnotes and reflections about my experiences in business, I show that 
autoethnography done by an industry practitioner provides unique insights which are not 
available to outsiders. In particular, insiders are able to deconstruct commonly held 
assumptions by drawing on their own thoughts and feelings. 
Although trust is often seen as serving a purpose, I strongly oppose this view. Trust is a 
non-calculative mode of interaction since a calculative approach cannot explain trust. I argue 
that trust belongs to Lévinas’ Saying. It is not a conscious decision but a preconscious urge 
towards the Other which I may rationally control. Lévinas’ Saying links trust, responsibility, 
forgiving, and genuine care for the Other. Trust as Saying supports its recurring nature and 
explains its elusive nature. Trusting the Other is not a conscious decision but an opening to 
basic human interaction – conversation and sociality.  
Trusting an unknowable Other risks disappointment and hence it demands forgiving – 
almost pre-emptively. However, it also makes it possible to benefit from the Other in 
unknowable ways. The uncertainty about the Other requires loosening control and making 
oneself vulnerable to the trusted. This questions ever-tighter control mechanisms and a 
culture of accountability that one experiences in business. However, without the courage to 
trust, one cannot unleash the creative power of trusting cooperation.
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I. Introduction 
I’m sitting on the balcony of our holiday flat. We’re on vacation. It’s 
beautiful. A crisp October’s morning with clear air and an impressive view 
of the Bavarian Alps. It’s around 10 o’clock and we’ve just finished our 
breakfast. The kids – still in their pyjamas – make some noise inside and 
occasionally look through the glass door onto the balcony. 
But I am in a completely different world – not as peaceful and relaxed as 
the scenery might suggest. I got a call from my office telling me that a client 
did not pay his bills on time. Actually, the payment is already 10 days late, 
and the week before my vacation we sent the client a reminder threatening 
that we would stop working unless he pays his bills. Now my site manager 
wants me to decide whether we stop working on the building site. 
I am angry for two reasons. First of all, I’m on holiday, and I don’t want 
to deal with problems like that. And second, I am completely fed up with 
clients not paying their invoices. We can’t do the job for them fast enough, 
but when it comes to their turn – paying their bills – suddenly they no longer 
feel any hurry. Even worse, often clients find numerous reasons not to pay 
their invoices. This infuriates me most.  
Only later that day, I received a call from an architect I had worked with 
for many years. He said he would like to talk to me about a new project. The 
message that came across is that he would prefer to give me the job because 
the previous projects went so smoothly. My mood brightened significantly. 
These two calls were typical of what I experience in business. The first reflects a breach 
of trust I have experienced various time in the last few years. The client initially seems to be 
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happy with the work we are doing. However, as we progress and come closer to finishing 
the job, payments arrive later. In some cases, the clients do not even pay the last bill. Hence, 
we often have to litigate them for years without knowing whether we are going to be 
successful or not. These late payments or not paying at all are a perceived breach of trust 
and cause me anger and frustration. The second call was quite the opposite. An architect I 
like called me to do business. We have built up trust working on previous projects and 
therefore the architect sought to convince his clients to give us the job. In these situations, 
doing business is enjoyable.  
This work explores this tension between the enjoyment of a trusting relationship in 
business and the anger I feel when my trust seems to be abused. Specifically, I am going to 
explore the role trust plays in my negotiations. 
From an outsider’s view, the decisions of business people often seem to be based 
predominantly on facts and hard evidence. In reality, it is a person with feelings and emotions 
that has to make these choices and these decisions are often influenced by subjective 
perceptions. 
This is my story and I am therefore going to use the first-person singular throughout this 
work. Doing otherwise would suggest I was in an omniscient, neutral, privileged position, 
which I am not. This is a subjective, personal, at time biased, but always honest and sincere 
account of my research. At best, it should come across to the reader as an authentic, honest 
and credible representation of my research. (Ellis, 2004, p. 560; Richardson, 1990) 
I run my own construction business which I started in 1999 with the help of my father 
and with 10 employees. Today, after some turbulent years in business, my company employs 
around 40 people. Most of my employees are bricklayers and carpenters as concrete and 
brickwork construction is the main part of most of our work. Our projects are quite diverse 
– ranging from the foundation for a carport to a 7-storey urban building to a stable for a 
couple of hundred cows. 
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Prior to starting my business, I completed a three-year vocational training as a carpenter, 
a four-year civil engineering degree and an industrial engineering degree. I therefore 
assumed I had considerable practical and theoretical knowledge about the construction 
business. However, most of the time my technical knowledge is less important than my 
human interaction. This includes managing my staff and dealing with suppliers, clients, and 
their architects and design teams – i.e. negotiating with people. 
Recently, I met an engineer on a building site to discuss some technical details and 
enjoyed using my engineering knowledge. The technical training helps me a lot in my daily 
work. However, even during our discussion about technical details we touched on personal 
and social issues. He reminded me that when we want to make some changes to the design 
we need to get the other stakeholders on board – employer, architect, engineers etc. We 
agreed that the solution we proposed was the best available – seen from an engineer’s 
perspective. Yet, other stakeholders might see the solution differently and therefore prefer 
another alternative. 
At this moment, the negotiating began – at least in my head. Could I get them on board? 
What would they prefer? What could be a compromise? Would I run into dangers making a 
proposal? All these questions hummed around in my head.  
Sometimes it is easy to reach a solution that I hardly recognise that I am negotiating. On 
other occasions, it takes some listening, responding and a well-presented argument to find a 
solution. And sometimes, the differences are so severe that I cannot resolve a conflict 
without going to court. It can be great fun to negotiate, but it can also be emotionally 
demanding. Although I enjoy the engineering part of my job, I find dealing with people even 
more interesting. I realise how little I know about it and how much I can gain from knowing 
just a little more. 
Over my years in business, I have gained some experience in negotiating with my 
business partners. But I am often still perplexed by situations in which I find myself. 
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Researching in this area provides me with the opportunity to gain greater knowledge. Given 
my personal interest in this work, I will focus on my negotiation with clients, architects, 
engineers, suppliers, and other business partners. 
The term ‘negotiation’ does not only refer to face-to-face negotiations. I also include 
telephone calls, emails, letters, etc. In other words, all means of communication with another 
person are forms of negotiating. In this piece, I am interested in medium or long-term 
negotiations. My interest in these sort of negotiations stems predominantly from the nature 
of my business relationships. Construction projects usually run for at least a couple of weeks 
and often months or even years. Moreover, architects work with me on different projects and 
with different clients. Some clients return and commission us for successive projects. That 
is why it matters to me and my business whether my clients and their managers place trust 
in my staff and me. Again, in this study, I am going to investigate how trust and my 
negotiation practice influences each other – in particular, how and why trust develops and 
what forms it takes. 
Playing field 
I research my own environment which is readily accessible and provides a unique insider 
perspective. I take an autoethnography approach and record my own experiences. This 
means I write notes about the negotiations I take part in and try to record my thoughts and 
feelings before and after these negotiations. At the same time, I seek to relate these 
experiences to the work of others to develop a deeper understanding of trust development, 
its surrounding processes and most importantly about myself and my own conduct. In this 
sense, this work is not only an autoethnography but also action research for myself (Ellis, 
1999).  
My approach has similarities to that of Le Gall and Langley (2015) as it is abductive 
rather than deductive or inductive. I do not review the literature in clear-cut research stages 
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but work constantly with the literature and in the field – as is typical in autoethnography. In 
this way, I develop my understanding of the subject and the methods and their implication 
while doing research. This can be understood as a cyclical process (Grosse, 2014). Reading 
about trust helps to gain new understanding of my experiences in business and this new 
understanding influences my writing and leads to ever new questions to be addressed by my 
reading. Learning about autoethnography works in a similar way. Reading about it and doing 
it is a bi-directionally fertilising process. Inevitably, my understanding of subject and method 
develop in parallel and have strong interdependencies (Grosse, 2015a). This has significant 
implications for my research. The more I learn about a topic e.g. trust, the more I start to 
understand my experiences. For example, at the beginning of my research journey, I used 
the word ‘trust’ much less consciously and would readily use it to refer to incidents of mere 
reliance. I would not do that anymore.  
To show this development, I am going to unfold my experiences as text written as 
fieldnotes. I will add reflections from a methodological, subject-related perspective, and 
personal perspective. The way I write this work is remotely related to a layered text. The 
layered text is the literary device where the writer reflects on experiences from different 
perspectives rather than a straightforward development (Rambo Ronai, 1995). I try to 
demonstrate development in my thinking by adding reflections – methodological, 
theoretical, and practical into the text. My use of layering is different from the approach 
Rambo Ronai took insofar as my reflective perspectives are signposted with subheadings 
and on a macro level. However, I take from her the underlying idea of hermeneutically 
developing an idea by the use of different perspectives. 
The Long-Distance-Runner 
The long distance running that I have done since I was ten years old may be the trigger 
for my pursuit of autoethnography. When I was still living in socialist East Germany, I 
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participated in regional championships and did quite well – second and third place in the 
3000m hurdles. I was still training when I left school at the age of 17 and began a vocational 
training as carpenter However, the physical labour of my work made it hard to make progress 
in sports. This changed, when I took up compulsory army service in 1993 in Berchtesgaden. 
This is a mountain resort in the Alps and was an ideal place for sporting activities. There 
was time, support and much appreciation for physical fitness. I have to admit, I loved to run 
out senior officers and poke a little fun at them. A year later, I began to study civil 
engineering and kept up my running. Dessau, the small town in East Germany with huge 
open landscape parks and rivers, was again quite well suited for long runs. However, this 
changed again when I moved to Berlin in 1998 I was still studying – now industrial 
engineering - because I thought I would need some management education. The city was not 
so pleasant for running, as I used to run in the open landscape. Now, I had to familiarise with 
smaller parks and stadiums.  
When I started my business, I went once a week to my parent’s place – a small village an 
hour’s drive south of Berlin. I started the business when I still had to study for another year. 
My father used to work for a company which ran into insolvency. My father and I hired a 
couple of workers from this company and bought a plot of land from it. While I finished 
studying, my father did most of the work in the business. His role changed a year later when 
I fully occupied my position as owner/CEO, although he still helped and advised where he 
could. 
At that time, long distance running became central to my life again. Running a business, 
especially during the crisis in the German construction industry in late 90s and early 2000s 
put huge pressure on me. I used the running as compensation for the stress in business. After 
an hour in the park, stadium or in the forest, all the pressure had dissolved. 
One evening when I went running to the stadium near my Berlin flat, I met Theo. Theo is 
a decade older than I am but we ran at a similar pace. We often met for a run and trained 
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together as I used to live just around the corner from his flat. A while into training with him 
I started running half and later full marathons, and I have been running marathons ever since. 
Yet serious marathon training is very different from just running half an hour twice a 
week. I met Theo on Saturday mornings and drove to a lake near Berlin to run 25, 30 and 
sometimes even 35 km. During these long runs, we talked a lot. And that is perhaps the 
beginning of my autoethnography endeavour. I struggled at the time with the demands 
stemming from running a business. Theo listened, advised and helped me a lot. He had 
studied philosophy and worked for years as a social worker. However, at some point, he 
suggested I should seek professional advice. He gave me some contacts, and from that time 
on I have taken coaching sessions almost every month. 
These sessions revolve around my professional practice. Often my coach urges me to 
reflexively approach the issues we discuss and asks me to explain the positions of others 
involved in the situation we discuss. Frequently, we engage in little role plays - he plays me, 
and I play someone else. I think I learned more about myself in these sessions than about 
others.  
I believe, these coaching sessions paved the way for me doing autoethnography. I was 
introduced to the way of thinking which is essential in ethnography in general but especially 
in autoethnography. Given that I met my coach through Theo and met Theo through running, 
I consider long distance running as a special key to autoethnography. 
In which direction do I run? 
In chapter II, I explore the field of ethnography and aim to locate autoethnography within 
this realm. I discuss the origins of autoethnography, its different branches and what 
contributions it can make to knowledge. I then try to make the case for autoethnography 
within trust research and construction management research. I discuss ethnographic studies 
in both areas and will show that autoethnographies are almost absent despite the valuable 
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insights they could offer. I then outline my use of an autoethnographic approach for my 
research and the difficulties and issues I face, especially as I do it in my own business. 
In chapter III, my focus lies on trust research. I show how the word ‘trust’ is used in 
everyday language and what we commonly refer to with it. I then concentrate on trust 
between people as distinguished from related concepts. I discuss the philosophical 
underpinning of trust and demonstrate the limits of trust research. In particular, I show that 
rational explanations of trust fail to account for the phenomena. This lack of rational 
explanation leads me to Lévinas. 
In chapter IV, I introduce the ideas of Emmanuel Lévinas. Although, I provide some 
biographical data, my main focus is on his concepts of Same and Other as well as Saying 
and Said. I seek to locate trust within these concepts and try to address the rational 
shortcoming of previous trust research. Furthermore, I relate Lévinas’ ideas and trust to my 
experiences in business. Here, the autoethnographic material slowly comes into play and 
begins to fertilise my thinking about trust. 
In chapter V, I reflect on my experiences in business. I seek to make the connections 
between Lévinas’ and my business practice stronger and more interconnected. Essentially, I 
try to draw a richer picture of my business practice and of how I think about it in the light of 
reading Lévinas. I show how responsibility, care, forgiveness, and trust are not only related 
but heavily interwoven and inextricably connected.  
In chapter VI, I seek to develop my thinking. It is not so much advice for what to do next 
as for a slight but impactful way of thinking differently. It is a hermeneutic development of 
my thought. Yet these small changes in thinking are the ones that make me much more 
conscious about things that go on around me and at the same time much more relaxed. It is 
valuing the alterity of the Other and becoming aware of the lack of control about the 
ecosystem I am living in, as well as being ready to forgive and to trust, that contributes to 
this consciousness and relaxation. 
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In chapter VII, I reflect on the papers I have written and presented at conferences while 
working on this thesis. In so doing I can demonstrate how my thinking developed over the 
course of these 6 years. 
In the closing thoughts I summarize what this work offers to managerial practice in the 
construction sector. I also review my contributions to autoethnographic methodology and 
trust research. Finally, I close this work with some thoughts about my own professional 
practice. 
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II. From Ethnography to Autoethnography 
Brief Background 
The following section provides an explanation of autoethnography and where I situate 
my approach within this field. This section draws strongly on previous work in which I 
explored this topic (Grosse, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2018; Grosse & Rose, 2016). 
Firstly, I will sketch what ethnography is. My emphasis is on what ethnographers do and 
what kind of knowledge they may acquire. Then, I seek to show how others used 
ethnographic methods in construction management and trust research and indicate how 
autoethnography may contribute to the field of construction management and trust research. 
I will differentiate between different strands within this methodological field followed by an 
exploration of how I am going to employ autoethnography in this study.  
Ethnography 
According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p. 2), ethnography has no “standard, well-
defined meaning”. I use the term in the sense of studying culture, such as a foreign country 
(e.g.; Geertz, 1972), a distinct social group (e.g.; Rambo Ronai, 1992), an organizational 
setting like a construction site management (e.g.; Sage, 2013) or even very personal stories 
embedded in social relations (e.g.; Ellis & Bochner, 1992). The possible fields of study are 
endless. More recently, ethnographic methods have gained importance in the field of 
management research (Denny & Sunderland, 2014).  
Ethnographers study these cultures (or parts of them) using participation and observation. 
The ethnographer seeks to become part of that culture by taking part in its daily activities. 
This may turn out to be quite demanding task (e.g.; Sage, 2013). Marshall and Bresnen 
(2013), for instance, struggled to follow the actions that were going on at the building site 
of their study.  
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The researcher then takes extensive notes about her or his observations of events and 
conversations with the people studied. The ethnographer usually just makes brief jottings in 
the field - perhaps single words, which they later develop into longer fieldnotes (Emerson, 
Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). Although there are advantages of writing fieldnotes as soon as 
possible after or even while participating, the ethnographer has to make a trade-off between 
participating and writing. Emerson et al. (2011) emphasise the advantages and pitfalls of 
both approaches. Some decide to participate for an extended period and write afterwards 
because they do not want to interrupt the course of action by starting to write. Others may 
rather write during the event because memory is always fading. Either way, ethnographers 
write descriptions of the events they participate in and these descriptions form the basis for 
exploring the culture under study (e.g.; Emerson et al., 2011; van Maanen, 2011). 
It is debatable whether material derived from observation or conversations (i.e. 
interviews) is more or less truthful. Some think the discussion is misleading because talking 
is also acting and events are not necessarily meaningful by themselves. Events obtain their 
meaning as participants talk about them (Atkinson & Coffey, 2001). The interview (or 
conversation) about the event “constitutes the site of meaning construction.” (Sherman Heyl, 
2001, p. 379). One could connect this discussion to the notions of “espoused theory” and 
“theory in use” (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005, p. 561) – the rationale they claim to follow 
and which they actually follow. However, this is less relevant to my autoethnography, since 
I am the person acting and addressing meaning to my action. 
Some call their material ‘data.' However, I am cautious about this term as it suggests hard 
data like measurements. Fieldnotes are only one representation of the events. They are 
subjective recordings of the experiences of the ethnographer written at one point in the 
process of doing ethnography. The ethnographer then revises and reinterprets these 
fieldnotes. Hence, I refrain from talking about ‘data’ and prefer to call my fieldnotes and 
reflections ‘material’. 
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It is very important to understand the process the ethnographer goes through during their 
research. Marshall and Bresnen (2013) describe themselves as interloper, spy, and consultant 
and assess the impact of these shifting identities on their research. These shifting identities 
have implication on what the researcher sees and how she or he understands the seen. 
Fieldnotes are never objective accounts of field experiences (van Maanen, 2011) and so I am 
reluctant to call them data. They are the material I created and with which I work. 
Some may regard the ‘unfinished’, ever-evolving nature of fieldnotes as a weakness of 
ethnographic research. This criticism often comes from the positivist camp because 
ethnographers cannot provide a definitive answer to a question but only offer new 
interpretations of a phenomenon. Such new interpretations then serve as a springboard for 
further work. However, I consider the incompleteness of ethnographic research as its greatest 
value. It represents a more honest version of the social world I live in since my social 
environment is ever evolving and evades closure. As Richardson and Adams St. Pierre 
(2005) argue, it is a matter of shifting perspectives which make us see different things. 
Therefore, ethnographers have to investigate the field and their own thoughts about their 
field of study from different points of view. In other words, "a good ethnographer immerses 
her- or himself in […] deep learning situations [...] where what is learned goes beyond what 
could be said in an interview and can only be known by being there, as events unfold" (Pink, 
Tutt, Dainty, & Gibb, 2010, p. 658). 
In the last two decades, ethnographers have tended to apply ethnography in a more 
constructionist/interpretivist manner (e.g. the different volumes of Denzin and Lincoln (e.g.; 
2005)). Nevertheless, ethnographers’ texts range from realist to impressionist accounts (van 
Maanen, 2011). The realist tales tend to seek closure (van Maanen, 2011). Realist 
ethnographers attempt to write the researcher out of the text; as if the story is told from a 
neutral point of view and the researcher saw the things as they were (van Maanen, 2011). I 
consider an understanding of ethnography to always be an unfinished account of 
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experiences. It goes in line with Wolcott’s observation that “first hand experiences” in the 
field are “both the starting point and the filter through which everything else is screened as 
we make sense of all that we have observed." (Wolcott, 1999, pp. 50-51) This sense-making 
and interpretation is ever-evolving and cannot be finished (Iser, 2000). Therefore, the 
ethnographer seeks more for patterns in the observed events (Wolcott, 2004) than for 
absolute law-like rules. 
Autoethnography 
“[T]here is always an autobiographical dimension to all ethnography” (Crapanzano, 1977, 
p. 72) and “[i]n a sense, all ethnography, is self-ethnography” (Goldschmidt, 1977, p. 294). 
They refer to what van Maanen later terms, “confessional and impressionist tales” – writings 
about the personal experiences of the researcher doing ethnography (2011). The writers 
above refer to cases where the ethnographer studies others in their environment and in these 
tales reflects on the process of doing research. However, I go further. I investigate my own 
native environment and focus on my experiences in my business context. This is 
autoethnography. 
The autoethnographer explores the social setting which the researcher is already part of. 
The researcher uses the opportunities already at hand (Riemer, 1977). Therefore, getting 
access and participating does not pose an obstacle, because the researcher is already there 
and accepted as part of the culture to be studied. It is the researcher’s own environment or 
"[m]y own story-that's what I am involved in" (Ellis, 2004, p. 128). This is problematic for 
the researcher, especially when it comes to ethical questions regarding personal relations. I 
will come back to this point later. 
Part-time researchers like me are often unable to fully enter another setting because of 
their first occupation. Practitioners working full-time do not have the option to quit their job 
to immerse themselves somewhere else – they have to make a living (Anderson, 2006). 
Hence, autoethnography is probably the only option they have for doing ethnography. 
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Heider (1975) coined the term ‘autoethnography’ although he used it in a somewhat 
different sense – he is a researcher capturing native’s descriptions of what they do. Some 
years later, although admitting having heard it years before in a lecture, Hayano (1979) used 
the term in its current interpretation for the first time in a research paper. He played cards 
himself and studied professional card players (Hayano, 1983). He researched his “people”’ 
(Wolcott, 1999, p. 170). In doing so, he was already inside and knew the people and culture 
he researched. This understanding of autoethnography is common today. 
Hayano considers the deep immersion and the insights gained as the advantages of 
autoethnography (Hayano, 1979). The subsequent understanding “could not have possibly 
taken place in any way other than full, complete long-term submersion, even communion, 
on the part of the ethnographer.” (Hayano, 1983, p. 155) It is important to perform the same 
or similar roles as the people studied (Hayano, 1983). However, he understands 
autoethnography to be the study of the group the researcher is already part of, rather than the 
study of the research’s self. Therefore, he argues “studies [...] which analyse one's own life 
through the procedures of ethnography are not only autoethnographic but also self-
ethnographic […].” (Hayano, 1979, p. 103) But the self – as one sees in studies of native 
anthropologists (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1984) - always plays a central role in studying one’s own 
culture and hence in autoethnography. Therefore, my understanding of the term is somewhat 
different. 
I locate autoethnography as one branch within the field of ethnography. Autoethnography 
is an ‘umbrella term” for writings “with an ethnographic sensibility about [the researcher’s] 
own cultural milieu”, the exploration of personal experiences, and the study of “doing 
ethnography” (Reed-Danahay, 2009, pp. 30-31). Yet, one must acknowledge the difficulty 
to precisely define the term autoethnography and its use (Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  
One can approach autoethnography another way. Reed-Danahay (1997, p. 2) emphasises 
the term’s “double sense – referring either to the ethnography of one's own group or to 
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autobiographical writing that has ethnographic interest." Hence, she attempts to "break down 
the distinction between autobiography and ethnography” and regards autoethnography in the 
midst of three writing genres: "native anthropology", "ethnic autobiography" and 
"autobiographical ethnography" (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 2). Within this triangle, one may 
locate many different applications and names for doing autoethnography. I found the best 
collection of them in Ellis and Bochner (2000). 
I tend towards the interpretation of “autobiographical ethnography” - emphasising my 
personal experiences and researching my own self. I understand autoethnography as “a form 
of self-narrative that places the self within a social context.” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 9). 
Hence, I see myself as one of the ethnographers who will deliberately use “narrative accounts 
of their own lives to make a point.” (Wolcott, 1999, p. 174) This is my story, and my personal 
understandings are central to this work. I therefore want to ensure that the “reader cannot 
fault the first-person orientation or personal nature” of my account (Wolcott, 1999, p. 175). 
That raises the question of whether “[t]he voice of the insider is assumed to be more true 
than that of the outsider" (Reed-Danahay, 1997, pp. 2-3). 
I think this question is misleading. It is a subjective picture that I am painting as I conduct 
an interview with myself, report the events I lived through, and recount the conversations I 
had. Hence, the previous distinction I made between observation and talking about the event 
is blurred [see ‘Ethnography’ p. 16]. The only thing I have to offer is my interpretation of 
events and how I came to think so.  
The autoethnographer’s interactions and concurrent and subsequent thoughts, feelings 
and emotions are central to understand personal experiences (Ellis, 1999). A “professional 
researcher[…]” will “incorporate own personal narratives” in their research (Reed-Danahay, 
2001, p. 407). In doing “[r]esearching and writing from the lived, inside moments of 
experience allows autoethnographers to cultivate an ‘epistemology of insiderness,’ of being 
able to describe an experience in a way that an ‘outside’ researcher never could.” (Reinharz, 
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1992, p. 260 (cited in Adams, Holman Jones, & Ellis, 2015, p. 31)). For me, it is one way of 
seeing – not better or worse than any other. As Hayano (1979) said, it is unique and perhaps 
insightful. 
One might also ask the extent to which an insider might be or become native (Narayan, 
1993). Through the process of research, I become less native. However, autoethnographers 
can offer “insights into social phenomena that we cannot observe directly, because the 
experiences occur in their own time, uninterrupted by the researcher’s presence.” (Adams, 
Holman Jones, & Ellis, 2015, p. 32 (emphasis in the original))  
In the following two sections, I locate the ethnography approach within the construction 
management and trust research field seek to show what the insider approach may contribute 
to these two fields of research. 
Autoethnography in Construction Management Research 
Chan and Räisänen (2009, p. 909) spotted that “[d]eep ethnographic studies in the field 
of construction management are relatively rare.” However, recently ethnography has gained 
some momentum and importance, as demonstrated by the edited work of Pink, Tutt, and 
Dainty (2013) and an upcoming edition of Construction Management and Economics on 
ethnography. Ethnographic studies deal with a variety of research subjects within the 
construction industry. For example, the spatial and temporal nature of construction work, 
health and safety issues, management practices, and the challenges for ethnographer in the 
field (Pink et al., 2013).  
Yet, autoethnographic studies are rare in construction management research. I am only 
aware of two autoethnographic PhD studies underway (Cummins, Graham, Thomas, & 
Lucey, 2016; Whaley, 2016). In other fields such as sociology and communication research, 
autoethnography is a well-established method (Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2011). Some works 
in construction management research highlight the researcher’s role e.g. Löwstedt (2014). 
He looks at what he can see and how his personality influences the research. However, he 
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went to the ‘foreign’ setting of a building site for his research. Similarly, Thiel (2005, 2010) 
went to building sites he was already familiar with, but he did so for research purposes. 
Kanjanabootra included reflections on his time as a manager in a wider ethnographic study 
(Kanjanabootra & Corbitt, 2016). All are, therefore, examples of autoethnographic elements 
in otherwise classic ethnographies (Crapanzano, 1977). 
I have chosen to research on my home soil where I already am – in my own business. I 
take a closer look at my business environment and at how and why I act in my role as a 
business owner. Verkerk (2005) did similar work in a business context. He wrote about his 
personal experiences as a manager in different plants, but to my knowledge, this kind of 
work is not available for the construction industry.  
Autoethnographic studies on management practice in the construction industry are almost 
non-existent. One may speculate about the reasons for this absence. Access, willingness and 
ability to expose oneself might be reasons. But the emergent nature of qualitative social 
research, which is unfamiliar to engineers and managers, might also be a deterrent. I could 
not anticipate what I would discover in my research because ethnographic research is 
emergent. I had to get used to this sort of research. For a detailed discussion of my approach 
and its contribution to construction management research I refer to my paper [see ‘Appendix 
J – An insider’s point of view (Grosse, 2018)’ p. 384] 
Autoethnography in Trust Research 
A significant part of research literature on trust is based on quantitative approaches. Some 
conceptualisation of trust is often required in quantitative research. This often results in a 
model of different variables. Researchers then build a research design and try to measure 
variables of this model. Most quantitative researchers use questionnaires in different forms 
but other methods such as experiments are also seen.  
However, I see some linguistic, methodological, and philosophical limitations of 
quantitative studies on trust. For instance, to Smallbone and Lyon (2002, p. 21) “empirical 
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studies of the concept of trust always face linguistic difficulties”. What do people actually 
mean when they say they trust someone? This is a difficult concept even for scholars to 
define (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). How then can it be adequately conveyed 
in a questionnaire?  
Tillmar (2012, p. 102) argues: "Trust is a social phenomenon that is hard to measure 
adequately." One only needs to ask friends what the word trust means to them to see the 
difficulty. Not one of my friends has been able to answer this question without ambiguity. 
For Smallbone and Lyon (2002, p. 24) this amounts to the notion that “[q]uantitative data on 
trust is difficult to collect […]”. 
Welter and Alex (2015, p. 75) argue in the same vein, that “[t]rust, in particular, its 
understanding and interpretation, is also a socially constructed and context-dependent 
phenomenon, which renders its measurement and empirical analysis difficult." They go on 
to argue that “trust is a context-bound phenomenon influenced by cultural traditions and 
settings” (Welter & Alex, 2015, p. 78). It is therefore one of autoethnography’s strength to 
explore the context of trust relations. 
Another methodological concern is that measurement of trust needs predefined concepts 
otherwise measurement is pointless. The problem with research that starts off with such 
concepts is that the researcher puts all results into “tidy and [often] unexamined conceptual 
boxes” (Kabat-Zinn, 2002, p. 69). This leads to the following problem: “you may decide to 
use a different definition; but once you subscribe to [one] definition, you have to live up to 
it in your methods.” (Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2015, p. 3). Hence, the adopted concept 
of trust greatly limits what a researcher is able to find. In other words, when one looks for a 
relation between trust and ethnicity, all the data may be related according to this relation but 
might miss the promising links to other factors, such as education, gender, etc. Only what is 
considered in the model or actively provisioned by it is reflected in the results. But to my 
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understanding, confounding influences of trust relations in our social world are so complex 
that it is difficult to build such a model. 
Exploring the research setting with what Kabat-Zinn (2002) called a “don’t know mind” 
will be helpful here. We are often quick to give labels for our experiences but the labelling 
is the very act of categorising, of putting our experiences too quickly into conceptual boxes 
(Weick, 2006). However, it is worthwhile to look beyond these existing concepts. When we 
interpret our experiences through a new lens, “this action can generate a world not previously 
thought of” (Weick, 2006, p. 1731). 
Therefore, more qualitative research on trust is needed because it explicitly seeks new 
perspectives on the phenomena. The need for more qualitative studies has been identified in 
trust research over recent years (e.g.; Lyon et al., 2015; Möllering, 2006, 2012; Möllering, 
Bachmann, & Lee, 2004). Roy Lewicki emphasises that “anthropology has a lot to contribute 
to understanding broader trust constructs, and [that trust researchers] need to learn more 
about methods from anthropology.” (Gillespie, 2017, p. 14) 
Although qualitative methods are the means to explore phenomena from a new 
perspective, they do not safeguard against the danger of reifying existing conceptual boxes. 
Of course, one needs to know what to look for – the sense of significance identified by 
Emerson et al. (2011), but there is always the risk of missing important aspects when looking 
at phenomena from an particular angle. It is important to be aware of the concepts used and 
to question the underlying assumptions reflectively.  
Möllering et al. (2004, p. 560) emphasise that an aim of qualitative studies should be to 
“perform collective ‘reality checks’ on concepts.” This is to explore the “tidy and 
unexamined conceptual boxes” discussed by Kabat-Zinn (2002). This inevitably leads to 
deeper questions about trust – the need to explore it in more depth and to look for its origins.  
There is a substantive body of research available on trust but I know of only a few 
ethnographers researching trust (e.g.; Tillmar, 2012; Verkerk, 2005) and am not aware of 
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any autoethnographic work. Autoethnography offers the possibility to explore personal 
experiences in great depth – the feelings, emotions, and thoughts and the context and 
personal history in which they appear. I readily access my thoughts and feelings and look 
for underlying reasons and causes. I reflexively explore the inner processes that happen 
during an event (Grosse, 2016a) and in doing so, I develop my understanding of the concept 
of trust.  
By researching my own environment over an extended period of time, I address "a lack 
of dynamic orientation in researching trust processes, the changing nature of trust, and the 
reasons for (not) trusting one another in business relationships" (Welter & Alex, 2015, p. 
79). But this dynamic orientation raises two questions: where will my research journey lead? 
and what will I learn?  
To state from the outset where my research journey will take me is somewhat odd for an 
ethnographer as ethnography and especially autoethnography are emergent research designs. 
I started with a vague idea of researching negotiation. I use the term to refer to my daily 
interaction with others in my business. This includes face-to-face meetings (e.g.; Grosse, 
2015b), but also phone calls, letter, emails etc. (e.g.; Grosse, 2016a). In fact, almost every 
act of communication amounts to some form of negotiation. 
My observations are made about negotiations and these negotiations are the stages in 
which trust appears. But from the outset the fieldnotes revealed that the negotiations I am 
involved in are not one-off events. I met the same people again and again and we negotiated 
repeatedly. I learned that trust played a crucial role in these negotiations. Hence, my focus 
shifted away from negotiation to the notion of trust.  
Knowledge 
What can ethnographers know? I am tempted to answer this question with “something” 
and “almost nothing.”  
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We are part of a larger scheme of things than we cannot understand. We cannot 
describe it in the way in which external objects or the characters of other people can 
be described, by isolating them from the historical 'flow' in which they have their 
being, and from the 'submerged', unfathomed portions of themselves [ … ]; for we 
ourselves live in this whole and by it, and are wise only in the measure to which we 
make our peace with it. (Berlin, 2013, p. 79) 
From the field of history, Berlin makes the point that we only know very little. However, 
he makes it clear that we can explore human interaction in great depth but need to be aware 
of the context in which our knowledge is embedded (Berlin, 2013). 
What do I mean by “almost nothing”? The fieldnotes I collect are my qualitative “data”. 
I am reluctant to regard it as hard data as I write the fieldnotes as a recollection of past events 
– some very recent, some even years ago. Loss and change of memory play a significant role 
when one seeks to assess the quality of these fieldnotes and how they reflect the actual event. 
These notes are my subjective accounts and others might have experienced the event 
completely differently. I only see a tiny bit of what is going on in the first place (Berlin, 
2013). This very limited scope of my perception makes me say that I know almost nothing. 
I also base my knowledge on my experience and compare it to what I find in the literature. 
A quantitative researcher would say my sample size equals one, so I cannot claim validity, 
reliability, or generalisability. I can never know how others understand their experiences. 
Hence, what I know is “almost nothing” compared to the possible range of perceptions and 
interpretations of the events I write about. 
However, I do know “something” when it comes to the depth of knowing about my 
experiences. Ethnographies are not about general unchallengeable knowledge but about a 
particular understanding of the field of study – a culture, a group, a social practice, an event. 
It is this depth I am aiming for. 
28 From Ethnography to Autoethnography  
Henning Grosse  
I seek to gain depth predominantly by digging deep into my experiences. I aim to explore 
what I think and feel and why I think and feel this. Why did I act or react in a situation as I 
did? What was the cause of this action or reaction? Is there more behind the reason than I 
initially thought. The depth comes with the answers to the question since the answers lead 
to new questions and further delving into the questions. It is reflexivity which I seek to use 
to understand my experiences better. In this sense, I may know “something” and perhaps 
something special (Grosse, 2016a, 2018). 
I draw on the idea of critical reflection to develop my reflexive skills because in my 
understanding, reflexivity and critical reflection have much in common. To clarify what I 
mean by reflexivity I need to distinguish it from simple reflection. Reflecting is 
contemplating past, present, or future. This cause-effect-relation is the way I was taught 
while studying for my engineering degree. I can say without any emotional involvement how 
much iron reinforcement a concrete beam requires to bear the loads it is designed to 
withstand. I can look at the equation from a distance and solve it. It does not matter to the 
beam and to the equation who I am or what I think; I can completely distance myself from 
this question and the possible answer.  
However, I cannot remain distant from human interactions and in particular my own 
endeavour. I become part of the equation. My contemplation of my action reflects my own 
action, what I do, what I think and who I am. Thus, in recognising the impact of my action, 
I see myself through the other (Chiseri-Strater, 1996). The consequence of this thinking is 
that there is no unbiased observation. I bring ‘something’ with me (experiences, attitudes, 
assumptions) and this ‘something’ shapes what I see. But as soon as I realise part of this 
‘something’, it begins to change. I approach further observation and interpretations with a 
different ‘something’. It is an ongoing hermeneutic process which constantly moves from 
the whole to the particular and back again. Within each circular movement, the 
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interpretations of the whole and the particular shift and there is no final interpretation to 
expect (Iser, 2000). 
A neutral, simple social reality that can be depicted or interpreted does not exist. 
Researchers must actively work with language and texts that have an ambiguous 
relation to signification and meanings – manifesting their local, contextual and 
arbitrary nature. (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 200) 
Moreover, the environment I explore is evolving and changing all the time. What I learn 
today about a person in my business environment is subject to change. For instance, a 
supplier might be desperate to win a contract today, but tomorrow he might be bought out 
and the whole power balance between us would change. So, I must be wary of what I claim 
to know about my surroundings. But the more complex issue is what happens to me. 
As I learn about my environment including myself and others, I as the knower change. 
The container in which the knowledge is stored changes during the process of learning. As 
Iser (2000) explains, by learning about the particular I understand the whole differently and 
subsequently understand its parts differently. These circular learning processes cannot be 
brought to an end (Moon, 2006). 
I therefore rely on critical reflection or reflexivity to constantly challenge and fertilise my 
learning processes. There are slight differences between critical reflection and reflexivity. 
Critical reflection always follows some political agenda – it aims at social change (Bohman, 
2016) – whereas reflexivity in a postmodern understanding is deconstruction (Cunliffe, 
2003).  
This deconstruction and the suspension of concepts leads to a vacuum. It seems as if there 
is nothing left to hold on, which often feels disturbing. However, as Derrida (1992) points 
out, after each suspension of a concept – i.e. questioning assumptions – the void left is 
immediately filled with responsibility in a pre-conceptual sense. Derrida (1992, p. 20) draws 
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on Plato’s Republic and terms it a “responsibility before the very concept of responsibility 
that regulates the justice and appropriateness (justesse) of our behaviour, of our theoretical, 
practical, and ethico-political decisions.” 
Postmodernism refers to the ethics of the ‘good beyond’ concept (Bauman, 1993) or as 
the ‘Good beyond essence’ (Lévinas, 1974b). This implies that as soon as concepts emerge 
they should be challenged (Lévinas, 1974b). Caputo neatly demonstrates this in his example 
of an accident (2000, p. 111). Every new event asks for a new explanation. Hence, reflexivity 
cannot lead to an endpoint. Even if critical reflection aims for social change, it has no logical 
end (Moon, 2006). Hence, I can understand a bit more about my experiences, but they will 
always escape full comprehension. There is always the possibility of going deeper into an 
experience and the perspectives I could apply are unlimited. Berlin summarises my view of 
what I think I am able to know and what I am aiming for in my research. 
“It is a view of reality which makes all clear, logical and scientific constructions 
- the well-defined, symmetrical patterns of human reason - seem smooth, thin, 
empty, 'abstract' and totally ineffective as means either of description or of analysis 
of anything that lives, or has lived.” (Berlin, 2013, p. 69) 
The permanent challenge of interpretation and the unfinished nature of my writing and 
understanding reflects the deconstructive power of my experiences. This deconstruction is 
inherent in my management practice and surfaces through reflection. It manifests itself in a 
reflexivity on practice, in practice and of practice. For a longer discussion of their working, 
I refer to my paper in Construction Management and Economics [see ‘Appendix J – An 
insider’s point of view (Grosse, 2018)’ p. 384]  
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My Way of Doing Autoethnography 
Two months into the research program, I realised I only had a few options to research 
negotiation. I wanted to research real word settings and sought to relate my research closely 
to my managerial practice. Ethnographic research provides these features. One might argue 
that other forms of research would also have these two features, such as study research or 
action research. 
However, because I run my own construction business – here the ‘auto’ comes into play – 
I frequently participate in negotiations with architects, engineers, suppliers, and clients and 
so exploring these negotiations autoethnographically was the most feasible option. I did not 
attempt to change anything from the outset of my research and so action research was not an 
option and I was not interested in one particular case so case study research was also not an 
option. It may be said that action research and autoethnography are closely related (Grosse 
& Rose, 2016). In some respects, as Ellis (1999, p. 677) puts it, I do ‘action research for the 
individual’.  
Taking notes on these negotiations is my personal opportunity (Riemer, 1977). I would 
argue that this is opportunistic research. As Anderson (2006) notes, when running a business, 
it is not feasible to go anywhere else. I am supposed to research in my own backyard 
(Wolcott, 1999). But the same logic applies to many full-time academics doing ethnographic 
research (or anything else). They do not have the opportunity to do research from inside a 
company and so their options are limited in a different way. They often only have the option 
to approach the research from the outside. This does not render either approach better or 
worse. Both have their own value and limitation. 
Ethnographers write fieldnotes, whether or not they are autoethnographers. In my case, 
these notes contain a record of the negotiations and what I thought and felt regarding them. 
I often use a voice recorder to take first notes after the event while driving. Later in the 
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evening, I sit down and write more extensive descriptions of my experiences and reflections 
on them. 
Writing in the evening 
It’s nine in the evening; I just took the kids, Anna and Bertram, to bed. 
They struggled to fall asleep. They sometimes do if they watch too much 
‘video’ as Bertram likes to call the cartoons they watch on Netflix. I go 
briefly to the kitchen; Charo asks whether I would like some wine. I 
decline, at least for the moment and tell her that I’ll go to my desk to write 
a bit. 
I was angry today because I had a meeting that didn’t go the way I had 
wanted it to. I felt like writing about it. I hoped for some relief, for letting 
off some steam, for some clarity. It usually works very well. 
*** 
One of my staff members and I met a potential client and his engineer 
to discuss the offer we sent him a couple of weeks ago. We were early and 
so waited for some 5 minutes on the sidewalk in front of the engineer’s 
office. The client who I had met once before on the building site, picked 
us up and guided us to the office, which was actually a bit difficult to find 
- in the third courtyard behind a side entrance. 
When we met first, we had a walk through the old house that is going 
to be changed. It is an old five-storey building. On each floor, some 20 
square meters should be added, and an additional storey should be built 
on top. We walked through the house and went through the design in order 
to discuss what our job should be. The client later sent me the design and 
asked whether we could make him an offer. 
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Of course we could, but usually, a quantity surveyor develops a bill of 
quantities from the design. But here they asked us to do it. So, we did the job 
of the quantity survey, which is worth approximately 2.000 Euros, calculated 
our offer and sent it to the client. But we only sent him the verbal description 
for each part of the work and what each part costs in sum. What we did not 
do was supply him with the actual quantities and the prices per unit. In other 
words, we told him only which sum he might have to pay for the steel, but not 
how much steel we thought was necessary nor what a kilogram of steel costs. 
Hence, we did the job of the quantity surveyor in order to calculate a reliable 
offer, but we did not supply him with a bill of quantities. In another case, I 
had done that only to find out the client or the architect took it and forwarded 
it to a competitor. In the end, we did not get the job and, therefore, got no 
reward for producing the bill of quantities. I wanted to avoid a similar 
scenario here. 
When the meeting began, the first thing, the engineer complained about 
was not knowing what was in our offer because she could not see the 
quantities or their respective prices. I told them about my experiences and 
that I was not willing to hand it over without getting rewarded for it. I 
proposed some agreement that in case we didn’t get the job we would get 
paid for measuring the quantities. This wasn’t discussed at length, and the 
talk went on.  
However, the engineer did not miss any opportunity to complain about the 
lack of quantities in our offer, although I gave her the reason for not 
providing the bill of quantities. Actually, I thought she did not listen to us at 
all. At some point, I was fed up by that and told her that I thought doing the 
quantity surveyor’s job is what she’s supposed to do rather than me. And that 
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given that it is some sort of concession on our side doing it, she may not 
be in the position to complain about it at all. Later I renewed my offer to 
hand it over in exchange for some agreement to pay us, but the client 
refused to accept. I immediately asked myself whether it was their aim to 
get it for free like the others. 
During the talk, we dealt with issues of how the construction process 
could and should work, which materials and techniques might be used and 
what our offer should contain. Some of our proposals differed from what 
the engineer had designed in the first place. This is not uncommon 
because engineers see things differently from construction companies. But 
here she was constantly defensive. She fought for her original design in a 
fierce manner that looked unusual to me. 
Listening to some of her arguments, doubts about her competence 
loomed. There were some mistakes in the drawings, there were some 
misconceptions about how things should be built, I had a different 
understanding of functions like, for instance, how noise insulation could 
be safeguarded. I mentioned my concerns, but I didn’t insist on them 
because otherwise, the situation might have escalated. At the end of the 
meeting, we agreed to meet again at the building site in order to examine 
and measure some things that should come into our offer. 
When we left, we went to a coffee shop next door, and I told my 
calculator how upset I was about the engineer. Actually, he had done the 
surveying work and had even more reason to be angry. 
*** 
After around an hour, I wrote down my experience and felt a bit 
relieved. In the meantime, I wrote an email to my calculator detailing a 
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misconception of the engineer and expressing my frustration with the 
meeting. Then I went back to the kitchen, the kids were already asleep, Charo 
was reading something, and we had a glass of Spanish Garnacha. 
That is the way I collect most of my fieldnotes. I sit down in the evenings and write about 
events that bothered me. When I feel strongly that something might be important but I do 
not understand what was going on, then I write about it. Emerson et al. (2011) talk about a 
sense of significance which the ethnographer develops over time. I think, in 
autoethnography, strong feelings are an indicator of events that have significance for me. It 
is similar to Ellis' (2004) note-taking about her experiences living with a terminally ill and 
dying partner. At the time of writing, she did not know what use the notes would become. It 
is also what van Maanen (2011) calls ‘confessions’. He talks about field-workers who went 
to strange places and then reflected on their experiences. I did not go anywhere else to study 
an unfamiliar group or foreign culture but explored my own environment, experiences and 
myself. For me, there is no such thing as becoming familiar with the setting (van Maanen, 
2011). It is more about the struggle of being an insider and passionate about my business 
and maintaining a dispassionate view of daily affairs in writing analytically about them (van 
Maanen, 2011). 
But there is also a risk. I write about things that bother me but the mundane events might 
also have significance. I do not recognise them because I take them for granted. For instance, 
without smoothly running business interactions, caring partners, and responsible staff 
members my work would have no enjoyment - just struggle and fight. These events are 
unnoticed, because they are not bothering or disturbing but are probably no less significant. 
I draw a subjective picture of my world but I seek to transform this subjectivity. I 
constantly try to reinterpret the reading of my experiences anew (Iser, 2000). I know that I 
cannot unlearn things and can only add new learning and reinterpretation to what is already 
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learned. However, my knowing is strongly influenced by my emotionality since this is one 
of the filters I constantly apply to my perception of the world. 
In this work, I draw on experiences predominantly from the last four years. However, I 
may also use memories from earlier – prior to starting my business in 1999. For reasons of 
confidentiality, I do not provide an exact date of the events but rather an approximate period. 
Hence, the reader can locate the events in my development, yet the persons involved are 
safeguarded. 
The fieldnote above contains the description of the actual event and also some hints of 
my feeling and emotions. Rereading it, I ask myself what I felt and why these feeling 
occurred. This is sociological introspection - “understanding the lived experience of 
emotions” (Ellis, 1991, p. 26). Hence, I investigate the “fusion of private and social” (Ellis, 
1991, p. 26). 
Some proponents of ethnography are critical of ethnographies in which the author takes 
centre stage (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Wolcott, 1999). Anderson (2006) proposes 
analytic autoethnography as an alternative to evocative autoethnographies as proposed by 
for instance Ellis (1999) but also Bochner and Ellis (2016); Ellis (1999). Anderson and later 
Charmaz (2006) made a case for the analytic form of autoethnography which puts more 
focus on observation than on the author. They do not ask for a “silent authorship” (Charmaz 
& Mitchell, 1996), however, to them the author should step into the background paving the 
ways to place autoethnography within the realm of realist ethnography.  
However, I believe it is difficult to maintain an ethnographic distance which allows for 
such positioning as I am far too involved in my daily business. It is difficult for 
ethnographers to claim to write a realist tale about others (van Maanen, 2011) but even more 
difficult, if not impossible, for autoethnographers like me. Since I am both the researcher 
and the subject I cannot step aside, as suggested by e.g. Wolcott (1999). Rather I follow 
Holman Jones, Adams, and Ellis (2013, p. 34) emphasising the value of autoethnography as 
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“[c]entring the work inside personal experience, autoethnographers not only have an 
investment in the experience they study but can also articulate aspects of cultural life 
traditional research methods leave out or could not access.” I like to emphasise the insider’s 
view. It is explicitly not my aim to step aside but to locate myself within my ecosystem. 
Then the reader does not get lured into thinking she or he reads a realist tale but understands 
that this is my subjective view.  
However, as with Anderson, Charmaz, and Mitchell (Anderson, 2006; Charmaz, 2006; 
Charmaz & Mitchell, 1996), my claims are the product of a subject observation and are, 
therefore, problematic. I am a trained carpenter, business owner, father, civil engineer, and 
was brought up in socialist East Germany, to name only a few features that form my 
personality. I am therefore unable to give a realist account, yet I can constantly challenge 
what I am saying and writing. Some may regard writing about myself as ‘self-indulgence’ 
but dealing with myself is necessary for the reader to connect to what I am living through 
and what it means to me and subsequently to the reader (Sparkes, 2002). As an example, I 
return to the story about the bill of quantities. Thinking about my anger the following inner 
dialogue unfolded. 
So why were you angry? 
Look they gave us just the drawing and a description of the project, and 
we put quite a bit of effort into surveying the quantities. The first thing they 
did was to complain. We did her work, the client should pay for it, but she 
did not, and we worked hard and now we do not even get a ‘thank you’ - no 
we got blamed for not handing over our work for free … come on do they 
think we are complete idiots? 
 
But that is a very emotional reaction. You could have refused to do the 
surveyors job, couldn’t you? 
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Yes, that’s true. But if another contractor had done the quantities they 
might have sent it to a couple of competitors. But that’s what I sought to 
avoid. 
 
Well, then what are you complaining about? 
It’s the way they urged me to give it to them. The underlying 
assumption that they can get it for free, this sort of openly seeking to 
exploit my good will. They knew how much this work cost. They knew that 
they saved money. I think they knew very well, why we did not give it to 
them. It’s perhaps thinking that we are naïve enough to give it to them. 
 
But you did it before. Maybe that’s what made you angry? 
Well, perhaps I am not angry about them rather about myself. Actually, 
last year I did exactly that and the architect back then just took our bill of 
quantities, copied into their form and sent it out to our competitor. 
 
Then the anger was directed to the architect from last year, wasn’t it? 
Yes, in part, but also to the client and the engineer since they sought to 
do the same thing. 
 
How can you know? 
Well, a colleague told me that I should be careful with him in this 
regard. 
 
Ah, so you’re assuming that? 
 From Ethnography to Autoethnography 39 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
Yes, but the reaction when they did not get the documents as they wanted 
them was the revealing part. It was more how they acted at the very moment 
as what they actually said. Of course, they could not evaluate our offer in 
depth, but the anger I saw in them seems to have little to do with that. It was 
unauthentic, far more than what fitted the reason they gave us. Therefore, I 
assumed that the real reason had to be something else.  
 
But, aren’t you jumping too fast to some conclusion? 
Yes, perhaps. But I had to make up my mind. I am supposed to act on what 
I know. I am under pressure to make decisions.  
Writing up this dialogue is an important process. Writing as a means of exploring thinking 
plays an important role for qualitative researchers. Sartre states: "I would write out what I 
had been thinking about beforehand but the essential moment was that of writing itself" 
(Sartre, 1975, p. 5). It is the very writing process that makes me think. As I move my fingers 
over the keyboard, I fix the thought and take the elusiveness from the thought. I am then able 
to analyse, scrutinise, and develop it. In this example, I sought to investigate my underlying 
thinking and reasons. Writing becomes my “method of inquiry.” (Richardson & Adams St. 
Pierre, 2005) 
Moreover, writing this dialogue provides the possibility to step into two roles and play 
with the space between them. To Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p. 90) some intellectual 
‘distance’ is essential “[f]or it is in the space created by this distance that the analytic work 
of the ethnographer gets done. Without that distance, without such analytical space, the 
ethnography can be little more than autobiographical account of personal conversion.” This 
distance is then the liminal space (Iser, 2000) created by translating experiences into theory. 
But the notion of distance can also imply a conception of realist ethnography. It suggests 
that the researcher might be a neutral observer. But I wonder whether there is an answer to 
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Wolcott’s quest if one might “become so involved as to make observation itself virtually 
impossible?” (1999, p. 48). I believe that it is impossible to avoid or escape involvement or 
subjectivity. It is essential to constantly step back and see what this involvement does to the 
sense-making process. It must become a deconstructive exercise, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter [see also ‘Appendix J – An insider’s point of view (Grosse, 2018)’ p. 384]. One must 
be constantly aware that “[t]he investigator would always be implicated in the 
product.”(Bochner & Ellis, 2016, p. 35)  
Since the researcher is always part of the product – the ethnography, he is always subject 
to certain personal constraints. I fulfil a dual role of researcher and practitioner. Therefore, I 
am now going to look closer at the ethical considerations that guide my research practice. 
Researching and Running My Own Business –Ethical Considerations 
After all, one cannot be a self on one's own. (Brennan, 2012, p. 40) 
I am deeply embedded in my social relationships – with my staff, my clients, my 
suppliers, and a number of others around me. Hence the autoethnography is not only about 
me, but also the people I interact with. The goal of my research is to investigate trust 
developments in real-world settings and my business environment offers me a great 
opportunity to do this. But my practice as a business owner does not belong to me alone - it 
always involves others (Ellis, 2009). 
There are common interests between the businessman and researcher, for instance, 
understanding the meaning and explanations of certain phenomena. But there are also 
differences. The businessman’s priority is to maintain good business relations, but the 
researcher’s is to gain insights and understanding. Occasionally these differences cause 
tension.  
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To understand these emerging dilemmas, I investigate the different interests affected by my 
study. Adopting their inherent perspectives highlights the conflict. In the end, I need to 
reconcile these interests which will inevitably be a trade-off between them. 
The Researcher’s Concerns: 
My interest as a researcher is to observe my environment in as unbiased a state as possible. 
However, my learning process and the transformations that happen to me mediate and 
influence what I can see and how I act. Hence, in ethnographic research, the unbiased 
research setting is impossible to achieve but I seek to depict my environment as neutrally as 
possible.  
One issue that may be a significant influence to participants’ behaviour is to disclose that 
I am doing research on trust and negotiation – this would cause a great deal of reactivity 
(Saunders, 2012). When I meet people for the first time and start to build a relationship with 
them, to disclose my research agenda upfront would alienate them – it would be impractical 
and tactless (Tullis, 2013). In some cases, it may even result in a cancellation of the business 
relationship. 
Approaching people later in the process to ask for consent seems much more feasible. 
Once a trusting relationship is built, the information about the research will not change the 
past experience but might influence participants’ and my interpretation of the events. 
Past experiences will inevitably influence future negotiations and are a valuable source 
for reflection. Gaining retrospective consent will do little to affect the experiences. Hence, 
at first sight, retrospective consent seems to work for methodological concerns. 
But where on the spectrum – between informing participants that research is happening 
and checking every word that is written about them – do I situate my consent request? 
(Spicker, 2011) Just informing them about the overall nature of my project might suggest 
further questions but revealing every word written might upset or hurt them or even cause 
them to object to certain parts of my writing (Ellis, 2009). 
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This can influence what I write. Therefore, it might be best to follow Ellis’ (2009) advice 
to write first for me and later imagine my participants as the audience. Moon (2006) notes 
similar effects of the anticipated audience when reflecting on journal writing for oneself or 
for external examination. Hence, I can only decide if and how much to disclose once I have 
written my fieldnotes and made some initial analysis. 
Furthermore, the relationships I want to include in my study range from complete trust to 
bitter conflict and so a one-fits-all-approach will not work. I therefore need to take the 
specific context into account to conduct research ethically. 
Participant’s Interests: 
My business partners and employees have a right to privacy and self-determination. In 
most cases, I will be able to obscure their identity by using pseudonyms, changing 
identifying details, collapsing characters, fictionalising, etc. (Ellis, 2009; Tullis, 2013). In 
some cases, it is very difficult to obscure a person’s identity, e.g. those very close to me, 
such as my father, certain employees and intimate business partners. When it is impossible 
or impractical to obscure their identity, it is necessary to gain their informed consent and 
discuss in detail what I am going to write about them and let them read it beforehand. This 
might lead to parts of the writing being altered or another perspective added or left out (Ellis, 
2009). 
The choice seems to be either to reach consent or write them out of the fieldnotes but it 
is not that simple. People close to me might have difficulty objecting to my writing because 
of our relationship (Tolich, 2010). My father, for instance, wants me to be successful with 
my thesis; hence, he might find it hard to object to anything I write about him. In this case 
written consent might fail its intended purpose completely (Ellis, 2009). The situation is 
similar for some employees and business partners as they are not in an equal power position. 
They might expect disadvantages if they do not agree to consent. In these cases, I deliberately 
frame the story so that these people do not appear.  
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Informed consent might be interpreted in different ways. One might say that informing 
participants that research is underway is enough; others might call for complete disclosure 
of all collected and written material (Spicker, 2011). But complete disclosure is seldom 
possible, hence all research has some covert elements (Spicker, 2011). 
Furthermore, the concept of informed consent is highly questionable when – as in my 
case – dealing with people unfamiliar with social research methodology. Introducing and 
explaining my research is often followed by a question like “Auto-… what?” People around 
me simply do not know what ethnography is, let alone autoethnography. How then could 
they decide what implications my writings could have on them? Hence, in some cases, I 
cannot obscure the identity of a person and so I seek to frame the story so that they do not 
appear at all. Although this is an alteration of my experiences, this little ‘dishonesty’ is 
justified for the sake of participants’ protection (Ellis, 2009; Tullis, 2013). 
The guiding principle here is not to hurt the participants (Spicker, 2011; Tullis, 2013). I 
avoid hurting participants if I make them unidentifiable in my thesis. This means every 
reader, including the participants themselves. Reading an unfavourable or uncomfortable 
passage about oneself could cause a lot of unease or pain even if nobody other than the 
participant is able to identify them (Ellis, 2009). Richardson and Adams St. Pierre (2005, p. 
966) alert us by saying: "Writing stories sensitise us to the potential consequences of all of 
our writings by bringing home - inside our home and workplaces - the ethics of 
representation." 
Consequently, I need to be very careful when deciding what I will write. It requires 
constant reflective and thoughtful role-taking as a means to anticipate the impact of my text 
(Ellis, 2009). Therefore, Ellis (2009) emphasises that fieldnotes might be edited up until 
publication to safeguard participants, but also the researcher. As an ethnographer, I am able 
to take “a situated and pragmatic ethical decision” about the content of my writing 
(Richardson & Adams St. Pierre, 2005, p. 966).  
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For example, when I want to write about a participant who is easily identifiable and acts 
in a way that seems irrational or is difficult to explain, I should not publish this event even 
if the participant had given consent to publication in advance. However, the event might find 
access to my study in a fictionalised way to safeguard the participant’s anonymity. In this 
way, I can safeguard the participants’ well-being but use and interpret my experience. Hence, 
we now need to look at the researcher’s – the author’s – interests. 
Author’s Interest 
Here two of my roles interact. I am the business owner and researcher. As a business 
owner, I want my business relations to be not at all or only minimally negatively influenced 
by my research. However, I want to learn about my research topic as much as possible, since 
that will help me to cope with my daily business better. In this sense, autoethnography is 
action research for myself (Ellis, 2009). As a researcher, I want to stay as close as possible 
to the guideline of ethical practice in autoethnography (Tullis, 2013). 
This poses a dilemma for me. The guidelines urge me to gain informed consent (Ellis, 
2009; Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures, 2008; Tullis, 2013) 
which will inevitably influence my business relationships. 
I talked to some of my business partners about my research project and the reactions were 
in general positive. Most were sincerely interested in my research. We discussed their 
negotiation experiences and what role trust plays for them. However, they often asked what 
I will do when I finish my PhD and whether I plan to leave the business. I assured them that 
this is not my plan and that I aim to work as part-time lecturer or researcher. But still, these 
questions left them scrutinising the long-term prospect of our business relationship. Hence, 
my relationship with my employees could be harmed by disclosing my research agenda. 
It is similar to doing research in general. People often see the downsides. Researching, 
reading, writing, and thinking requires time. I cannot dedicate this amount of time to business 
purposes. However beneficial my new knowledge for my business might become, I need to 
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spend a lot of time and effort to acquire it beforehand. I need to take the necessary time from 
business projects. Hence, I may pay less attention to my custumers’ concerns. I often feel as 
if I run my business only by the notion of ‘good enough’ for the time being but not ‘good 
enough’ for the long term. 
Another concern is what will I be able to reveal by researching my business partners? I 
could think of situations when business partners are afraid of what the results of my research 
might be. They might suspect that I will manipulate them for my benefit and their 
disadvantage. I may counter that by full disclosure. When they understand how I make sense 
of my experience they might lose their fear. However, I still run the risk of being unable to 
convince them that their fear is unfounded.  
My employees are haunted by similar concerns. There was a rumour in my office about 
what happens once the PhD is finished. Some suspected that I may leave and close my 
company. This is a very bleak outlook for most employees. To counter such thinking is quite 
tricky and hard work. I need to engage in research and put a lot of effort into it but I also 
need to display a commitment to my business to convince my employees and partners of my 
sustained interest in maintaining it. 
Furthermore, some of my employees may feel somehow coerced into participating in my 
research. However, the benefits of this endeavour are predominantly mine – deeper 
knowledge, Ph.D., new career options etc. They may benefit from my knowledge when I put 
it into practice; however, that is quite far in the future. Compared to the risks (inherent in 
being a research subject and dependent employee) the possible benefits appear rather limited.  
Some of my business partners and most of my employees have not had the opportunity 
to enrol in a university or other higher education institution. Therefore, they will inevitably 
have a different perspective on research. Some might regard my research as merely a hobby 
- something for academics in their ivory towers but not for someone who has both feet on 
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the ground. In these cases, I need to be careful whether and how much of my research project 
I disclose. 
I need to draw the attention to the more personal interests for me. Writing 
autoethnographic work always requires self-disclosure. But to what extent do I want to 
disclose my emotions to others? How much vulnerability do I want to display? These are 
questions that cannot be answered upfront. It is part of the investigation to learn about 
emotions and vulnerabilities and only when the investigation proceeds can I begin to answer 
them. 
I want others to know what I felt in a particular situation, however, the situations and the 
feelings I want them to know about need to be thoughtfully selected. This cannot be done 
beforehand, since the very process of thinking through these situations, “figuring out what 
to do, how to live, and what [my] struggles mean”, and composing text about them is the 
research process of autoethnography (Ellis & Bochner, 2006, p. 111). Unless the meaning 
of an experience is investigated, I cannot make any decision about whether and how to write 
about it. For Ellis “[t]he turn to autoethnography in qualitative research is connected with a 
shift from viewing our observations of others as nonproblematic to a concern about power, 
praxis, and the writing process.” (Ellis, 2008, pp. 2-3) Therefore, Ellis (2009, p. 317) claims, 
when it is properly done, autoethnography is ‘ethical practice’ in itself. Her claim seems bold 
but awareness of the problems is a necessary step to take when attempting to research 
ethically.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I have briefly introduced ethnography in general and autoethnography in 
particular. I emphasised that autoethnography can contribute by drawing a local, personal, 
contextual, and subjective picture of the culture the researcher explores - in my case a view 
from a business owner in the German construction industry. 
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Although there is a growing interest in ethnographic research in the construction industry, 
autoethnography is lacking in construction management research. Autoethnographies are, to 
my knowledge, almost non-existent in construction management and can, therefore, provide 
a rich insider’s picture of the world of a business owner. My contribution may offer material 
for the thoughts of others in the industry (Grosse, 2016a, 2018). Trust research is dominated 
by quantitative research and there is a significant body of qualitative studies available, as 
well as some ethnographies. But autoethnographies explicitly dealing with trust are very 
rare. Hence, the view from the inside might provide some new perspectives on trust. 
I use the example of how I collect fieldnotes and how I interpret my experiences to make 
a case for an evocative autoethnography; an interpretation and use of autoethnography 
criticised by some and promoted by others. This insider’s view requires numerous decisions 
about what, how and about whom to write. Therefore, I sought to highlight some ethical 
considerations and questions regarding my autoethnographic research. My dual role as 
business owner and researcher contains supplementing and contradicting interests. To 
reconcile the interests of researcher, participants and business owner is a major task. For me, 
the dominant tension lies in trying not to hurt anybody but to be as honest and authentic 
within the fieldnotes I present. 
The subject and the focus of my research has major implications for my research practice. 
Hence, after each reiteration on the research focus, some sort of fine-tuning regarding the 
methodology is necessary. In the next chapter, I will explore conceptual issues of trust in 
more depth. I am especially interested in the question of to what extent rationality can explain 
trust between people. 
Some Final Reflections 
Throughout the writing of this chapter, I asked myself: Why am I writing this? Does the 
reader already know this? Of course, the reader knows. But there are different possible 
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understandings of autoethnography (Charmaz, 2006; Ellis & Bochner, 2000). Hence, it was 
important to me to make clear how I understand and apply autoethnography. I feel a tension 
between analytic and evocative autoethnography. I think I tend more to the evocative camp 
promoted by Bochner and Ellis (2016). However, at the same time, I feel an urge to analyse 
my experience and to make my work sound scientific. 
This tension will surface again in the third chapter when I explore Lévinas’ thought. There 
are parallels between analytic/evocative and Lévinas’ notion of rational/pre-rational. I think 
the power of Ellis’ stories and the way she makes readers feel and empathise is strongly 
related to the pre-rational or non-rational part of our selves. However, both the rational and 
non-rational always come together – as I will show when dealing with Lévinas’ thought. 
Hence, we cannot separate analytical and evocative ethnography completely. 
Autoethnographies move along a continuum between both forms (Grosse, 2018) and one is 
well-advised to refrain from emphasising one over the other since there is no single right 
way to do autoethnography. (Anderson & Glass-Coffin, 2013).  
The earlier hints to Lévinas were minor but are developed in the next chapter about the 
rational and non-rational elements of trust and fully explored when I look at Lévinas’ 
thinking. Edward Trezise made me aware of how Derrida (1967, p. 398) saw Lévinas’ 
thought: as “the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, always, of the 
same wave against the same shore, in which, however, as each return recapitulates itself, it 
also infinitely renews and enriches itself.” Through our conversations I adopted the metaphor 
of the wave; sometimes the waves are small and calm and at other times they are huge and 
powerful and hit the shore with noise and power, but they always trickle through the little 
stones and get everywhere.  
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III. Trust 
In this section I give a brief overview of how I conceptualise trust. I emphasise the fact 
that trust only occurs in the absence of complete knowledge and therefore always involves 
some form of risk or uncertainty. The incompleteness of our knowledge about the person we 
trust leads me to question whether trust can solely be explained in terms of knowledge, 
reason, and ontology. 
However, one must be cautious when searching for clarification of a concept in 
ethnographic research. Although, the researcher should have some knowledge of the 
research field and some problems in mind (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), to interpret the 
meaning of ‘trust’ too narrowly may inhibit me from seeing the wider picture. This can result 
in a sort of tunnel vision, i.e. only seeing what I am expecting to see. Although, too broad a 
view also has its dangers. It is essential to observe my experiences in a focused manner to 
develop a sense of significance (Emerson et al., 2011). Hence, I go on to outline how I use 
the term trust. This interpretation should give this work some direction. However, I leave it 
open to later revision and refinement. 
First, I explore the everyday usage of ‘trust’ and then I look into the treatment of trust and 
its related concepts in philosophy. Subsequently, I draw on other human science disciplines 
such as sociology, law and management since trust is a concept used across a wide range of 
disciplines. This view is supported by the Journal of Trust Research as it defines itself as “an 
inter-disciplinary and cross-cultural journal”. Therefore, I think, my interdisciplinary 
approach to conceptualising trust is justified. 
I go on to look at the different viewpoints on a trust relationship from the trustors, the 
trusted and the third party to the relationship between trustor and trusted. I look for the roots 
of the risk involved in a trust relationship. Here, I emphasise the role of control over and 
knowledge of the Other. Our limited knowledge of the Other – of the trusted – inevitably 
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requires us to trust and demonstrates the limits of rationality in trust relationships. It is the 
failure of rationality to explain trust that led me to explore Lévinas’ thought.  
What does it mean ‘to trust’? 
 “Trust is as elusive in philosophy as it can be in practice.”(Bailey, 2006, p. 1) 
The question, ‘What does it mean ‘to trust’?’ might take a lifetime to answer. However, 
I seek to shed some light on it. In our daily lives, we hear the word ‘trust’ or ‘to trust’ quite 
often. We discuss whether to trust the government, our public services, certain brands or 
companies, people close to us, or a stranger on the street. Here, I would like to focus on 
interpersonal trust. What do we actually mean when we say ‘I trust this person’? Sometimes 
even scholars (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) – use the term ‘trust’ when they mean something else. 
Often trust is not clearly distinguished from related concepts (e.g., reliance) and from its 
reasons (knowledge, familiarity, routine) and consequences (e.g., cooperation) (Rousseau et 
al., 1998). The meaning of trust can also depend on what the trusted is entrusted with. 
Sometimes it is only one limited task, and on others a close friend is trusted with almost 
everything. But it is also important to distinguish between general trust in people and society 
(e.g. people on the street), in more specific groups (e.g. colleagues) and in one particular 
person (Pettit, 1995). I concentrate on trust as it is used in the sense of an expectation of 
another person. 
Dictionaries list  the origins or ‘trust’ and related words (Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, 
2016a; Oxford Dictionaries, 2016a). ‘Trust’ is akin to the Old Norse word traust which 
shows some similarities to its German translation ‘Vertrauen’ (noun) and ‘vertrauen’ or 
‘trauen’ (verb). According to Merriam-Webster trust is “akin to Old English trēowe faithful.” 
This leads us to the common theme of defining trust as a belief. The noun ‘trust’ is defined 
in the Oxford dictionary as follows: 
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“Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something:” 
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2016a) 
I deal with ‘trust’ regarding human relationships as this work is not concerned with ‘trust’ 
as a form of legalistic construction to manage equities, which is also mentioned in the 
dictionary. 
Merriam-Webster’s definition of the noun shows great similarity: 
“belief that someone or something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc.” 
(Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, 2016a) 
Merriam-Webster says ‘to trust’ is: 
: to believe that someone or something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc. 
: to have confidence in (someone or something) 
: to believe that something is true or correct 
: to hope or expect that something is true or will happen 
(Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, 2016a) 
The Oxford Dictionary uses different words, but the overall definition is very similar. 
1. Believe in the reliability, truth, or ability of: 
1.1 (trust someone with) Allow someone to have, use, or look after (someone or 
something of importance or value) with confidence:  
1.2 (trust someone/thing to) Commit someone or something to the safekeeping of: 
1.3 [with clause] Have confidence; hope (used as a polite formula in conversation): 
1.4 [no object] Have faith or confidence: 
1.5 [no object] (trust to) Place reliance on (luck, fate, or chance): 
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(Oxford Dictionaries, 2016a) 
What we find in all the definitions is the notion of belief, confidence or hope. This belief, 
confidence or hope in the truthfulness, honesty, or goodness of the other, the trusted. Trust 
in our common language use always shows some ambiguity; something we do not know for 
certain, but we hope, expect or believe will happen. We say we trust other people to care for 
our plants while we are on vacation, we trust in the network operator to provide a stable 
network connection, and we trust our cars not to break while we are driving. Hence, trust 
always involves some insecurity or risk. And the trust is directed towards the Other’s 
reliability, truthfulness, and ability. Although, it is not uncommon to use trust in relation to 
physical objects, for instance, machines or vehicles, I would limit trust’s use to human 
individuals or groups. Using the word trust in relation to physical objects is somewhat 
misleading, since these objects are, of course, very distinct from human beings. 
As we have seen above, trust is a belief that involves risk. It is directed towards actions 
of the trusted. The expected actions of the other leads us to some precondition as they are 
the ability to fulfil, honesty in account, goodwill and responsibility. In particular, through 
honesty and goodwill, the trusted can betray the trusting party. This opens the way to 
distinguish trust from related concepts. The ability to betray is the feature missing in physical 
objects that do not allow us to call our belief in their functioning genuine trust. 
The common use of language, e.g. reflected in dictionary definitions, allows for the use 
of ‘trust’ in relation to physical objects and I will return to our relationship to physical objects 
when dealing with the act of betrayal. However, in this study, when I talk about ‘trust’ or ‘to 
trust’ I speak solely about personal relations. To me, to trust is distinct from the actions I 
may make based on the belief or expectation involved. 
Peeling the Onion 
The following incident contains a lot of features of interpersonal trust. 
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During Vacation 
Late last year a client for whom we worked a couple of times called me 
and asked whether I could come to his house in the upcoming days. We met 
there, and he showed me what he was planning to build and which part of 
the work we should do. He asked me to estimate the cost and to send him an 
offer. After a few days, I sent him my price and listed what I was planning to 
do. But then we did not hear from each other for months. 
In August he called me and told me that he was going on vacation with 
his family for two weeks and asked whether we could do the job during that 
time. He said he would leave the keys to his house in a sealed envelope with 
his assistant. We should pick the keys up there and finish the work during his 
holidays. He added, “Please, don’t leave the keys with my staff. I don’t want 
them to have access to my private home.” 
Annette Baier (1986) wrote that to trust means to hand over discretionary power over 
things that are valued. Looking at this example, I would argue, that this client trusted my 
employees and me. He gave my employees control over his home which I suspect had some 
value for him. He believed that my staff and I would take care of his belongings. I or any of 
my workers could have easily damaged or even stolen his belongings. Without being able to 
control us fully he put himself, or at least his house, at risk. 
He did so because he expected my staff to do the work properly and to take care of his 
and his family’s house – in other words, he expected us not to abuse our powers (Baier, 
1986). He seemed to confidently believe that we would act in his best interest. The notion 
of confidence in expectations and the acceptance of vulnerability to the action of the trusted 
are shared across a variety of disciplines (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, the action he took (giving us the keys) based on his trust, made it possible 
for us to do the work in the most convenient way for him – when he and his family were on 
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vacation. So, they did not have to suffer the noise and dirt that far too often comes with 
construction work. Hence, his trust made things possible that could not be reached without 
it – trust unleashed a creative power (Barbalet, 2009). 
Trust, Control and Reliance 
The client in this example could not control us when he was away on vacation. 
Furthermore, he had no one else to control us. This resonates with O’Neill’s (2002a) 
statement: “At some point, we just have to trust.” Even if we have a long chain of guards 
and guards’ guards at the end of this chain, we have to trust a person – a person with 
discretionary power over our things of value. So, trust means that the person trusting is not 
in full control. There is always the possibility for the trusted of not fulfilling the expectation. 
This is not only the case when I trust a person or group of people but also when I say, ‘I 
trust the computer to work”. Annette Baier (1986) distinguishes between trust and reliance. 
I can completely rely on a computer or any other technical device. She argues that it is 
difficult to trust a computer, since the computer does not make decisions on its own and so 
is not capable of betrayal. It might stop reacting to my ever more frequent and desperate 
mouse clicks and keyboard hits, but it is not the computer’s own decision not to react, rather 
a defect within the hardware or software. Although I must admit it sometimes looks to me 
as if the computer is tricking me deliberately, my engineering knowledge tells me it is not 
the case. This machine has no bad intentions, but neither does it have good intentions. 
I rely on the computer to function but I do not hand it discretionary power. Therefore, it 
is not in the position to betray me (Baier, 1986). I may have expected the computer to work 
properly, but there is no room for personal disappointment or feeling of betrayal. To 
Peperzak (2013, p. 42) applied “force or constraint reduces the other person to an instrument, 
a machine, or will-less property.” The trusted must be in the position to “responsibly accept 
my request.” (Peperzak, 2013, p. 42) It is the freedom of the trusted that distinguishes trust 
from other concepts. It is the other’s freedom to accept the responsibility for the task I entrust 
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him or her with and the freedom to choose how to fulfil the given task; these two freedoms 
are unique to a trust relationship. If the other has no choice whether or how to fulfil the task, 
the other is just controlled and not trusted by me. When I control the other, there is no need 
to believe in their goodwill and it is does not matter whether I trust them.  
In the example above, the client believed in our goodwill. Any abuse of our power would 
have resulted in deep disappointment on his side. He would have felt betrayed because we 
made him believe that we would take care of his house and his belongings. 
Trust in a technical device or more generally in a physical object is quite often directed 
to the person or group of people or organisation behind it. I may say that I trust the food to 
be good in a certain restaurant, but I actually trust the chef to cook something delicious and 
the rest of the staff to do a proper job. I cannot trust the food itself. The same is true for my 
beloved VW. I trust the carmaker to build reliable cars – although not as eco-friendly as they 
previously promised – and my mechanic to maintain the car properly. Hence, my trust is not 
in the car but the people behind it. The car is metaphorically the vehicle for my trust. 
My car is a good example as I do not personally know anybody at the plant in Mexico 
where it was made and yet I trust them. Hence, trust is also possible without the trusted 
knowing that another trusts her. To Peperzak (2013) it is essential that the trusted is not 
forced to act in certain ways but acts “out of her own responsibility.” (2013, p. 34) So trusting 
can be one-sided – without another knowing about nor reciprocating my trust (Peperzak, 
2013). I do not need anybody in the VW company to trust me. Therefore, as well as being 
betrayed personally by the trusted, she can also unknowingly disappoint me. 
In my example above, I knew about the trust the client put in me, but this is not necessary. 
I do not need to know that the other trusts me to make the other’s trust possible. It is the 
possibility of betrayal that makes the trust possible. This possibility manifests itself not only 
in the personal relationship but also in whether I act responsibly or not. It is my own 
responsibility to drive carefully and to respect traffic lights, irrespective of whether I am 
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aware that others act on trusting in my responsible behaviour. I can only assume that they 
do so. It is the same with the VW plant workers in Mexico. They do not know me but they 
know that there are a lot of Golf drivers trusting them. 
To people with some discretionary powers, the ability to betray (Baier, 1986) or 
disappoint is unique. Like machines, people without such powers are unable to betray or 
disappoint someone. If I can fully control a person with a task, this person cannot betray me 
as they would not hold any discretionary power. Controlled by me, this person would just 
fulfil the tasks given to them. I would reduce this person to being no more than a tool for 
me, but not one that I need to trust. In this case I merely rely on this person (Bailey, 2006). 
But there is never complete control or guarantee. “[T]rust is needed precisely because all 
guarantees are incomplete.” (O'Neill, 2002a) We cannot actually control each and 
everything. “[…] So, trust cannot presuppose or require a watertight guarantee of others' 
performance and cannot rationally be withheld just because we lack guarantees. Where we 
have guarantees or proofs, we don't need to trust” (O'Neill, 2002a). Hence, I have to hand 
over some power over things I value to another trusted person. This person has the freedom 
to act in ways I regard as positive or negative but I expect them to act benevolently to me 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) - to be good-willing (Baier, 1986). Therefore, I use the 
expression ‘to act on trust’ for handing over power over things I value with the expectation 
of the other person to act in my best interest. 
To expect a person to act in my best interest, I need to be convinced or at least confidently 
believe that they have the necessary abilities to fulfil the task. Hence, my acting on trust is 
always particular and seldom general. For instance, I go to my dentist so that he does the 
right things to keep my teeth healthy. However, I will not consult him about any problem 
regarding my laptop. This example is rather crude but observing myself, I apply fine-grained 
distinctions between what I entrust to a particular person in particular circumstances. 
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In the example above, the client entrusted us only with the keys to his house to do the 
work he ordered us to do and not to take care of more general things (Baier, 1986). Through 
our repeated interaction he came to understand what kind of jobs we could accomplish and 
what kind of jobs he had better not place with us. Hence, he formed some understanding of 
our abilities as a company but also of me in particular as person. He sought to understand 
what kind of person I am. 
Benefits and Risks of Trust 
“But a complete absence of trust would prevent him even from getting up in the 
morning.” (Luhmann, 1973; 1975, p. 3) 
If we think about the various situations in which we trust one another, we may wonder 
whether there are instances of social life that would be possible without trust. I struggle to 
find one. Interacting with any other person we need at least a minimal level of trust – 
otherwise, we must fear getting violently attacked. But we still go out in the street, meet 
other people and engage in social life. As Luhmann says – we get up in the morning. Without 
trust, social life would be rendered impossible. The ability to engage in social action is 
perhaps the most basic benefit of trust.  
Aurelius (1992) makes a similar argument when claiming that humans are made to 
cooperate. However, introducing Theory X and Theory Y, McGregor and Cutcher-
Gershenfeld (2006) demonstrate that some run their businesses on the assumption that 
people are lazy and need to be incentivised if not coerced to work. Yet, they too believe that 
cooperation is the better way to run a business.  
The form of trust Luhmann, Aurelius, and McGregor refer to is directed towards a general 
pattern of social behaviour rather than the observance of routines. When we pick up our 
coffee in the coffee shop, we rarely assess thoroughly whether the barista is trustworthy or 
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not. We assume her to be trustworthy out of some routine (Möllering, 2006). Checking each 
person we interact with would make our lives far too complicated – we could not cope with 
this amount of investigation (Luhmann, 1973; 1975). Basic interactions, such as buying 
food, crossing the street or doing our daily job, would not be possible without minimal trust. 
This is the sort of trust in which others are rarely aware of being trusted. As the trusting 
person I assume that you as trusted fulfil your responsibility. If the trusted does not do so, I 
feel betrayed. 
The recent food scandals (e.g. the horse meat scandal that made the news in 2013) remind 
us how little we question our routines but also how vulnerable we are to misconduct. Perhaps 
our assumption that everybody does their job properly is so deeply rooted that we take it 
almost as a matter of fact, regarding the risk as being close to non-existent. When such a 
deep-rooted assumption starts to falter through such scandals, we realise how much we trust, 
how little we control and how dependent our daily life is on trust.  
But these everyday interactions are only one aspect of the benefits of trust. When we look 
at more specific interaction trust has to offer a lot. When we leave our kids with the babysitter 
to go to a concert or have dinner out, it is not a routine action that touches the very basis of 
our social life. We would be able to survive without the help of a babysitter, but we enrich 
our life by handing over the care of our kids for a few hours to them. In fact, this piece of 
writing would not have been written without the help of babysitters caring for our two 
children. 
But in trusting, I hand over the responsibility for a task to another person. I count on this 
person to accomplish the task through their own responsibility (Peperzak, 2013).  
In a sense, I leave you alone with that task, which, as yours is somehow an 
extension or replacement of my own task. You have become an extension of me, and 
I am with you as long as you are working on the task.” (Peperzak, 2013, p. 34)  
 Trust 59 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
Our babysitter is then the replacement of my partner and me for the time we cannot care 
for the children. It is similar in the example of the client from the beginning of this chapter. 
Since he gave us access to his house when he and his family were away on vacation, the 
family did not have to suffer from noise and dust and any other inconvenience. Of course, 
he could have stayed at home and controlled us the whole time we were working on his 
house, but the family benefitted enormously from trusting us and, as a consequence, they 
were able to go on vacation. Hence, trust makes things possible which were impossible 
without it. 
On a slightly different level, trust is very important in a society of divided labour. For 
example, I cannot fix my car. If a tyre of my car is broken, I do not need to go to the garage 
immediately but when it comes to more complicated jobs I need the help of others. And in 
many instances, I cannot sufficiently control whether or not the job is done right. To drive 
my car, I need to trust the mechanic in my garage. Lacking the specialised skills to 
accomplish a job or task is very wide-spread in our lives from sophisticated medical care to 
preparing a bouquet of flowers. 
It is difficult to distinguish between the basic interactions which are necessary to lead our 
lives and the instances where our trust just enriches our lives. I need the car to do my job. 
Without a car, running my business would be hardly possible. Hence, I have no choice but 
to trust others or just hope that they abide by traffic regulation to the extent that they do not 
threaten my life or health.  
However, according to Luhmann, to call my action trusting I need to be in the position to 
choose. “Trust is only involved when the trusting expectation makes a difference to a 
decision; otherwise what we have is simply hope.” (Luhmann, 1973; 1975, p. 24). To him, 
trust requires one who acts on trust – to hand over discretionary powers - and another who 
can more or less freely choose one course of action over another – using these discretionary 
powers. Hence, trust presupposes freedom in both parties. But I am often not in the position 
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to choose to trust or not. I just could not live without trusting. Therefore, I think this 
distinction between hope and trust is problematic since whether I have a choice to participate 
in traffic depends on your point of view. In some situations, I might be able to refrain from 
driving, but not in all situations. I may have a choice in any one situation but if I always 
chose not to drive it would make it impossible to do my job.  
Hence, if as Luhmann (1973; 1975) argues, I need to trust to get out of bed in the morning, 
it is difficult to say I have a choice - I have to get up to live. Therefore, there is no choice 
but to trust. Luhmann’s distinction between trust and hope is, therefore, difficult to maintain. 
Consequently, I would rather say trust involves hope in the form of a belief in the trusted 
person. I hope others will act in ways beneficial to me. 
In a later work, Luhmann (1988) distinguishes between trust and confidence. For him, 
confidence relates to situations of impending danger where the actor is confident that the 
expected outcome will be realised. But the actor in these situations does not have a choice 
to act differently. To Luhmann, trust, requires an active choice by the actor and therefore 
leads to risk-taking. The trustor can avoid risk by choosing another action (Luhmann, 1988). 
I think that it is very difficult to imagine situations where the actor has no choice. In other 
words, one must “refrain from action [to] run no risk.”(Luhmann, 1988, p. 100) But inaction 
can be considered as action too and “inaction is often risky.” (Giddens, 1990, p. 32) For 
instance, not seeing the doctor might be far riskier than actually going to the clinic. Hence, 
I believe it is more helpful to consider trust as “a particular type of confidence” – trust is 
having confidence in the other – as to distinguish both from one another (Giddens, 1990, p. 
32). 
Since we have no choice but to trust, we need to look at its downsides. Through 
cooperation, both parties can realise mutual benefits, but it can be more beneficial to one 
party just to exploit the other’s trusting attempt to cooperate.  
This is shown in the following example: 
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Delays 
What had happened? I had several meetings with a client and the project 
manager that were marked by ongoing conflict. The building process was 
three weeks behind schedule because some drawings were delivered late and 
others were still not done. In one of these meetings, which was exceptionally 
cooperative, we agreed on some changes to the design in order to meet the 
approaching deadlines. Our work went on, and we met the deadlines. 
However, in a later meeting, both the architect and the client blamed me for 
not delivering the quality originally agreed upon. I reminded them that we 
had deliberately altered the design in the above-mentioned meeting, and 
hence the quality, in order to finish the work on time. Now, I learned that the 
whole responsibility had been shifted to me with no acknowledgement of the 
fact that this had all transpired following the architect’s delay in delivering 
the drawings on time. This was ultimately his responsibility and not mine. 
(Grosse, 2015a, p. 3) 
In this example trust first makes betrayal possible. We need to be aware of the possibility 
that others act opportunistically for a variety of reasons. They may actually betray us. We 
start a cooperative effort, but they might just exploit their favourable position and ultimately 
exploit us. 
But risk-taking is an inevitable part of our lives; often these risks result from some form 
of trust in more general terms – as participating in traffic – or in more particular situations – 
as signing a certain contract. Without taking these risks and without trusting we would be 
paralysed. An absence of trust “reduces the range of possibilities for rational action.” 
(Luhmann, 1988, p. 104) But that does not mean that to act on trust is always the right choice.  
We may feel betrayed when another person acts other than how we expected. But that 
alone is not sufficient for feeling betrayed. I need to consider the non-fulfilment of my 
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expectation as an act of moral misconduct. It needs this moral dimension. I must feel morally 
justified to hold my expectation, and I must regard the action of the other as morally 
unjustified. In the example above, I did not see any reason for what I considered their 
opportunistic behaviour other than morally inferior selfishness. But that is my take on the 
events and very likely not theirs. They probably felt justified to act in the way they did. 
But in another situation, when I am able to step into another’s shoes and see why she 
acted in the way she did, I might come to the conclusion that I may have acted in the same 
way and it becomes difficult for me to regard her behaviour as a breach of trust. If I still 
think it is a breach, I may be able to forgive it since in her situation I would have acted in 
the same way.  
We may be wrong acting on our trust in others not only because they deliberately try to 
betray us, but also because they might not be in the position to fulfil the task as I expected. 
At the same time, I may be wrong to regard their actions as breach of trust as they might 
have acted in my best interest, but I am unable to see it. Hence, we need to look closer at the 
reasons why I am trusting. 
Trust is an ingredient for cooperation, but this is not always an entirely good thing. 
Cooperation might serve unfavourable ends (Gambetta, 1988). For instance, if two of my 
contractual partners trust each other and decide to cooperate with each other to trick and 
betray me, I would not appreciate their cooperation, as in the case above, where I understood 
their cooperation was aimed at exploiting me. Taking a societal standpoint, we may not 
appreciate seeing a group of criminals trust each other and so be able to jointly organise and 
commit crimes (Gambetta, 1988). But the concerns regarding wider society are not the scope 
of my study. 
Reasons to Trust 
When acting trustingly, one makes some sort of risk assessment. Risk understood as 
“weak inductive knowledge” is “virtually always” balanced against trusting (Giddens, 1990, 
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p. 35). Hence in this sense, our knowledge determines whether or not we act on trust. We 
address the likelihood of certain outcomes of our action according to the perceived strength 
of our knowledge of the person we are about to trust and the particular situation. In other 
words, we weigh how likely and beneficial one course of action is against another course of 
action or inaction. Therefore, I will explore which role knowledge play in relation to trust. 
There are instances in which we trust without any consideration, such as when we assume 
the coffee in a coffee shop to be safe. We take it for granted that many things are the way 
we expect them to be. We do this although we have no specific knowledge about the coffee 
shop or perhaps coffee shops in general. We believe the likelihood of any harm to us is very, 
very low and we are frequently proven right. If there were substantial threats involved 
someone would notice and alert us. It would be a catastrophe if a restaurant was found to be 
serving out of date and therefore poisonous food. The restaurant would lose its reputation 
and subsequently customer’s trust. Customers would no longer rely on the assumption that 
almost all restaurants sell not necessarily tasty but at least not poisonous food.  
This assumption is also a routine, and we trust by routines (Möllering, 2006). Our 
previous experiences make us believe that others – groups or individuals– act as we have 
experienced before. We do not assess whether they have particular reason to do so but 
assume that they will follow a standard pattern of action. 
The lines are blurred between these two reasons to act on trust. It is difficult to determine 
whether a repeated interaction with a certain person or group led us to routinely trust them 
in any new interaction or whether we just assumed the risk to be very low from the outset. 
Furthermore, I struggle to distinguish whether I routinely trust the French fries to be good 
because I often visit different restaurants of the same fast food chain or whether my trust is 
guided just by a thoughtless assumption that this particular restaurant run by a particular 
franchise taker will satisfy my expectations. 
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These chain restaurants create some form of familiarity. They look similar, offer the same 
food in the same way and it costs almost the same all over the country. I know from previous 
visits how the food tastes and that it has been okay so far. Out of my familiarity, I place my 
trust in any restaurant in this chain which creates this sense of familiarity (Luhmann, 1988).  
But when we are given evidence to believe otherwise, we withdraw our trust; we do not 
stick to our initial belief. By default, we believe in the proper conduct of the restaurant staff 
but one incident of bad food might make us suspicious of even very careful restaurants. 
When the food smells bad, we will send it back. If a pedestrian gets the green light to cross 
the street this person may not run into a speeding car. If there are signs to doubt our 
assumptions, we seldom hesitate to reject them. 
This sense of familiarity also applies to my business partners. There are some partners I 
just interact with on the basis of previous experience. I do not doubt whether they are able 
and willing to do what I am asking them for but just believe they would do what we agree 
on. But this applies only to standard tasks. When I order the usual amount and type of 
concrete to a building site, I do not spent much thought about it. But if I want some special 
concrete then I may spend some more time investigating whether the supplier could deliver 
in this circumstance. I seek to gain more knowledge about the person I am going to interact 
with and investigate further into this person’s abilities. In the end, I want to know what kind 
of person I am dealing with. 
Understanding the Other 
Although what the other actually says is an important part of our relationship, when I talk 
about ‘understanding the other’ it is not about literally understanding the words the other is 
uttering; I am talking about the other as a person. I try to answer questions as to what kind 
of abilities this person has, how he thinks, what his values are and on what points we differ. 
It is seeking to know the other holistically.  
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To illustrate the processes that happened during this investigation, I draw from some 
fieldnotes presented at the ACROM conference in Lincoln [see ‘Appendix C – Trust and 
Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b)’ p. 302] 
The Engineer I 
We made major alterations on a residential, mid-19th-century building. 
The house was owned by a family. The architect had close connections to 
that family. He negotiated our contract on the family’s behalf and also 
commissioned the other contractors, including the engineering firm. One of 
the goals in renovating the building was to enhance the load capacity of the 
foundation. The project engineer suggested deepening the foundations 
through the designated underpinnings. I thought a sole plate would suffice, 
at only a fraction of the cost. When I got the design from the civil engineer, I 
told the architect in charge of the project that I had a cheaper solution in 
mind and asked if I should propose it to the engineer. He supported my 
proposal. 
[…] 
I called the engineer briefly and explained my proposal. We agreed to 
meet at the building site. We started analysing the situation, and he explained 
to me how he arrived at his proposed solution. I tried to explain my approach 
to solving the underlying geotechnical problem. During the negotiation, I 
explained my proposal in detail it to him and suggested a design and what 
the construction details should look like. Simply put, he wanted to make the 
foundation deeper, and I wanted to make it wider. Both solutions would lead 
to increased load capacity. We discussed the pros and cons of both solutions. 
At some point, I struggled to explain my proposal sufficiently so that the 
engineer could understand it. However, we agreed to incorporate my 
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proposal into the design. After some days of reflection and work, he 
arrived at nearly the same solution that I had. (Grosse, 2015b, pp. 1283-
1284) 
The fieldnote suggests that this was merely a technical discussion but that is only part of 
the story. I could have made and sent drawings and sufficient explanations of my solution to 
the engineer, but I knew it would not have worked. He may have found some objections to 
it or perhaps my drawing and explanations would not have been as clear as I thought. And I 
knew I could make my point far better when I met him in person. 
By meeting him, I could find out what kind of person he was and could adapt to his 
reaction. If one strategy of convincing him about my proposal would not work, I could easily 
switch to another. For this purpose, the personal exchange is far more flexible. 
On reflection, I can identify another dimension; I consciously or subconsciously wanted 
to learn more about the person I was going to deal with during the next couple of months. It 
is one thing to learn about a person via email and telephone, but it is quite distinct from 
meeting in person. This personal meeting opened a number of communication channels not 
available through the telephone or via email. 
During the meeting, we talked about the technical solution. But our conversation drifted 
away from that to cover topics as our experience as students in engineering and what we do 
in our spare time. For me, these talks about other topics than some specific technical solution 
provide the material from which I begin to form a picture of that person. I learn through 
these discussions about how others think, what kind of values they hold, and what is 
important to them. 
When I seek to understand the Other, I seek to gather as much information about him as 
possible. The gathered information helps me to assess his abilities, and so provides a 
rationale for trusting him. It often starts with the simple question of whether he is able and 
willing to do what I expect him to do. Thinking about my ‘assessment’ I begin to doubt 
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whether it is about trust. This understanding and knowing the Other is a knowing to dominate 
and control the Other but not knowing for the Other’s sake (Said, 2003). Hence this knowing 
is not related to trust but to control. 
Trust and Reflexivity 
However, this simple assessment of whether the person is able and willing is often of 
limited use. One has to dig deeper. We have to understand in what kind of constraints and 
dependencies the Other we ought to trust finds himself. This was brought home to me after 
the second meeting with the engineer and now also his boss [see ‘Appendix C – Trust and 
Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b)’ p. 302]. 
The Engineer II 
Later, when the construction process progressed, I had another 
negotiation about a possible technical solution for a special detail at this 
building site. This time, his boss was also present. We talked, sketched, 
calculated, and discussed for nearly two hours how to reinforce an old 
structure. The discussion unfolded around how it should be in theory and 
what is possible to apply in practice. However, this time the discussion was 
predominantly between his boss and me – the junior engineer was almost 
sidelined. 
The two engineers defended what the solution should ideally be, whereas 
I emphasised that their ‘ideal’ solution would cause more (collateral) 
damage than benefits. In the end, we agreed on a solution somewhere in the 
middle. However, what the engineer later designed and circulated differed 
significantly from what I perceived as the outcome of our meeting. At first 
sight, I thought, 'That's not what we came up with! I did not agree to this 
solution - not at all. How could he claim that this is the outcome of our 
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discussion?’ I felt betrayed. In my eyes, he was now lying about our 
meeting. Furthermore, I regarded this solution as a bad one. 
Apart from my emotional reaction, I considered my judgement in trust 
to be misguided. At first, I did not understand what had happened. I was 
tempted to call him and let off steam. But I did not do this, because I knew 
that that usually just makes such a situation worse. […] 
Only the next day - in a calmer mood - I understood that he might have 
been under pressure by his boss - who may have favoured the proposal he 
presented. (Grosse, 2015b, pp. 1285-1286) 
I miss an important point if I regard the main aim of the meeting as convincing the Other 
about my proposal, as I did in the first meeting. It is far more important to learn about the 
Other. Who is he and how does he think? I began to explore this in the first meeting but in 
the second meeting I learned that the engineer acted in his own environment of which I am 
only a tiny part. His boss played a far bigger role than I did. He is the one who hired him and 
paid his salary (Grosse, 2015b). 
To better understand the engineer’s trustworthiness, I needed to understand his situation 
and see the world from his perspective (Pillow, 2003). It is very much a reflexive assessment 
of the Other's world. In the process of understanding the Other, I need to adopt the Other’s 
perspective on the world. I need to understand the constraints, the history, the options, and 
opportunities of the Other. Taking the Other’s perspective enabled me to see what he was 
able to deliver and more importantly what not. This puts me in a better position to judge 
whether or not to trust and with what to trust this person (Grosse, 2015b). 
This also opens the way for me to change my action. I can seek to see myself through the 
Other’s eyes. “Turning in upon ourselves as researchers makes us look subjectively and 
reflexively at how we are positioned.” (Chiseri-Strater, 1996, p. 119) The same is true for 
me as an investigator seeking to understand the engineer. I began to see how my assumptions 
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about power and my own position, freedom to act and make decisions influenced my 
understanding of the engineer. Taking his view offers a distinct perspective on my actions 
and the consequences of these actions. (Grosse, 2015b) 
But I act in a limitless complex social environment. I only need to take a look around my 
professional environment to see the constraints I face. I have to consider my members of 
staff, clients, suppliers, architects and engineers, public servants, to name only a few. It is 
impossible to gather complete information about the trustworthiness of another person 
(Möllering, 2006). 
In this complex social environment I can see that all the people around me have certain 
expectations of me – how I should act, how I should behave, how I should communicate etc. 
I might manage to reconcile some of these expectations, however, some of them are 
conflicting to the point that I can only fulfil one for the price of not fulfilling another. 
When another person decides not to meet another’s expectation, I may perceive it as a 
breach of trust. However, I could have anticipated it by investigating the other person’s 
context more thoroughly (Grosse, 2015b). Hence, it has to do with both understanding the 
other person and their context. The very question of whether we trust somebody 
appropriately might be answered by a reflexive approach to our assessments (Grosse, 
2015b).  
However, the assessment is never going to be perfect since I am unable to perceive 
everything and moreover I am incapable of understanding everything that goes on around 
me (Berlin, 2013). The world is simply too complex for me to comprehend it fully. To 
Luhmann (1973; 1975, p. 20) “[t]he complexity of the future world is reduced by the act of 
trust.” 
I may fail in my assessment of the Other, whether she or he has the necessary abilities, 
skills resources, and the very freedom to act as I trust the Other. Often, I trust others to do 
things I cannot do – I am in principle able to do these things but not at that moment, or I am 
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not able to do them (e.g. fix the engine of my beloved VW Golf). In the latter case, my 
assessment becomes even more problematic because I may be unable to judge whether the 
Other did a good job or not. My physician, my lawyer, the engineer from the example above, 
my bricklayers – all do things I cannot do. They have the specialist knowledge I rely on and 
therefore they have a special idea of what is in my best interest. I cannot say whether they 
are right or wrong.  
When I trust you, I am convinced that you act in my best interest. But who knows what 
is in my best interest? How can you know what is in my best interest and do I actually know 
what that is? I do not believe that I always know what is best for me. So, I can entrust you 
with a particular task or just a single action you should perform on my behalf. But I can also 
hand over some extensive discretionary powers to you to let you decide which course of 
action you take and decide about the possible outcomes. In the end, in a more or less broad 
range of options, I assume you know better what is best for me. 
For example, I am often a bit hungry in the afternoons and I may ask you to get me a 
chocolate bar and a coffee. You could do exactly what I told you and satisfy my wish or you 
could come back with an apple, a banana and a bottle of water. I could not really argue that 
you were not acting in my best interest. Fruit and water are far healthier than chocolate and 
coffee. I could, however, argue that you went too far and your decision exceeded the powers 
I had given to you. To make this thought even clearer, consider a situation where a smoker 
asks a friend to get him a pack of cigarettes, but the friend turns up with some chewing gum 
accompanied by the message that chewing is better for his health than smoking. I have got a 
vivid picture of the argument that might unfold between the two afterwards. Yet, the friend 
could rightly claim to have acted in the smoker’s best interest by not buying cigarettes.  
When we trust, we hand over powers to act on our behalf and the range in which the 
action of the trusted varies can be quite broad. It might be that I just want another person to 
get me the chocolate bar I am longing for. But, in another case I hope that the Other decides 
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on my behalf about issues about which I do not know enough, and I am not able or willing 
to decide for myself. In other words, I believe that this person knows better what is best for 
me. My physician is perhaps one of the best examples of this. 
And yet there are cases in which I think I know what is best for me and the Other might 
be equally convinced to know better than I do what is best for me. This shows that the 
trusting party does not exactly know what she or he can expect from the trusted, but at the 
same time the trusted lives with the insecurity of whether the way she or he deals on behalf 
of the trustor is what the trusting precisely expected. So, both the trustor and the trusted need 
to deal with incomplete knowledge about the trust relation. This lack of knowledge is, again, 
a condition for trust to occur but also a source of possible disappointment. The trustor can 
be disappointed by the perceived misconduct of the trusted, and the trusted can feel rejected 
by the trustor. Baier (1986, p. 238) makes the point drawing on Luhmann (1973; 1975) “If a 
trust relationship is to continue, some tact and willingness to forgive on the part of the truster 
and some willingness on the part of the trusted both to be forgiven and to forgive unfair 
criticisms, seem essential.” 
I explore the issue of forgiveness later. But it is here that some humility, especially on the 
part of the trusting party, is very important. I am supposed to ask myself again and again, 
how I can judge when I know so little 
Incomplete Knowledge 
It is the very nature of trust there is a lack of knowledge about the Other. Otherwise we 
would not need to trust.  
Mark I 
I got this draft contract from the architect – Mark. We had never worked 
together before. I read it and on each page I had up to five corrections to 
make – either to cut something completely, change it significantly or at least 
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soften some clauses. Actually, I saw in some passages real traps built into 
the contract. 
However, when I proposed the changes and explained the reasons for 
my demand, I faced little or no opposition. Almost everything got changed 
in the way I wanted it to be changed. 
I was a bit surprised by that. Often, we face fierce discussion about 
such changes, but not here. Was he already aware of the unacceptability 
of their draft or had he used some form he once came across without 
spending too much thought about it?  
I didn’t know whether Mark actually tried to fool me or whether this 
was just a mixture of laziness, little thought, and not caring whatsoever. 
Both could be the case, and I couldn’t find out. 
In my negotiation with Mark, I got contradictory messages. I could have understood the 
contract as an attempt to trick me. In some sense, an expression of the attitude ‘What can I 
get away with?’ But whether this was the case was not clear. There were other messages. 
One member of staff said, ‘he could be the good buddy guy, but I’m not sure.’ For me both 
interpretations were possible. And I am not sure which one I considered the most likely.  
It is often quite difficult, as Möllering (2006) says, to acquire knowledge about the 
trustworthiness of others. Moreover, my world is constantly changing. I actually only know 
a small part of the world that surrounds me (Berlin, 2013). Because I only have limited 
abilities to perceive and understand, I am unable to see the whole picture. What I actually 
see is only a small part of the whole (Berlin, 2013). Or it is part of the whole and important 
links are missing, so, the picture I get is incoherent. Yet I doubt I could develop a coherent 
picture of the whole. Hence, I come up with contradictory indicators of trustworthiness 
(Möllering, 2006).  
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By gaining new knowledge about the other person, I reinterpret the previous events. 
Hence my understanding of the other person is shifting. There is a constant reinterpretation 
of the Other’s actions. Sometimes my interpretation is stable and changes only a little, but 
then it might change abruptly or be overthrown altogether. Yet still, it is an ongoing 
hermeneutic circle with permanent perturbations (Iser, 2000). 
My attitude and behaviour towards the Other is of course influenced by my shifting 
interpretation of this person’s actions. This in turn feeds back to the Other’s perception of 
me and their subsequent interpretation. Now the Other’s actions are influenced by what this 
person makes of my behaviour. It is a constant back and forth between us two and the 
environment we act in. 
Nothing is fixed and everything is in flow with permanent new input. For the people I 
interact with I am part of the changing environment and vice versa. Hence, we change, and 
our understanding of the Others must inevitably change as well (Iser, 2000). Therefore, my 
assessment of the trustworthiness of the Other must be dynamic (Möllering, 2006) and 
constantly updated. In this way, I might be able to resolve some contradictions about the 
trustworthiness of the Other but by no means all of them.  
Given the changing nature of our understanding of the Other, I am doomed to make 
imperfect assessments of the trustworthiness of the partners I interact with (Grosse, 2015b), 
and I am well aware of this. 
Mark II 
Although, we significantly amended the contract in our favour and hence 
gained more control; we were well aware of the fact that we could have 
overseen something, or the client might try to cheat us anyway. 
That thought was brought home to me when the client did not pay his bills 
in time. We sent him reminders and finally stopped working. Then he 
apologised and paid, and we continued the work. 
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Mark told me then the client is very busy and sometimes does not care 
too much about this project, because he’s got several other projects of 
more importance for him. However, he said, the client is an honest guy 
and has always paid his bills in the end. 
Well, I thought. Finally, he paid what Mark told him to pay. So that 
could be the case. But it could well be that he only paid because we built 
up the pressure. 
But at this point, I didn’t stop working with this architect. I must have trusted him at least 
a bit otherwise I could not have continued doing business with him. I made the decision to 
act on trust but I could have chosen otherwise. However, I cannot refrain from trusting 
indefinitely. I cannot do business without trusting anybody. Doing business with someone 
requires trusting this person to some extent. More generally, I cannot refrain from trusting. 
Otherwise I would be unable to live the life I live (Baier, 1986). The very basis of human 
interaction – of even the smallest piece of cooperation – would be absent (Bailey, 2006). So, 
I place my trust in others on the very basis of this imperfect knowledge. Moreover, if I had 
perfect knowledge, I would not need to trust. Again if I had watertight guarantees, trust 
would be redundant (O'Neill, 2002a). Trust needs some ambiguity as without uncertainty I 
would act on granted knowledge and trust would not be needed any more. “The person who 
knows completely need not trust” (Simmel, 1908, p. 318). The interesting question is why 
do I trust and how do I deal with this uncertainty? Knowledge is always incomplete. 
Therefore, I wonder; Is knowledge of the Other necessary to trust another person? Some say 
so, but there is a reason to doubt that. I do already trust others without knowing them. 
Luhmann (1973; 1975, p. 20), argues that trust “needs history as a reliable background” 
and one cannot trust “without all previous experiences.” He hints that “trust goes beyond the 
information it receives and risks defining the future.” Hence, trust is not purely rational. It 
goes beyond rationality. The element I would like to investigate is the non-rational 
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component of trust. Möllering (2006) calls this suspension of rationality ‘leap of faith’. But 
what are the processes in this leap of faith? 
The Non-Rational 
Trust is, however, something other than a reasonable assumption on which to 
decide correctly, and for this reason models for calculating correct decisions miss the 
point of trust. (Luhmann, 1973; 1975, p. 88) 
As we have seen above, trust emerges in situations of limited control and cannot be 
controlled. For instance, Sitkin and Roth (1993) have shown that legalistic remedies are 
largely ineffective in rebuilding trust. In other words, as O’Neil says, more control does not 
lead to more trust. In most cases these remedies to cure lack of trust come as control 
mechanisms. However, a common reaction to declining trust is even more control which has 
the effect of even less trust (O'Neill, 2002b). To Farrell (2009), institutions are such control 
mechanisms. He uses the term ‘institutions’ to refer to laws, contracts, and similar legal 
documents and calls them in reference to Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2007) ‘midlevel social 
phenomena’. Farrell says, in order to restore trust institutions e.g. contracts and similar 
documents, these institutions become more and more fine-grained and specific. This 
resonates with O’Neil’s observation that even more control is exerted.  
Farrell references Hart’s (1958) notion of the core of a law (where the law applies 
directly), what the law is actually written for and the penumbra of the law (the shadow of it), 
where it can be used as reference or translated to but where it does not apply directly. In the 
core of a law, trust is not needed and hence absent but in the penumbra – in the vague shadow 
of the law - trust is important and evident (Farrell, 2009). One may argue that even in the 
core of a law, some sort of trust is necessary, at least in a common interpretation of the law 
and/or the law enforcement. However, he seeks to clarify that trust declines when control 
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expands. Control in the form of the institution has an effect contrary to the intention of 
increasing trust. Stronger institutions lead to larger cores of these institutions and smaller 
penumbras (Farrell, 2009). Hence, there is less room for trust to flourish.  
Again, there is no absolute. There is no total control over things (Baier, 1986) nor a 
complete hand over of power. There is no possibility to avoid wrongdoing completely by 
deterrence nor complete trust (Bailey, 2006). Furthermore, “all rules have a penumbra of 
uncertainty where the judge must choose between alternatives” (Hart, 2012, p. 12). This also 
applies to our expectations of another person. At some point, our expectations as part of our 
trusting have a penumbra of uncertainty (Farrell, 2009). At this point, the trusted – the judge 
– must make a decision which might not meet our expectation. It is helpful to regard the 
trusted as the judge. The trusted is equipped with the discretion about the things the trusting 
party values. I will use this notion again later when connecting my thoughts of trust to 
Derrida’s work (1992). Derrida positions the judge as balancing between general law and 
individual case. The judge should follow the general law but has to consider the individual 
circumstances of the case the judge has to decide. Therefore, a judge has to strike a balance 
between general law and individual case. Hence, the control of the law is always limited. 
With close reflection of O’Neill’s thoughts, Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) argue, that 
“trust would not be needed if action could be undertaken with complete certainty and no 
risk”. In turn when there is no certainty trust is always needed, since complete control or 
watertight guarantees are out of reach (Baier, 1986; O'Neill, 2002a). The extent to which 
trust is needed differs significantly since the penumbra of expectations differs in size 
(Farrell, 2009) and depth. The limits of certainty, the limits of our knowledge are the limits 
of rationality too. 
The notion of the non-rational in trust is not new. Simmel (1907, p. 179) notes,” in the 
case […] of trust in someone, there is an additional element which is hard to describe: it is 
most clearly embodied in religious faith”. To trust someone “may rest upon particular 
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reasons but is not explained by them”. Trust “contains a further element of social-
psychological, quasireligious faith.” (Simmel, 1907, p. 179) The non-rational element of 
trust has been addressed by different authors afterwards (e.g.; Giddens, 1990; Möllering, 
2006). 
Mark III 
Later, during this project, we argued again about late payments and Mark 
insisted again on his claim that the client would be honest. In the end, he sent 
this message to my phone: ‘Look all you said doesn’t change the fact that he 
will pay everything. Now trust me and concentrate on the job’. 
But as we know, one “cannot trust at will” (Baier, 1986, p. 244). One cannot rationally 
choose to trust. I can act the way I choose, but I cannot reason and choose to trust. Trust is a 
response in a different mode as reasoning. Although Frederiksen argues that “[i]t makes 
more sense to consider calculativeness as the opposite of trust” (2014, p. 41) I am cautious 
to call it the opposite and would rather consider it as something other than calculativness.  
Trust – Being with the Other 
Trust, to Giddens (1990, p. 33) is “in a certain sense blind trust.” Similar to Luhmann 
(1973; 1975) Peperzak (2013, pp. 24-25).argues that “[t]rusting someone thus involves more 
than a necessary or inevitable result of the correct evaluation.” I believe that we accumulate 
knowledge or seek to gain control as much as we can but at some point, we do not make any 
more progress. At that very point, we would actually be paralysed if we could not trust. To 
Möllering (2006), suspending our rational calculation and taking the ‘leap of faith’ we 
escape the paralysis by trusting the other (Möllering, 2006). We find a very similar notion 
regarding the ‘knowing the other’ in Said’s ‘Orientalism’ (2003). He distinguishes between 
knowing the other to control, dominate and appropriate the other on the one hand and on the 
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other hand knowing as a form of appreciation of the other – in her or his otherness. It is the 
latter form of knowing which looks promising because it leaves the area of controlling. 
Therefore, I argue trust should be considered outside of the realm of calculation, but not 
necessarily the opposite of it. 
Frederiksen (2014, p. 35) cites Løgstrup who considers “trust as a fundamental category 
of social life and realigne[d] trusting and calculativeness as different modes of engaging”. 
So, completely different thinking about trust seems necessary. We cannot go on and seek 
reasons for trust.  
Peperzak advises abandoning the “drive to an all-encompassing objectification” to 
emphasise “the most basic human interaction, dialogue, and conversation […] because they 
form and maintain the core of all sociality.” (Peperzak, 2013, p. 36, emphasis in the original) 
“Persistence in scientific ‘objectivity’ would reduce the encounter [with the other person] 
to a phenomenon in which none of the confronted subjects personally encounters the Other.” 
(Peperzak, 2013, p. 38). This is the clearest link Peperzak makes to the work of Emmanuel 
Lévinas. 
According to Lévinas (1961, 1974b), all our rationality derives from our encounters with 
others. We first experience others before we start to make sense of our world and before we 
become rationally thinking beings. Hence, all our rationality is a result of subjective sensing 
of our environment and in particular of the people that we encounter in the course of our life. 
The very notion of what we are – the self – depends on “all the persons, things, institutions, 
circumstances, and events that make us dependent during each phase of our existence.” 
(Peperzak, 2013, p. 79) We are, to Lévinas, limitlessly indebted to the Others because we 
depend on them to be ourselves.  
In the next chapter, I explore Lévinas’ thought in more depth. His philosophy deals with 
the most basic categories of human existence – being and being’s other. One might argue 
that this is too far-fetched in order to deal with trust. However, I think that a final explanation 
 Trust 79 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
of why we trust is missing. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the very basics of human 
existence to see what they can offer to our understanding of trust. Perhaps, I look at trust in 
this way in order “to criticise, to transform, to open [my way of trusting] to its own future” 
(Derrida & Caputo, 1997, p. 6) 
Methodological Remarks 
As outlined above, I am exploring the emotions and thought that are related to trust. I am 
particularly interested in how I rationalise trust and what is not rational within my trust. For 
example: in Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b) I sought to understand my 
emotional reaction. 
“I thought, 'That's not what we came up with! I did not agree to this 
solution - not at all. How could he claim that this was the outcome of our 
discussion?’ I felt betrayed. In my eyes, he was now lying about our meeting. 
[see ‘Appendix C – Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b)’ p. 302] 
I can access my own emotions and thoughts first hand. What I feel, and think is – as far 
as I am honest with myself – readily accessible. I do not need to check whether an 
interviewee tells me what he or she is actually feeling or thinking. It is up to my ability to 
acknowledge what I feel and think and then to express these feelings and thoughts. Being 
honest about my own feelings and thinking and writing about them is difficult enough. 
However, autoethnography offers me insights that are difficult to gain using other methods 
(e.g., ethnography focussing on others or interview research).  
One can understand each step from experience to the written research document as 
translation. For example, an interviewee has an experience and translates it into his own 
cognition. Then he translates it again from cognition to the words he uses to describe it in 
the interview. And it goes on - the interviewer listens and transcribes the interview more or 
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less verbatim into her transcription. Comparing this and similar research methods to 
autoethnography the number of translations from the actual experience to my writing are 
reduced. As autoethnographer, I reduce the number of translations to just one – my feeling 
to my realisation of these feelings – I try to write (describe) directly what I felt.  
Furthermore, as an autoethnographer, it is far more feasible for me to go back and forth. 
In some sense, I am the interviewee to myself as a researcher. Hence, if something needs 
further investigation the ‘interviewee-self’ is always readily available to the ‘researcher-
self’. And more importantly, the ‘interviewee-self’s’ feelings and thoughts are present to the 
‘researcher-self’. There is no way to omit these feelings and thoughts. It is up to the 
researcher whether to draw on them and use these feelings and thoughts for further analysis. 
It is then that critical reflection that is most important to un-earth feelings and thoughts which 
are uncomfortable to myself (Pillow, 2003). 
As in the fieldnote before, I felt betrayed. But the next day I could see things differently 
and be honest with myself I had to acknowledge how strong emotions influenced my 
judgement. I could then revise my thinking and see it differently. 
Only the next day - in a calmer mood - I understood that he might have 
been under pressure from his boss - who may have favoured the proposal 
he presented [see ‘Appendix C – Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 
2015b)’ p. 302] 
I think this sort of insight is far more difficult to achieve with other research methods. 
Therefore, autoethnography offers unique insights into emotions and thought processes 
related to trust. However, I have to admit that I am only talking about myself. The depth of 
investigation I may achieve only relates to me. 
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“Regardless of methodology, all researchers of humans should understand that we 
are not (static) rocks or telephones, rather, we are dynamic, unpredictable, and ever-
changing beings. […] We might be able to make informed, educated guesses about 
human behaviour, and there might be significant, knowable social constraints […] but 
to know, with full certainty, what others will do, say, or think is impossible.” (Holman 
Jones et al., 2013, p. 26) 
But although I follow the qualitative path in my approach, I need to be careful not to drift 
into dogmatism. I now believe that the qualitative approach – autoethnography – is the most 
appropriate. However, I am not sure whether this will be the case in a couple of years’ time. 
As I learned from a recent conversation with a colleague, fashions are changing, and 
mindsets are changing too. Hence, dogmatism in either direction, perhaps in all walks of life, 
is dangerous, because we are excluding the other. But we need the other to learn from the 
other.  
However, it is perhaps necessary to take this approach – autoethnography as self-
exploration – to the extreme to see where its limits are. I argue that trust is something other 
than rationality – fundamentally different and in a totally contrasting position. Therefore, I 
take my exploring and thinking to the extreme – reflecting about myself and my 
experiences in the light of Lévinas’ thought.  
Some Reflection on my Business Practice 
I run my business and I would like to be in control of it. But as I have described above, I 
never will. There is no absolute control, there is always trust. Bizarrely, I am in charge of 
my business to a large extent because I trust others, not because I control them.  
I gain power and income because I give away power and control. This turns some basic 
assumptions on management upside down – scientific management in particular. It is not 
more control that makes one stronger but what is beyond control that makes one successful. 
82 Trust  
Henning Grosse  
I cannot help thinking about Hermann Hesse’s Siddhartha (1974). Siddhartha was most 
successful in his pursuits when he ceased to desperately will success. He was best when he 
let go and adopted a stance of playfulness. Not to be taught principles, having scholarly 
knowledge is what made him better, but the experience – a playful experience – that 
Siddartha made helped him to grow and to form a deeper understanding. Perhaps the 
playfulness Hesse describes has a lot to do with Lévinas’ notion of Saying. 
These thoughts reveal that my thinking is quite a bit ahead of what I am writing here. In 
this chapter, I sought to pave the way to Lévinas. It seems logical to come to a point where 
rationality must be questioned. To me thinking about trust in Lévinas’ terms is sensible. But 
how can I be sure that it is not the other way around? Perhaps because I appreciate Lévinas’ 
thought I just see trust only from this perspective. Is there a way of getting out? Is seeing it 
from some distance possible? Yes and No. Yes, in the sense that I may take another point of 
view during a later stage but also no because my reality is my construction I struggle to 
escape. Hence there is the possibility to see things differently, but I cannot abandon my 
intellectual history. Thus there is no neutral or distanced view possible.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I tried defining the concept of trust as I have understood it from my 
readings in the respective literature. First, I drew on the common use of the word ‘trust’ that 
allows for a wide range of applications. However, in this work, I only concentrate on trust 
between people. Trust to my understanding is an expectation, a belief, or hope directed 
towards the actions of another or intentions of the person. The trusting party believes the 
trusted will act benevolently towards him or her. Whether or not an action on this belief may 
follow is another matter. When I trust, I believe that the other is not abusing the powers I 
hand over to him or her.  
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Control, on the contrary, does not need this belief. I would not need to trust if I knew 
enough or if I could control the other and the situation through enough knowledge. It 
amounts to complete knowledge about the other. But that is impossible. I must trust because 
I cannot know enough about the other or control him or her completely. Complete knowledge 
about the other, even with regard only to a specific task, is impossible. My ability to perceive 
and to understand is limited as I only see very little of the world around me and therefore 
can only grasp a small part. 
Furthermore, the way I make sense of my environment makes it impossible to come to 
‘full’ understanding. There is a hermeneutic process of interpretation underway. New 
experiences form new interpretations, and old interpretations are reinforced, altered, or 
abandoned. It is an ongoing process of interpretation. It cannot by its nature come to closure. 
The world around me is not static but dynamic and constantly changing. Hence, I might be 
able to understand the world better, but will never come to complete understanding. 
Complete knowledge would be prerequisite of complete control. Hence, to some extent, 
I need to trust if I want others to fulfil the task for me. The crucial thing is that I cannot avoid 
a situation where I rely on the help of others, or at least on them not harming me. I cannot 
know what is best for me in most situations and nor can the Other in whom I trust. Hence 
the other being benevolent to me might be thinking they act in my best interest. Then my 
judgement on whether the other’s actions are a breach of trust tells less about the other and 
more about me. I am just judging the other against my expectations.  
To my understanding, life would be impossible if I did not believe in other’s benevolence. 
This belief is not a result of a rational calculation. Therefore, I am going to explore the 
relation between the non-rational and rational and between being and beyond being in 
Emmanuel Lévinas’ thought. Using this exploration, I seek to better understand what trust 
is and where it comes from. 
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IV. Emmanuel Lévinas 
“[…] we have come into the world to work together, like feet, like hands, like 
eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To work against one another 
therefore is to oppose Nature, and to be vexed with another or to turn away from 
him is to tend to antagonism.” (Aurelius, 1992, p. 7) 
This quote summarises the last chapter, where I show that avoiding trust is impossible. 
At the same time, the quote is also a good introduction to Lévinas’ thought. To him we are 
not made to live in solitude - we are not self-sufficient. To be myself, I need the Other. 
Therefore, the Other rather than myself should be my primary concern.  
Introduction 
In summer 2015, I talked to Edward Trezise, at the time a senior 
lecturer at my university. He knew that I was doing autoethnography in 
my business and was interested in trust. During our talk, he mentioned 
Lévinas and his understanding of responsibility. ‘Think about a car 
accident and the urge you feel to help; that is what I think Lévinas meant 
by responsibility. This very first urge before you start to think about the 
consequence of your action that you may cause more harm to the victim, 
may infect yourself with some disease, etc. Perhaps, trust has some 
similarities to this pre-rational urge.’ This thought did not leave me, and 
I started to read Emmanuel Lévinas’ work. 
The ‘urge’ Edward was talking about is pre-rational. He drew on Caputo’s example 
(Caputo (2000), but he introduced the urge to help and linked it to trust. It is a desire, an 
inner force, an urge I feel to help the person in this car accident. This urge is not something 
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I have thought about beforehand. It is already there without me actively choosing it. We have 
seen in the previous chapter that trust cannot be pinned down to a specific reason or set of 
reasons. Therefore, I seek to explore whether trust is better understood outside of rationality. 
I try to relate trust to human interaction before or beyond rationality, ontology or being.  
Lévinas’ thought is not something easy to digest. He deals with the very basis of being 
and what is beyond being. Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I sketch Lévinas’ 
thinking. I roughly follow the chronology of his writings using Lévinas’ original publication 
dates and not the dates of the translations.  
First, I deal with the concept of alterity and the Other as fundamentally different from me. 
This goes along with the notion of Same and Other (Lévinas, 1961). Lévinas argues that this 
leads to an infinite responsibility for and to the Other. This responsibility is the recurring 
theme throughout Lévinas’ writings. He later moves to the notion of ethical language which 
culminates in response to the Other which he terms as Saying. This Saying, which is every 
form of giving signs to others, produces the Said (Lévinas, 1974b). In between, I will also 
draw on some of Derrida’s writings because they are influenced by Lévinas, and their 
influence is, in turn, visible in Lévinas’ later work. Towards the end of the chapter, I am 
going to show that Lévinas thought, as Derrida asserted, can ‘make us tremble.’ (Derrida, 
1967, p. 101) 
Although I almost exclusively use the notion of Saying and Said in my further 
exploration, it is necessary to sketch the development of his thinking. The basic nature of 
Lévinas’ thought is profound, and one can only grasp his ideas after following a similar way 
of thinking. To me there is no shortcut to understanding Lévinas – it is hard work, yet it is 
transforming.  
In the second section, I explore the notion of trust again. After arguing for a pre-rational 
conception of trust, I explore trust in light of my understanding of Lévinas’ thought.  
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Pre-Rational Trust  
If I look to justify why I trust my friends I would have difficulty finding a specific reason. 
There is no definitive reason why I trust. I often fail to come up with a reason why I call 
them friends at all. Of course, they have certain qualities, and abilities, but does that give me 
a reason to call them friends? If they were, for instance, more or less intelligent, they would 
not qualify any more or less as a friend. I actually do not think friendship is anything to do 
with rational choice. My friends are my friends because I feel connected to them not because 
they have certain personality traits. But how we interact is essential. If a friend does me harm 
knowingly and deliberately, that will inevitably affect our friendship.  
My kids are 5 and 7 years old and give the impression that they choose their friends – ‘So 
and so is my friend now.’ (only the next day this kid is not a friend anymore). However, I 
wonder whether we actively choose our friends. The same applies to trust, which I do not 
choose to do. In fact, I cannot choose to trust someone – it slips into my consciousness before 
I make the choice. I may act on my rational thought and avoid making myself vulnerable to 
the actions of the Other but that might go against my desire to trust. Therefore, to trust is 
pre-rational.  
The notion of pre-rationality is found in different places. Simmel (1907, p. 179) already 
noted, “in the case […] of trust in someone, there is an additional element which is hard to 
describe: it is most clearly embodied in religious faith”. This non-rational element of trust 
was subsequently dealt with by different authors (Giddens, 1990; Möllering, 2006)  
Recently, Frederiksen (2014, p. 35) drew my attention to Løgstrup (1997) who defines 
trust as “a fundamental category of social life and realigne[d] trusting and calculativeness as 
different modes of engaging.” Since, according to MacIntyre and Fink, Løgstrup’s work 
shows significant similarities to that of Emmanuel Lévinas (Introduction to: Løgstrup, 1997) 
I seek to explore the non-rational component of trust from a Lévinasian perspective. Apart 
from only scantly mentioning Lévinas – Bart Nooteboom interviewed by Möllering (2015) 
 Emmanuel Lévinas 87 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
and Frederiksen and Heinskou (2016), Eikeland and Saevi (2017), and Saevi and Eikeland 
(2012)– trust researchers have up until now not explored Lévinas’ thinking in relation to 
trust. 
But Lévinas has something to offer to our understanding of trust. As I emphasised above, 
rational explanations of trust fail in their attempt to find the foundation of trust. Some speak 
of quasi-religious belief (Simmel, 1907) others of a leap of faith (Möllering, 2006). But they 
agree that trust needs a suspension of rationality. Lévinas’ thinking moves between 
rationality and non-rationality in a fascinating fluctuation between what seems to link trust 
and calculation. Levinas questions and deconstructs very basic assumptions. He essentially 
asks where consciousness our sense of being and the way we think come from. I seek to 
discover what that means for an understanding of trust. Therefore, I explore his thought in 
order to see whether his thinking helps to understand the roots of trust. 
Lévinas’ Background 
Lévinas is regarded as one of the most influential French philosophers of the 20th century. 
“Indeed, in many ways, it now looks as if Levinas were the hidden king of twentieth-century 
French philosophy.” (Critchley, 2002, p. 5) Born in 1906 to a Jewish family in Kaunas 
(Lithuania), he moved in 1923 to France. From 1928-29 he travelled to Freiburg (Germany) 
to study with Husserl. In an interview, he later said, “I went to Freiburg because of Husserl, 
but discovered Heidegger” (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. xvii). The next year, he 
published his doctoral thesis “The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology”. In 1939 
he became a French citizen and joined the French army the same year to fight the Germans. 
Less than a year later he was captured by the Germans and despite being a Jew was not sent 
to a death camp but detained as a prisoner of war in a labour camp. During that time, he 
started to work on “Existence and Existents.” (Lévinas, 1947a) As Bergo (2015, p. 14) noted, 
“[t]here is no doubt that the uncertainty about his wife and daughter, not to mention the 
rumors about the liquidation of the Jews in Lithuania, influenced his work at this time.” His 
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wife and daughter survived the Holocaust hiding in a monastery in Orleans, but ultimately, 
the Nazis murdered his whole Lithuanian family (Bergo, 2015). Hence the Holocaust and 
his experience with the totalitarian system of Nazi Germany had a strong influence on his 
later thought and his understanding of ethics. The Holocaust led him to criticise western 
philosophy for giving knowledge priority over ethics (Atterton & Calarco, 2005). To 
Lévinas, ethics come before philosophy.  
The primacy of ethics over philosophy is one reason for his break with Heidegger, 
especially because Heideggerian philosophy allowed for Hitlerism. Another reason is that 
Heidegger himself supported the Nazis and Lévinas had difficulty forgiving him (Lévinas, 
1968; 1977). It is the turn to ethics in Lévinas philosophy that made him so influential in 
French philosophy during the 1980s and 90s. “The alleged ethical turn of Derrida’s thinking 
might be viewed simply as a return to Levinas […]” (Critchley, 2002, p. 3). Derrida himself 
said “Confronted with a thought like Levinas’s, I never have any objection. I am ready to 
subscribe to everything he says.” (Guibal (Ed.), Breton (Ed), & Herbrechter (Transl.), 2004, 
p. 64) Whether this statement is to be taken at face value might be up for discussion. 
However it certainly attests to the closeness of both thinkers. Reading both Lévinas and 
Derrida is very helpful for my understanding of what responsibility meant to them. The 
concept of responsibility Lévinas uses results from his understanding of our relation to the 
Other, the human being next to us, and what role ontology and ethics play in this relation. 
How to start? 
I would like to quote Simon Critchley upfront. For me, it summarises how to read 
Lévinas. It may prime the reader for Lévinas’ way of talking, a way of conveying his 
message: 
For Levinas, the negative becomes positive. What he's trying to describe is (or 
better, is mobilized with) an ethical language. A useful way of thinking about 
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Levinas is not in terms of arguments or verifying propositions but in relation to a 
certain accumulation of terms, a rhetorical intensification through forms of repetition, 
invocation, and multiplication. Levinas is a rhapsodic thinker. He's not Freddy Ayer. 
As Derrida rightly says, Levinas' movement is like a wave on the beach, always the 
same wave on the beach over and over again with repeated force and intensity. 
[(Derrida, 1967, p. 124)] Levinas has one point to make and he keeps coining different 
terms in order to make it. He doesn't explain the language he uses, he doesn't provide 
definitions of concepts; he just adds another term to a previous term. It's beautiful to 
dance to, although a little frustrating when you can't hear the music or if you have no 
sense of rhythm. What Levinas is trying to describe is something that occurs prior to 
understanding, prior to comprehension, a debt contracted before freedom. It's trauma 
that can only be traced through its effects, which are only felt après-coup, after the 
fact, belatedly. (Critchley, 2015, pp. 68-69) 
I use this quote because it describes the way in which Lévinas’ thought affects me. Its 
affect is like waves coming sometimes gently, sometimes forcefully, but incessantly moving 
the reader. What the waves do to the reader is more important than what the wave actually 
is. I sometimes sat in the library reading Lévinas and at first did not really understand it. 
However, after a couple of pages, Lévinas’ thought started to move something in my 
thinking, in a deep way, as if there was some movement underneath the surface rationality. 
One may compare this thinking to an ongoing hermeneutic. But in Lévinas’ thought it goes 
deeper; it does not just scratch the surface. To me, it often felt as if the very foundation of 
my thinking started to drift.  
Therefore, I cannot come up with a final conclusion and develop it deductively. In the 
following pages I must describe Lévinas’ thought so that the reader understands and perhaps 
feels how to think in Lévinas’ way. The best way to do this is to explore his writing 
chronologically. 
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Ethics and responsibility, as I argue above, are of high significance for an understanding 
of trust. Lévinas relocates these two in the realm of the pre-conscious. Hence, the importance 
of ethics and responsibility in Lévinas’ thought are essential to understanding his 
contribution to the discussion of trust. But this requires a deeper understanding of Lévinas’ 
thought. As I argue above, trust cannot be explained by pure reason but Levinas offers some 
answers. I will begin by outlining his thought to show how my interpretation of trust relates 
to his thinking.  
To follow Lévinas’ thought it is necessary to understand the relation between the basic 
concepts of Being and being’s Other. To that end I needed to explore the Other and Same, 
desire and responsibility, Saying and Said. They are so interwoven that I can only explain 
them in relation to each other. A word of caution: Lévinas’ writings are continuous iterations 
of thoughts and ideas. Therefore, my representation of Lévinas is not straightforward; it also 
develops and shows a deepening of thinking throughout the writing. I may pick up themes a 
couple of times and develop them. It is a hermeneutic way of thinking.  
Lévinas’ encounter with the Other is the central event in the formation of the self. 
Contrary to Heidegger, we first and foremost feel, sense, or experience the Other before we 
become aware of our own and the Other’s being. This encounter with the Other precedes 
everything; it is primordial. To Lévinas, we are basically responding to Others who 
(implicitly) demand something from us. He emphasises that being is to be among and for 
Others (Lévinas, 1974b) rather than a being in the world and towards death (Heidegger, 
1927). Therefore, philosophy has to start with the human encounter (Bergo, 2015). 
Put very simply, the Other challenges me and puts me in question because the Other is 
different. Through our response to the Other and this interruption by the Other, we become 
aware of our own being. Therefore, I start my exploration with the Other. 
 Emmanuel Lévinas 91 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
Alterity – Same and Other 
The Other and Same are the central figures in Lévinas’ Totality and Infinity (Lévinas, 
1961). Here Lévinas draws on Plato who had already introduced these terms into the 
philosophical debate (Davis, 1996) For Lévinas, the Same is my rational thought. It 
comprises my own categories and is my understanding of my experiences. The Same is not 
restricted to similarities; it can also be opposites e.g. light and dark, black and white. This is 
because they can be displayed in the same category. 
The Same is essentially what we know. Lévinas (1964, p. 48) asks suggestively whether 
“[…] philosophy wants to reabsorb every Other into the Same and to neutralize alterity.” 
The absorption of every Other into the categories of the Same is for Lévinas the biggest 
problem of western or Greek philosophy. To him, knowledge of the Same is limited and 
therefore the Other who is infinitely other, cannot be adequately displayed in terms of the 
Same. One would have to reduce the Other in order to fit him into the limits of the Same. It 
would mean to subordinate the infinite otherness of the Other to the totality of the Same. To 
Lévinas, the translation of the Other into the Same is, therefore, a violent act (Lévinas, 1951).  
To get to grips with Lévinas’ Other one has to understand the very nature of the Other’s 
otherness. So, what is Alterity? 
“Absolutely other is the Other.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 39) 
By the ‘absolutely other’ Lévinas refers to the Other as one who “escapes my grasp by an 
essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in sight.” (Lévinas, 
1961, p. 39) To Lévinas, we seek to understand others by translating their action into the 
categories of our own. We actually seek to make them the Same. But this endeavour is bound 
to fail. We may use the same language as the Other, but we are essentially Strangers.  
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“I, who have no concept in common with the Stranger, am, like him without 
genus.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 39).  
Lévinas distinguishes between the other (in lower case) – which might be incorporated 
into my own categories, into the Same and the Other (capitalised) – which is impossible to 
display in the categories of the same (Davis, 1996). One may notice that the use of the 
capitalised form is not entirely consistent in Lévinas’ writings. However, one will always 
find his concept of the Other and alterity as I try to sketch it here. 
To give a rough example of how I began to understand the concept of alterity I thought 
about my understanding of being a woman. I am a man, and I will never understand what it 
means to be a woman. Being a woman escapes my comprehension because I do not have a 
female body, I do not feel like a woman and I am not socialised as a woman. Being a woman 
essentially escapes my categories. Hence, women will always stay strange to me, and every 
effort to translate their being foreign into my own categories is bound to fail. I am probably 
able to form an understanding of being a woman, but it will be a man’s understanding of 
being a woman not that of a woman. Our registers are essentially different, and we cannot 
overcome this difference.  
I could now replace the term “being a woman” with all sort of terms, e.g. “being French,” 
“having another profession,” “being a child of other parents.” But alterity is not about traits. 
Regardless of similarities and differences, every other person is the Other, because I am 
simply not him or her. Hence, he or she is just the Other.  
It is this essential otherness that is difficult to grasp. It is here that my example of being 
a woman becomes flawed. I am a man and being of a different gender is a trait as being of 
different colour, race, or origin. If I can name a difference, such as gender, I can translate it 
into or, better, subject it to my categories. Hence this difference is already subjected to my 
totality. But alterity or the Other must not be subjected to my totality – it cannot be subjected.  
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Lévinas explained in an interview that “there is something which remains outside, and 
that is alterity. Alterity is not at all the fact that there is a difference that facing me there is 
someone who has a different nose than mine, different colour eyes, another character. It is 
not difference, but alterity. It is alterity, the unencompassable, the transcendent. It is the 
beginning of transcendence. You are not transcendent by virtue of a certain trait." (Wright, 
Hughes, & Ainlley, 1988, p. 170) The Other is just not me or in Lévinas’ words “[T]he Other 
as Other is not only an alter ego; the Other is what I am not” (Lévinas, 1947b, p. 83). In a 
footnote, Richard A. Cohen comments that Lévinas states that “alterity encountered through 
negativity is merely a relative, not absolute, alterity.” Therefore, alterity has to be understood 
outside of ‘negativity, and thus in a truly positive “sense”’(Cohen in Lévinas, 1947b, p. 83). 
Therefore, my being a woman example does not work. 
Hence, alterity is something I cannot comprehend. It is neither possible nor desirable to 
comprehend the Other in the Other’s alterity. It would essentially mean to ‘kill’ the Other 
because I strip them of their Otherness. However, it is important to recognise, the Other is 
neither fundamentally with nor against me. The Other is just the unknown, the stranger 
(Davis, 1996). But with the resistance of the Other to my categories, one can recognise that 
the Other exists in another dimension. Therefore, he is not against me nor with me – he is 
just there, free but in relation to me. 
"The central difficulty for Levinas is to elaborate a philosophy of the Self and Other 
in which both are preserved as independent and self-sufficient, but in some sense in 
relation with one another. This is more difficult than it might appear, since it is in the 
nature of the relation to bringing the Other into the self´s sphere of familiarity, thus 
making it intelligible from the perspective of the self and reducing its true otherness." 
(Davis, 1996, p. 41)  
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The act of making the Other intelligible is making him the Same, translating him into my 
categories. My Same comprises my limited categories, of ‘large’ and ‘small’, ‘sour’ and 
‘sweet’, or ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’. But the Other is not limited in his otherness; the Other is 
infinite. Yet, I need to share the meaning of ‘sour’, ‘sweet’, ‘beautiful’, and ‘ugly’ with the 
Other. I need this “community of speakers who share that name.” (Large, 2015, p. 44) I need 
some understanding of the Other to avoid solitude. 
And here one faces a dilemma; I want to know the Other and to be familiar with him, but 
I need to preserve his alterity. I cannot make him the Same. Again, the Other “escapes my 
grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my 
sight” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 39). 
The Same is the totality of my knowledge - of my categories. It is my large and small, 
sour and sweet, beautiful and ugly. These categories are what Weick (2006) calls ‘conceptual 
boxes’, but they are only a lens to comprehend the Other and however sophisticated these 
categories might become, I am never able to grasp the Other completely. The categories are 
always limited, as is my knowledge. The Same is limited too and the Other cannot be 
subordinated to these categories because it is infinitely other. 
The notion of the Other will later assist the exploration of why my understanding of my 
business partners is always incomplete. I have sought to understand why the engineer I work 
with acted in ways I regarded as a breach of trust [see ‘Understanding the Other’ p. 64 and 
‘Appendix B – Experiences with Auto-Ethnography (Grosse, 2015a)’ p. 289]. However, I 
failed in my attempt due to my inability to see the whole picture (Berlin, 2013) and that it is 
an ongoing hermeneutic exploration that cannot be finished (Iser, 2000). ‘Incomplete’ 
understanding might not be the best word to use here. It suggests that complete knowledge 
of the Other is possible, if only in theory. But the Other, as infinitely other, escapes my grasp. 
The possibility of complete understanding would require equality between me and the Other 
which is not given.  
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 Lévinas’ notion of the Other opens a new way of thinking about that relationship. I am 
in principle unable to grasp the Other because of her or his fundamental otherness – alterity. 
In this work I show that the Otherness of the Other is challenge and value at the same time. 
The Other already exists prior to my own existence (Hand, 2009). From the encounter 
with the Other, I understand that we share the world (Davis, 1996) and I am not alone. Hence, 
myself is defined by the encounter with the Other. Prior to all thought, I am obliged to be 
good to the Other and to take care of him. If I were violent against him, I could not form a 
relationship with him and hence not become a conscious being. This results in my 
responsibility “for the Other because my existence as individuated subject is entirely bound 
up with my relation to him or her." (Davis, 1996, p. 80) Again, I need “the community of 
speakers” (Large, 2015, p. 44). 
Yet the fact that the Other is already there and that I am never alone has another 
implication. The encounter with the Other precedes the very constitution of the self, of my 
own being. But before I deal with Ontology, I will briefly explore how the Other presents 
him- or herself to me – through the Other’s face. The encounter with the Other is prior to my 
own consciousness, thinking, ontology and philosophy. Hence, I need to understand how the 
Other appears to me – in the form of the face – before I can move on and see what follows 
from this encounter. 
The Face 
“The face has turned to me – and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and not by 
reference to a system.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 75) 
The face (le visage) is the device to convey the presentation (not representation) of the 
Other (Davis, 1996). It might be the Other in person, but can also be any other piece of 
artwork, communication, etc. that is strange to the self (Atterton & Calarco, 2005). The face 
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is not bound to a ‘system.' It is, therefore, not subject to categories; it does not fit into them. 
Hence, it disturbs my Same, because the face puts my Same into question and demonstrates 
its limits. And, of course, the face urges me to develop my categories. 
Here, Lévinas makes clear that the face is what is exposed to me. It is how the Other 
appears to me and is presented to me. It is the nudity of the face, its exposure and the very 
truthfulness of the Other – not polished, not hidden, not reserved. The face appears as a 
naked face, not as a mask (Bauman, 1993). It is the means of communication between the 
Other and me. The face is more a metaphor than the actual bodily part of the Other. In 
Lévinas’ writings, the face stands for what the Other presents to me. We are drawn to the 
Other’s face as we desire to be in contact with it. 
Desire 
For Lévinas, desire has to be distinguished from need. Needs are the very basic 
requirements of life e.g. food, shelter, sleep etc. A need is a lack of something that can be 
filled. We can satisfy our need, but we cannot satisfy our desires. As I said before, I want to 
be with the Other; I have a desire for him and to be with him. Desires are directed to alterity 
of the Other (Davis, 1996). Lévinas doubtlessly refers to Plato, “who, in his analysis of pure 
pleasures, discovered an aspiration that is conditioned by no prior lack.” (Lévinas, 1964, p. 
51) The desire is not egoistic, as needs are, it is as self-sufficient as the desire for happiness 
– it aims at itself. This self-sufficiency is similar to Heidegger’s sufficiency of Dasein: 
“Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue.” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 
236) The desire does not aim at satisfaction because it does not aim at a lack of anything.  
Having recognized its needs as material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the 
I henceforth turn to what it does not lack. It distinguishes the material from the 
spiritual, opens to Desire. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 117) 
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In the attraction of the Other as Other both the self and the Other are confirmed by desire 
and not reduced to the same (Davis, 1996). To Lévinas this desire for the Other is the bedrock 
of our sociality.  
The desire for the Other (Autrui), sociality, is born in a being that lacks nothing, 
or, more exactly, it is born over and beyond all that can be lacking or that can satisfy. 
(Lévinas, 1964, p. 51) 
We desire to be with the Other; we seek, prior to any thought, to sense the Other – the 
Other’s face. However, although satisfying material needs is essential for men to survive, I 
wonder what would happen to a human being if this person was deprived of all social 
interaction. This person might survive, but would certainly suffer. A permanent lack of 
human encounters would lead to severe psychological and physiological problems. In this 
sense, human interaction becomes a need. Hence, desire must be understood differently. 
Desire is what is not lacking. It is the urge to the Other only as someone different from me. 
I do not need him for anything; my health is safeguarded, but I want to sense him and enjoy 
being with him. Desire is then directed to enjoyment and sensibility.  
Sensibility and Enjoyment 
Thoughts, to Lévinas, only arise from sensing things. We sense things, and we enjoy them 
before we start to think.  
The sensibility we are describing starting with enjoyment of the element does not 
belong to the order of thought but to that of sentiment [...] (Lévinas, 1961, p. 133) 
He proceeds to explain that sensibility is sufficient to itself: it does not aim at a thought.  
Sensibility, essentially naïve, suffices to itself. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 135) 
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Sensibility does not aim at an object, however rudimentary. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 
137) 
Sensibility is prior to any thought. It is the very basic encounter with the Other. 
Sensibility, itself, does not have a direction and does not seek. This sufficiency to itself, we 
have already seen in desire, we see it here with sensibility, and we are going to find it again 
in responsibility. Desire and sensibility precede the development of concepts, are primordial 
and can be conceived as sociality and responsibility.  
Desire cannot proceed to an end which it would be equal to; in Desire the 
approach distances, and enjoyment is but the increase of hunger. (Lévinas, 1975, 
p. 140) 
At this point, I start to wonder whether I should relate desire, sensibility and enjoyment 
to trust. I ask whether trust is – without regarding it as a means to an end – not a form of 
desire and enjoyment to act trustingly. I enjoy being trusted regardless of whether there is a 
material benefit for me in it or not. I also enjoy trusting another person, just for the sake of 
doing something together. 
To be with someone is different from eating. We can eat enough not to be hungry any 
more, to satisfy this need, but spending time with someone is different. Of course, one might 
get bored by someone, but it is different from not being hungry. To drink one and a half litres 
of water per day might be sufficient for an adult to stay healthy and survive, but we seek to 
be with others for the sake of being with them. And we all know the line: “I can’t get enough 
of you.” Desire, sensibility, and enjoyment are infinite, and we see later that responsibility 
is also ever growing and, hence, infinite.  
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But sensibility and enjoyment form the basis for signification. Both are the bedrock from 
which consciousness and thought arise. By giving our sensation names and by ascribing 
words to them, we move them into consciousness.  
The separation accomplished as enjoyment, that is, as interiority, becomes a 
consciousness of objects. The things are fixed by the word which gives them, which 
communicates them and thematises them. […] Over and above enjoyment […] a 
discourse about the world takes form. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 139) 
That is the point where sensibility and enjoyment become experiences. We begin to make 
sense of what we feel and enjoy, and we assemble sensibility and enjoyment into experience 
- experience that constitutes our own being. Therefore, I am able to be and to communicate 
only because I am able to sense and enjoy. 
Only a subject that eats can be for the Other, or can signify. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 64) 
Only one who eats can be one who enjoys, and can, therefore, truly offer something to 
others. “In giving to the Other ethically, there is an obligation to give something of oneself, 
which means to give one’s own enjoyment.” (Atterton & Calarco, 2005, p. 61) It is perhaps 
this enjoyment that forms a great deal of my job satisfaction. I work with people - I constantly 
face Others and as long as I make a living, I can offer something in return. That might be a 
job for my employees, some assistance for an architect, or good service for my clients. 
I could have embarked on a career as a design engineer with far less human interaction 
involved in my job. But I think the constant exposure and ongoing encounters with Others 
makes my work so valuable for me. I do not need these interactions, but they contribute a 
lot to my well-being. It is perhaps because being, working and interacting with Others plays 
such an important role in my life that I am so drawn to Lévinas.  
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The notion of giving ‘from a full mouth’, mentioned earlier, becomes quite important in 
my treatment of trust. It essentially says that to become a moral self, one needs have satisfied 
basic needs. This is a recurring theme in business when I have to decide whether to share or 
to be selfish. It looks as if a person fighting for survival – literally or metaphorically – will 
act, sometimes must act, egoistically in order to eat. Although, there are already deep 
connections to trust and my business practice I think I still need to reflect on Lévinas’ 
thought.  
Ontology 
The Greek philosophical tradition emphasises the supremacy of being, rational thought 
and ontology. But Lévinas questions ontology’s supremacy.  
As I have shown above, prior to knowledge and consciousness, one encounters the Other. 
One is pulled to him and desires to be with him, feeling, sensing, and interacting with him. 
Through this encounter, one becomes aware of the Other and oneself. One becomes 
conscious; one begins to know. Therefore, being is not constitutive to itself – it is the Other. 
One may wonder why being and ontology adopts this primal position in philosophy.  Lévinas 
argues that this position should be reserved for the encounter with the Other. He contradicts 
Heidegger in the following:  
“To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence 
of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is existent, (the 
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits 
the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relation of knowing) subordinates 
justice to freedom. […] It would be opposed to justice, which involves obligations 
with regard to an existent that refuses to give itself, the Other, who in this sense 
would be an existent par excellence.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 45) 
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The encounter with the Other, the Other’s face, this calling into question must precede 
every consciousness, hence, all being and ontology. It is the response to the Other, my 
responsibility before any rational thought, the ethical moment that must come first. If it were 
the other way around, humanity, indeed justice, would be subordinated to freedom. A 
freedom that “comes from obedience to Being, it is not man who possesses freedom; it is 
freedom that possesses man” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 45). For Lévinas, I first respond to the Other 
then I begin to understand my own being, I begin to know.  
“Knowing is only understood in its proper essence when one begins with 
consciousness, whose specificity is defined with the concept of knowing, a concept of 
knowing, a concept which presupposes consciousness.” (Lévinas, 1975, p. 132) 
Knowing and consciousness need each other. Hence, they must originate somewhere else. 
Consciousness emerges from the encounter with the Other and leads to knowing and 
knowing makes one conscious. But since the encounter with the Other precedes all 
consciousness and therefore knowledge, we have to look closer at the response of the self to 
the Other. This responding is responsibility prior to consciousness, being and rationality. 
Facing the Other, being responsible does indeed precede all philosophy. Then, what is 
responsibility? 
Responsibility 
“The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question my spontaneity, as 
ethics.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 43) 
The primordial nature of the encounter with the Other relocates responsibility. To 
Lévinas, responsibility derives from the encounter with the Other. But responsibility is not 
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to be understood in the Greco-Roman sense as “[s]omebody is responsible for something to 
somebody […]” (Waldenfels, 1995, p. 40). In this sense, responsibility goes hand in hand 
with accountability. The responsible has to justify him or herself in front of somebody and 
give reason for his action. Hence, responsibility in the Greco-Roman sense is subjected to 
reason. This would presuppose an all-encompassing totality. “This interpretation of the 
world of words and things, however, presupposes that there is only one order to which our 
saying and doing can be coordinated or in which it can be incorporated [...].” (Waldenfels, 
1995, p. 41) In other words, this sort of responsibility would not allow for the Other. Because 
of the Other’s alterity his “saying or doing” cannot be understood “in a non-ambiguous way.” 
(Waldenfels, 1995, p. 41) Therefore, Lévinas talks about responsible responding – 
responsible to and for others. To be responsible is to approach the Other with an attitude of 
care and openness.  
But an encounter with the Other demands a response – hence responsibility – before I am 
able to reason. Therefore, Lévinas locates responsibility beyond being. Responsibility must 
come first – before reason and before philosophy.  
“To be judged [on the grounds of responsibility] thus does not consist in hearing a verdict 
set forth impersonally and implacably out of universal rules.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 244) The 
response has to be placed appropriately to the subjective conditions of the encounter. 
To Lévinas, responsibility is ethics. It is there before we develop concepts and it lies 
underneath, below the radar of concepts (Caputo, 2000). Ethics originate in the encounter 
with the Other or, as Derrida (1992) approaching the issue from the opposite angle describes, 
when we suspend every concept – in the moment of universal épochè – what is left is ethics 
- free, unrestrained ethics. 
Only a subject, which is sensible and able to enjoy – an ‘embodied subject’ – can bear 
responsibility. Yet, sensibility and enjoyment – by its temptation – make it possible for the 
subject to break with responsibility and act irresponsibly (Atterton & Calarco, 2005). But to 
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be responsible is not an autonomous decision - it has begun before I was able to make a free 
decision. Lévinas argues, that since our very existence is dependent on the encounter with 
Others, we are infinitely indebted to them (Davis, 1996). Since I am only myself because I 
interact with Others, I am responsible for the others.  
The responsibility for the Other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my 
decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side 
of my freedom, from a "prior to every memory," an "ulterior to every accomplishment," 
from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the an-archical, prior to or 
beyond essence. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 10) 
This responsibility originates in the ethical encounter with others. It has its origins in 
ethics prior to ontology, and hence it cannot be restricted by reasoning. So, ethics is ‘first 
philosophy.’ 
Responsibility for the Other, this way of answering without prior commitment, is 
human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 116) 
But this implies that I am not in the position to reject any responsibility. Therefore, I am 
overwhelmed by demands originating in almost infinite encounters with others. I am unable 
to respond to each calling and, hence, I end in an overflow of responsibility. Consequently, 
the more I follow my desire for the Other – and I do so because it is an infinite desire – the 
more I become responsible for and to the Other. 
Lévinas argues, “[t]he infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a 
responsibility increasing in the measure it is assumed, duties become greater in the measure 
that they are accomplished.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 244) But I will inevitably arrive at a point 
when I have to decide which responsibility I will fulfil and which not. My decision about 
my actions defines myself. 
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“Perhaps the possibility of a point of the universe where such an overflow of 
responsibility is produced ultimately defines the I.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 245) 
The self is the ultimate coping strategy to make life liveable. We see now that my desire 
for the Other, sensing him prior to all memory, demands me to treat him responsibly. Yet 
this primordial responsibility is not limited – there is no concept to limit responsibility. I am 
unable to live up to my responsibility. I have to choose which action I take and which I do 
not take. The self decides to whom I act responsibly and the Others urge me to this decision. 
But the inability to fulfil all responsibilities leaves this nagging sense of inadequacy. I still 
hear the command of responsibility. 
We also find this understanding of infinite responsibility in Derrida’s writing, which 
supports Crichley’s (2002) claim that Derrida’s turn to ethics is rooted in reading Lévinas. 
“This responsibility toward memory is a responsibility before the very concept 
of responsibility that regulates the justice and appropriateness (justesse) of our 
behavior, of our theoretical, practical ethico-political decisions.” (Derrida, 1992, 
p. 20) 
Derrida refers here to a concept of responsibility – sharply distinguished from 
accountability. This is very close to Levinas’ concept. He sets this in the context of other 
concepts and continues: 
This concept of responsibility is inseparable from a whole network of connected 
concepts (property, intentionality will, freedom, conscience, consciousness, self-
consciousness, subject, self, person, community, decision, and so forth) and any 
deconstruction of this network of concepts in their given or dominant state may 
seem like a move toward irresponsibility at the very moment that, on the contrary, 
deconstruction calls for an increase in responsibility. (Derrida, 1992, p. 20) 
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Although it looks first as if a deconstruction of concepts might lead to a breakup or 
meltdown, it is the opposite. Responsibility for him fills the gaps left by the suspension of a 
concept.  
But in the moment that an axiom's credibility (crédit) is suspended by 
deconstruction, in this structurally necessary moment, one can always believe that 
there is no more room for justice, neither for justice itself nor for theoretical interest 
directed toward the problems of justice, This moment of suspense, this period of 
épochè, without which, in fact, deconstruction is not possible, is always full of anxiety, 
but who will claim to be just by economizing on anxiety? (Derrida, 1992, p. 20) 
The anxiety, he talks about, is the very moment I have to decide which responsibility to 
fulfil and to whom I am irresponsible - the very moment I define myself. This anxiety, for 
him, is not motivated by structures or principles, it is as it is for Lévinas, a desire.  
And this anxiety ridden moment of suspense—which is also the interval of spacing 
in which transformations, indeed juridico-political revolutions take place—cannot be 
motivated, cannot find its movement and its impulse (an impulse which itself cannot 
be suspended) except in the demand for an increase in or supplement to justice, and 
so in the experience of an inadequation or an incalculable disproportion.” (Derrida, 
1992, p. 20) 
Derrida demonstrates Lévinas’ idea of responsibility approached from the other end. 
When he suspends concept after concept – i.e. he deconstructs being – what is left is a space 
free of rules. But the freer the space, the higher the demand for appropriate behaviour - 
behaviour considering the subjective circumstance. In the end, this responsibility is infinite. 
I may only deal with a single Other, but since I abolished all rules and concepts, I cannot 
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share this responsibility. I must divide the responsibility to him by zero – literally or 
metaphorically. Hence my responsibility is infinite.  
It is, therefore, a free decision, because I can judge. But it is also a constrained decision 
because I am obliged to judge and take the responsibility. This is a marked resemblance to 
Derrida (1992). Derrida demonstrates that justice cannot be achieved since it either falls 
short of applying principles, it does not account for the particularity of the case or even worse 
it applies unjust laws. Hence, I may strive for justice or to respond ethically to others, but I 
will always fall short of achieving either of the goals. 
My conversation with Edward Trezise above, reflected on the urge you feel when you see 
a car accident - this calling in you to help the victim is the very first moment of humanity 
(drawing on Caputo, 2000). This is the experience of ‘inadequacy.’ Not reacting or 
responding is inadequate – it would be inhuman to respond by starting to calculate. A second 
later you start to think about the consequences of possible actions. Lévinas and Derrida both 
try to demonstrate that there is something beyond being. Being is not sufficient to itself it 
has, as the title of Lévinas’ second magnum opus suggests, an ‘otherwise’ something that 
cannot be subjected to categories of being but is fundamentally different. This thought is in 
stark contrast to Greek tradition and Heidegger and Husserl in particular. 
The significance lies very much in the notion that ethics comes before ontology – ethics 
as first philosophy. Every ethical code derived from ontology inevitably contains some pre-
conceptual assumptions (Jinks, 1997). Hence, ethics derived from ontology is not free to 
account for the human interaction in its very uniqueness; it inevitably follows some 
predetermined law (Derrida, 1992) or is derived after the fact, as in Caputo’s accident (2000). 
Ethics, however, cannot wait for an explanation. The encounter requires it immediately 
(Caputo, 2000). For Lévinas, humanity and, therefore, an ethical relationship with the Other 
must be the only reference for an ethical philosophy. Lévinas certainly draws strongly on the 
Greeks up to Heidegger but he differs significantly in his valuation of ethics over philosophy.  
 Emmanuel Lévinas 107 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
As mentioned above, Lévinas was a Jew who survived the Holocaust. This background 
helps to explain his efforts to overcome totalitarianism. A philosophy, such as Hitlerism, 
which is founded on inhuman assumption must be called into question. Heidegger’s idea of 
being sufficient to itself fails to do exactly that. Therefore, philosophy needed a human 
origin, and for Lévinas that is the Face of the Other – the ethical encounter. To be 
safeguarded against inhumanity Lévinas emphasises the need to build a philosophy from 
human interaction – ethics. In other words, when we deconstruct philosophy what is left has 
to be responsibility – ethics (Derrida, 1992). 
“This thought calls upon the ethical relationship – a nonviolent relationship to the 
infinite as infinitely other, to the Other – as the only one capable of opening the space 
of transcendence of liberation metaphysics.” (Derrida, 1967) 
To Lévinas, our consciousness originates from the sensing of the Other. Consciousness 
precedes being. We can only consciously be ourselves. Sensing the Other signifies and 
signifying forms my awareness of my own and the demand the Other makes upon me by 
speaking to me.  
But how do these factors relate to trust? The relation between knowledge, our 
understanding of being, and the human encounter is important. I have shown that our 
knowledge of the Other, the circumstances, or our knowledge in general, is insufficient 
reason for trust. There seems to be something that is stronger than knowledge. I think this is 
the key to a new understanding of trust. One must abandon our quest for objectification 
(Peperzak, 2013). It is here where Lévinas’ thoughts are most helpful. The significance of 
his thought lies within the primacy of the human encounter over Being. Humanity comes 
before being, rationality and calculation. As I have shown in the previous chapter, 
calculation cannot explain trust. It is more helpful to consider trust in the realm of pre-
rationality.  
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Goodness 
“Good is Good in itself and not by relation to the need to which it is wanting; it 
is a luxury with respect to needs. It is precisely in this that it is beyond being.” 
(Lévinas, 1961, p. 103) 
In Lévinas’ early work, one encounters the notion of the Good in relation to Plato 
(Lévinas, 1947a) and this concerns Lévinas throughout his work. Perhaps, Lévinas’ 
endeavour throughout is work is best described in the preface to ‘Existence and Existents’: 
“The Platonic formula that situates the Good beyond being serves as the general 
guideline for this research – but does not make up its content.” (Lévinas, 1947a, p. 
15)  
Reading ‘Totality and Infinity’, Derrida asks whether the “Platonic sun already enlightens 
the visible sun” and answers that “Plato’s sun does not only enlighten: it engenders. The 
good is the father of the visible sun which provides living beings with ‘creation, growth and 
nourishment’” (Derrida, 1967, p. 106). It is this sense of creation, growth and nourishment 
that we find in Lévinas’ Saying [next section].  
Let me, for the moment, go off at a tangent to show the working of the Platonic sun. 
Derrida (1992) demonstrated in his essay ‘Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of 
Authority"’ how deconstruction functions when investigating justice. He shows that when 
we dissolve concepts – in other words, go beyond the visible – responsibility, the good, 
remains. He claims that to achieve justice the judge must follow the law. At the same time, 
he must take the particularities of the single case into consideration. Hence, his judgment 
must be free to account for the particular case. The judge enters unchartered territory and 
sets a new precedent. So, the judgment cannot be both strictly following the law and being 
free to decide on an unprecedented case. Justice is unachievable as we cannot reconcile both. 
 Emmanuel Lévinas 109 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
In this essay, Derrida further shows that each time we abolish a concept or a law, we 
ought to fill the free and open space. We must fill this space by taking over responsibility. 
Each suspension or move in deconstruction épochè requires us to take responsibility. 
In other words, when a judge does not follow the law, he is free to make a decision on his 
own but he must take full responsibility for this decision. Responsibility is not in the sense 
of accountability and justification but as a sensible response to the case he is about to decide. 
When one takes this approach to the extreme – when all laws and concepts are suspended - 
only responsibility without any concept of itself is left. The responsibility ultimately results 
in the Goodness of the subject. 
Goodness consists in taking up a position such that the Other counts more than 
myself. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 247) 
This sentence is a longer version of one of Lévinas’ central ideas. In short, it says ‘aprés 
vous’. Not me, not my thinking, not my concerns but yours count more – ‘after you’. It is 
taking responsibility for the Other. The example below sets this in context [See ‘Appendix 
G – Does Lévinas help us to trust? (Grosse, 2017a)’ p. 354]. 
The Cracks 
On a sunny June’s morning, I walked through the rather small building 
site with my foreman. My company had worked on this building site for a 
couple of weeks already, and we were about to finish our job there. Then my 
foreman said something like, “we haven’t touched this part of the building, 
but I have to show you.” My foreman had already told me about the cracks 
in the old column, but when I saw them myself, I knew we had to do something 
about them. The cracks, two of them, were some 50 cm long and almost 1 cm 
wide. These were huge cracks for a column of 40 by 40 cm. I jokingly said to 
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my foreman, “the column is not collapsing only because it is used to 
withstanding the load.” 
I called the architect from the building site to tell him about the cracks. 
He already knew about them and knew that we had to fix the cracks. He 
asked for a price, and I told him a rough estimate. Without long hesitation, 
he told me: ‘Do what you think is best.’ That was it. (Grosse, 2017a, p. 7) 
This notion of ‘I leave it to you’ gave me freedom to decide. We had not agreed on 
anything; rather we abandoned any concept. In Derrida’s terms, it was the moment of 
suspension (1992). ‘Do what you think is best’ gives me the freedom to choose but it also 
implies responsibility. I had to fill the gap which was left for me to decide.  
I still had to follow some rules or concepts such as what material would be sufficient in 
strength to bear the load. Hence, I did not act in a void and an amount of arbitration was 
possible. The element of freedom I was given required me to act responsibly. We had agreed 
on a price for the work. This was a limitation of my freedom, as building norms and 
regulations are limitations. We could have either fixed the price very tightly on what there 
was to do, leaving me less freedom, or we could have left the price open, leaving even more 
room for me and more responsibility. For Lévinas, there is always rational and pre-rational, 
being and beyond being.  
As soon as the Other – in this case, the architect – abandons a concept, responsibility 
grows in the same measure. We may look at the phenomenon again from Lévinas’ side. The 
concepts in place suggest that I have no responsibility –in the sense of calculable 
accountability or legal accountability. Although, the underlying responsibility in Lévinas’ 
sense might be glossed over, it is always there. 
We could have easily said that the cracks were ‘not our business’ but we did not. Nobody 
could have held us accountable for them. But still, it did not feel right to keep silent. We had 
to say something. “[T]he response does not primarily refer to something which has said and 
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done but rather to something which has to be said and done.” (Waldenfels, 1995, p. 41) It 
was a responsibility beyond the concept of accountability. We just had to care for the 
architect’s issues. And furthermore, giving me freedom and leaving this responsibility to my 
foreman and me was also a defining moment for me as a moral self.  
Furthermore, in mentioning the cracks to the architect, I assumed responsibility for them 
and subsequently on the architect’s behalf. I could communicate what I thought was 
appropriate to do at this moment. In relation to the Other – the architect but also my foreman. 
I could make a choice and set a precedent in Derrida’s terms, therefore defining myself. 
Although this is a minor issue, I am trying to make the point that although rational 
concepts may get in the way of seeing our ultimate responsibility, this ethical response is 
still there. It may be reduced to the sentence: “you can’t do that!” In our case, keeping silent 
about the cracks in the column. We felt it was our obligation to do something and to say 
something about it. In other words, I was already responsible without assuming this 
responsibility (Lévinas, 1961). Ethics come in this very hands-on example before any 
concept. In retrospect, I wonder whether the architect expected us to act in this way and if 
he did, what would Lévinas have to say about it? 
Either way, one approaches the relation of being and responsibility and one cannot escape 
primordial responsibility. It always precedes and therefore trumps any concept or 
philosophy. I think responsibility and trust belong together as they are both pre-conscious. 
When a person trusts, he counts on the responsible actions of the person he trusts in. To trust 
is to hand over responsibility or, put in Lévinas’ words, to be vulnerable by the Other. This 
must happen before I know anything about the Other and even before I am conscious of 
myself. The desire to sense the Other requires trusting – to sense the Other and to be close 
to him I have to trust him. 
But to think of trust this way we have to relocate it. Trust in the sense I am using here is 
not bound to a concept. It is primordial trust - the trust of a child in its caregiver, the 
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thoughtless blind trust of a lover, the becoming one with the Other (Peperzak, 2013) by 
subordinating myself. Trusting is primarily a belief in the Good. It inextricably belongs to 
responsibility and to a belief in the Other’s goodness prior to objectification, reason and 
being. 
Although it looks almost like a reciprocal relationship, I hesitate to call it one. I am 
responsible to and for the Other without being able to claim anything. “Reciprocity is his 
affair.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 98) It is the responsibility before any rights or claims as it is with 
my trust in the Other. It precedes everything. It is already there before I am aware of it – 
before any obligation of the Other towards me. This is the very sense of trust’s vulnerability. 
If there were a counterclaim, I would limit my vulnerability. Hence, it would not be genuine 
trust but rather a calculation of risks.  
Calculation belongs to the realm of essence or of being, but to Lévinas there is not only 
being there is also otherwise than being. Therefore, he developed in ‘Otherwise than Being’ 
(Lévinas, 1974b) the notion of Saying and Said. 
Saying and Said 
Saying and Said are the main theme of ‘Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence’. Saying 
and Said are a further development of desire, Same and Other. In Totality and Infinity, the 
self has a desire towards the Other. Later in ‘Otherwise than Being’, one scarcely finds any 
reference to desire. Now we are provided with the Saying, which is not a desire for the Other 
but “to give something of oneself” (Atterton & Calarco, 2005, p. 61) - an address to the 
Other. It is the calling into question or “an order out of oneself.” (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 148) 
To say is to approach a neighbor, “dealing him signifyingness.” Saying is 
communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as exposure. 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 48) 
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There is a slight difference between a desire – a wish to be with the Other – and an order 
– to give the Other a sign. But this being ordered or pushed to the Other rather than having 
a desire for or being pulled towards the Other makes its meaning to me more forcefully. A 
desire pulls me out of my comfortable home, but the order sends me out. There is something 
in me that pushes me out to the other. I do not feel comfortable at home anymore and I have 
to approach the Other.  
The subject in saying approaches a neighbor in expressing itself, in being expelled, 
in the literal sense of the term, out of any locus, no longer dwelling, not stomping any 
ground. (Lévinas, 1974b, pp. 48-49) 
This voice orders me to show myself to the Other and say “hello” (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 
143), to make me visible to the Other, to make me vulnerable, and to denude myself. “Saying 
uncovers beyond nudity […] saying is denuding of denuding.” (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 49) 
Lévinas closely links sensibility, vulnerability, and approaching the Other. It is not only 
sensing the Other but also giving to the Other. Saying is the ultimate encounter with the 
Other, prior to all concepts, knowing and being. Whereas, the Said is a further development 
of the Same. 
To Lévinas, being or essence, as he calls it, is displayed and founded in logic and reason. 
Moreover, language – especially written language – establishes what is. But when there is 
being, there also has to be a counterpart. “But being must be understood on the basis of 
being's other." (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 16). Being is in logical terms the most basic category; 
hence the Other to being cannot be conveyed easily by the use of language because language 
is already a form of being. Therefore, he distinguishes between Saying and Said.  
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Essence is not only conveyed in the Said, is not only “expressed” in it, but 
originally – though amphibologically – resounds in it qua essence. There is no 
essence or entity behind the Said, behind the Logos. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 39) 
The Said is language (often written), but Saying is the elusive momentary action of 
expressing. Or as Atterton and Calarco (2005, p. 55) distinguish: “language in its expressive 
or ethical function, called ‘saying,’ and language in its theoretical or ontological function, 
the ‘Said.’ They go on and explain “[b]ut 'saying' is not restricted to verbal or written 
communication; it also includes the possibility of material giving" (Atterton & Calarco, 
2005, p. 55). As Davis (1996, p. 77) puts it: “[f]or Levinas, Saying has its own meaning, 
quite separate from anything that might be communicated by the Said.”  
William Large coined it more prosaically in a personal conversation: “Saying is the act 
of speaking, what linguists call, utterance. The Said is what is spoken about when speaking 
but is not the speaking itself. Speaking is a relation between two people. It is not the relation 
between words and things. Levinas critique is that Western philosophy tends to favour the 
latter over the former. His argument is without the relation of speaking, which is primarily 
ethical, there would be nothing spoken about. Ontology and knowledge are therefore 
dependent on ethics, and not the other way around.” (email on May, 29th 2018) 
In the Said, we nonetheless surprise the echo of the saying, whose signification 
cannot be assembled. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 27) 
In Totality and Infinity, Lévinas argues that the Other in his otherness and his infinity 
cannot be displayed in the totality of the Same. In Otherwise than being, he develops this 
thought further. Saying cannot be displayed in the Said because when we seek to thematise 
Saying we already betray it because we force it into the structures of the Said. It is very 
similar to the violence of forcing the Other into the Same. The unfixable nature of Saying is 
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betrayed when it is thematised. But the Saying leaves its traces in the Said, as the Other is 
never the Same, is never me, but leaves me impressed, leaves his traces on me.  
To me, it is the richness of the saying as the primal human encounter, and its distinctness 
from the Said, that makes it so valuable to elucidate trust. It is not being and ontology but is 
related to it. This is very similar to trust because we find the results of trust all over society 
although we fail to explain it rationally. 
For instance, when I say something in a meeting, it might end up in the protocol or 
minutes as follows: “Henning proposed solution Y to the problem X”. But this is only a 
representation of what I said, indeed a very crude representation. Even if one wrote down 
every little detail of what I said or how I made the proposal, it can never be the act itself. It 
is not my action; I am not present any more and it is only a re-presentation of my action. 
Hence, the Saying – in the form of a verb – produces the Said in the form of a noun. 
Interacting, moving, expressing and responding produces facts, results and knowledge. 
For example, in writing minutes, my Saying produced something Said (in this case 
written). So, the writer tried to pin it down and to fix it. It is then that the Said is or exerts 
control. I am accountable for what ended up in the minutes of that meeting. Hence, it is a 
way of controlling. In the same way trust is believing in a coordinated course of action. It is 
not a fact but acting with the Other and for the other. What essentially becomes ontological 
fact is the outcome of trust. This is the result of our actions but not trust itself. 
The architect for whom we repaired the cracks knew the rough price for fixing them, but 
he believed that we would handle the issue with care. We did not write down anything but 
the outcomes – the fixed cracks and the invoice we sent – were the actual results of our trust 
– the traces the saying left on the Said. 
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The Third Party 
The third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also 
a neighbor of the Other, and not simply his fellow. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 157) 
The third party puts the relationship with the Other in a social context. The Third is the 
one that looks at us. It is yet another Other to me and the Other as well. Through the Third, 
it becomes evident that I am unable to fulfil all my responsibilities. I cannot serve both at 
the same time; I am supposed to make a choice. The entry of the Third is very much the 
‘moment’ – although it is a non-event or not an “empirical fact” (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 158) – 
I become aware of being part of society.  
The non-event must be understood again as not limiting my responsibility, and the entry 
of the Third does not ‘constrain’ my responsibility ‘to a calculus by the “force of things.”’ 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 158). It is not lifting the burden of responsibility from my shoulder, but 
it forces me to assemble my impressions, to create a Said, and to make a decision. 
At the same time, the Third is always waiting to appear. The Third, although not present 
creates a trembling - an ‘il y a’. Each action I take has an impact beyond the relation to the 
Other, it has an impact on the Third – whether present or not. In this sense, the Third creates 
even more responsibility.  
In a special sense, I become equal to the Other. We are both limitlessly responsible to the 
Third. Or as Davis (1996) reminds us, the Third party makes it possible for Lévinas to 
account for inequality and equality at the same time. Unquestionably, I am unequal to the 
Other since I am limitlessly responsible to him, but the Third party is also limitless with 
respect to the Other responsible and therefore equal to me (Davis, 1996). Yet, one should 
not misunderstand my reading. In the very encounter there is never equality for me to the 
Other, there is no reciprocity, I am responsible, limitlessly and “reciprocity is [the Other’s] 
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affair.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 98) Here, Lévinas’ thought is distinct from Buber’s equal ‘I-Thou’ 
relation (Schroeder, 2013).  
The Third breaks up the solitude of my relationship to the Other. The face to face 
relationship with the Other does no amount to ‘cosy intamacy’  – in the sense that it is unique 
relationship to the Other; it becomes one among apparently infinite relationships to Others 
(Davis, 1996, p. 52). The Third is, therefore, the foundation of society. To Lévinas society 
is not a homogenous mass of people but comprises personal relationships between one and 
his Other and the Third(s). Therefore, one needs to look at this relationship and the role of 
the Third to understand consciousness and justice. 
The entry of a third party is the very fact of consciousness, assembling into being, 
and at the same time in a being, the hour of suspension of being in possibility, the 
finitude of essence accessible to the abstraction of concepts, to the memory that 
assembles in presence, the reduction of a being to the possible and the reckoning of 
possibles, the comparison of incomparables. (Lévinas, 1974b, pp. 157-158) 
For Lévinas, justice is possible through the Third. It is the peculiar equality (in inequality) 
between me and the Other that is made possible through the Third that opens the possibility 
of justice. But the Third is not an event, it is rather the possibility – the non-event – the Third 
that is potentially present in all relationships (Davis, 1996). 
The Third does require us to compare the Other and the Third with each other. Therefore, 
we have to become conscious; we have to limit their respective infinite otherness and make 
them measurable and finally have to judge. We make a judgment about the responsibility 
toward whom we seek to fulfil.  
But justice can be established only if I, always evaded from the concept of ego, 
always desituated and divested of being, always in non-reciprocable relationship with 
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the Other, always for the Other, can become an other like the others. (Lévinas, 
1974b, pp. 160-161) 
It is this evasion of concepts, this constant back and forth between Saying and Said and 
lingering between the Other and the Third that makes the Third so important to 
understanding what trust might be. It is often when the Other does not serve me but a Third 
that I feel betrayed, left behind and think I have misplaced my trust. Therefore, my 
relationship to the Other is always situated among third party relationships. 
One can easily imagine how the engineer I discussed design solutions with [see ‘Trust 
and Reflexivity’ p. 67], and who seemed to me to yield to the power of his boss, has struggled 
with his dilemma. Should he have acted responsibly towards his boss or me? He apparently 
‘spoke’ or ‘answered’ first to his boss and not to me. But seeing him in this situation makes 
a difference. He had to make a calculation as I would have done if I had been in his place. It 
was not necessarily against me. 
[T]o be is to be with the Other (autrui) for or against the third, with the Other 
(autrui) and the third against omeself; it is to be for justice against a philosophy 
that does not see beyond being and reduces, by an abuse of language, the Saying to 
the Said and all meaning to interest. (Lévinas, 1974a, pp. 122-123) 
Lévinas locates justice in the triangular relations with the Other and the Third. It is justice 
regardless of whether the Other and the Third are against me or not. This finds resemblance 
in Derrida (1992) when he refers to justice to located in-between general principles and the 
regard of the situation – the responsibility prior to concepts. Justice is not something we can 
achieve; we can only strive for it. 
Judgments and propositions are born in justice, which is putting together, 
assembling, the being of entities. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 161) 
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Justice is the process of “putting together”. It is not static but should be understood as the 
intersection between Saying and Said. This understanding shows that it is impossible to 
achieve since as soon as one arrives at a judgment, justice has already moved on.  
“It is not that the entry of a third party would be an empirical fact […]. In the 
proximity of the Other, all the Others than the Other obsess me, and already this 
obsession cries out for justice, demands measure and knowing, is consciousness.” 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 158) 
To summarise the quotes above, the Third forces us into consciousness and consciousness 
paves the way for judgments - the Third demands judgments. We cannot avoid it as saying 
and responsibility is already there before any concept. The Third is also there – not 
necessarily physically, but he is the other Other making demands on us.  
Trust is found in this tension between me, the Other and the Third. I have shown in the 
previous chapter that trust is not to be pinned down to any particular reason or set of reasons. 
I am reluctant to sketch this as a diagram as this would violently subordinate trust to the 
realm of the Said. Trust belongs beyond being and so I deliberately avoid fixing it in an 
image. It must retain its place ‘behind the sun’ (Derrida, 1967). Therefore, after some 
methodological contemplation, I continue looking more on the pre-rational side of human 
interaction. 
Methodological Reflections 
Throughout writing and reading about Lévinas, I had the feeling of waves 
coming over me. It reminded me all the time of what Edward said - Lévinas 
comes in these small waves, like when the wind blows towards the sea. These 
waves are small they don’t do much to the beach, they just sprinkle through 
the pebbles on the beach. But Lévinas also comes as one of these huge 
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Atlantic waves that take you and tosses you around, and in the end, you 
don’t know where you are … 
That is how I feel quite often reading Lévinas. It is this constant sinking 
in of his thought this persistence, repeating, and again repeating. By this 
constant movement I understand, perhaps I believe, what he has to say. 
And then there comes this big wave. It is one or two sentences, and it 
feels like, woohoo! I am overwhelmed. I am taken aback. I must stop, 
think, and read again.  
One such sentence is his quote of Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov: 
“We are all responsible for all for all men before all, and I more than all 
the others.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 101)  
Me before all others – read again!  
But yes, who else. If responsibility is beyond knowledge, then there is 
only me for the others. I cannot claim anything from anybody, but I cannot 
let the others down.  
Up to this point I have built some scaffolding of Lévinas’ thoughts as I understand them. 
Now, I seek to fill this scaffolding with what I read and think about trust. I have already 
added some of my experiences to my understanding of Lévinas and now I am going to 
decorate the scaffolding with more of it – thoughts about trust, Lévinas, and me.  
Here, I pick up the thought of ‘thinking through writing’ again [see ‘How to start?’ p. 88] 
It is the “essential moment” (Sartre, 1975, p. 5) of writing a thought down which is one 
aspect of writing. This is an aspect of writing close to ontological thinking. However, this 
misses a central theme in Lévinas’ thought. Another aspect – and perhaps the more 
challenging one – needs to be emphasised. As Schroeder (2013, p. 480) puts it, Lévinas 
“attempts to articulate the inexplicable.” It is creating the “waves” Derrida (1967) talks 
about. It is to convey Lévinas’ pre-ontological message by means of text.  
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The metaphor of scaffolding is somewhat misleading because it suggests a fixed structure 
to be filled. This is not what Lévinas’ thought is about. His project goes deliberately beyond 
conceptual frameworks. “Levinas recognises that there is no thought before language and 
outside of it—except by formally and thematically posing the question of the relations 
between belonging and the opening, the question of closure.” (Derrida, 1967, p. 138). Yet, 
the metaphor might be helpful for the time being. We should be prepared to deconstruct it 
(or let it deconstruct itself) when the time comes (Derrida, 1988).  
When I began to think about reflexivity, one of my first readings was Pillow (2003) and 
Chiseri-Strater (1996). They emphasise the importance of the Other to be reflexive. Reading 
Lévinas, I understood the value of the Other for a reflexive methodology much better. 
Perhaps, I am supposed to go even further. Is Lévinas’ thought deconstruction brought to 
the edge? Am I able to talk about methodology at all? Edward recently asked, “Can one 
really reflect on Lévinas’ ethics given that they exist before consciousness, which is needed 
for reflection?” I may reflect on the traces of Lévinas’ ethics but not on ethics itself. I may 
reflect on the awareness of the unknowable. What does this feeling of inadequacy, not being 
able to grasp or to express and this trembling mean to me? 
Writing this I feel the wave coming over me, taking over me, and moving me – Lévinas 
at his best. 
Significance for the Businessman 
As I have outlined above, Lévinas does not regard any human act, apart from the 
primordial encounter with the Other as value-free. Apart from being with the Other, 
everything has some value for us. I strive, since I sensed the Other, for sensing the Other 
again and again. I want to be a responsible, social and caring being. For me, that is one of 
Lévinas’ central messages. But it is only a striving or a continuous attempt to act responsibly 
and on the path to it are numerous obstacles. In principle, they boil down to the decision of 
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whether I serve one or the other person. This decision - the very impossibility of 
reconciliation of the different demands - is the daily struggle I face. 
It is the question of whether I demand more money from my client or squeeze out more 
from my supplier, let my workers work harder or shoulder the financial burden myself and 
pay the bill. I am supposed to keep my business running just for the sake of the people around 
me. I am responsible for my employees, suppliers, customers, and any other I am interacting 
with. Although I cannot serve all at once, nor will I achieve a just balance, I am supposed to 
strive for it. And last, but not least I have to eat myself. I am supposed to keep my business 
running otherwise, I cannot serve anybody. This is one direction in which Lévinas’ notion 
of responsibility overflows. 
Another dimension of overflow is the impact my actions in business have on the others 
around me. When I ask a supplier for an extra discount, push hard against an architect’s 
demand or make my employees work extra hours, it has an impact beyond what I can see 
and think of. What does it mean to be a subcontractor when the price is not sufficient to 
cover his costs? Could I have known that before? And even if not, am I able to help him 
anyway or is it okay to leave the risk and in this case the damage with him? I cannot say 
beforehand where my responsibility ends. I am unable to say what ought to be done before 
I am in the actual situation.  
Lévinas’ discussion of the disturbance of the Other’s face reminds me of this situation. I 
may be in the position to say, ‘I am not accountable for your mistake. It is legally not my 
business to check your prices in that depth’. However, I suspect what impact my insistence 
on a contract can have for the Other. It can lead him to severe economic difficulties and may 
even mean the company goes bankrupt. Is that appropriate or just? In this case, can it be 
ethical to insist on our contract? Is not the flexible approach to a partner’s abilities – as 
shown by Weir (2011) in Arab countries – a more ethical approach, because it takes the 
Other into account? This is to me the very disturbance of the Other in his vulnerability. 
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But when I give it to him, I cannot give it to someone else, let alone care for my own 
economic survival. When I am generous and supportive, I give away money or time or both. 
Do my kids value that I made life less hard for someone who made a costly mistake? Now 
they may miss me even more. It is a dilemma and, therefore, unsolvable. I am constantly 
faced with it. I must reduce it to my Said to cope with the overflow of responsibility, but I 
know I am unjust and violent. 
Why Lévinas? 
For around 10 years I have taken an hour’s coaching session almost every month. In these 
sessions, I deal with my personal problems (I first thought) and dilemmas (I now know). 
Quite often the coach helps me to turn upon myself. We explore issues and at some point he 
asks me to tell the story in the words of the other involved. One may understand this as a 
practitioner’s application of Pillow’s approach (2003) only she applied it to research practice 
and not to professional practice. Yet in the end, the only person who is responsible for a 
change of perspective and subsequently change of action is me. 
Reading it this way it looks almost obvious that Lévinas’ philosophy was tailored for me. 
At times during fairly uncomfortable reflections (to use Pillow’s words) and disturbing 
encounters (to use Lévinas’ words) I got used to the idea that I am the one to change things. 
Others might be accountable or responsible but this is their ‘affair’ (Lévinas, 1982) – I am 
ultimately responsible before all others. I return to the Brothers Karamazov: “I more than all 
the others.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 101) 
If I had come from a legal background without previous encounters with this sort of 
reflexivity, I may not have appreciated this way of thinking. Perhaps I am just very lucky to 
have met Theo, who gave me the hint to seek professional advice with a coach. In my civil 
engineer’s worldview, these thoughts are regarded as strange, if not outright insane. In this 
world, what counts is what is written or agreed on. If someone is wrong, it is his business 
and not mine.  
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However, it would be unjust to generalise in this way as I frequently see people acting 
differently. Although, this accountability is the hallmark of my industry, there is often a more 
modest way of dealing with things. People understand their own imperfection and therefore 
help others when they fail to do the perfect thing. They can be forgiving. 
Perhaps it is this view of ethics, as being what is already there before we have concepts, 
that suggests that Lévinas’ thought might be of value for understanding trust. It is this 
forgiveness and the appreciation of our imperfection which stems from divine subjectivity. 
There is a crack in everything, that’s where the light gets in. Leonard Cohen 
(1992) 
For me, this crack in our understanding of trust is Möllering’s (2006) leap of faith. We 
assess, but at some point we have to break with the assessment. This is similar to 
Kierkegaard’s break with reflection – faith is not to be justified by objective reason but by 
“individual choice and inner commitment.” (Gardiner, 1998, p. 240) There is no perfect 
calculation of trust. We have to break with it. If a person looks too perfect – the person is 
completely able, benevolent and integer, to use the terms of Mayer et al. (1995) we do not 
trust them. I will not deny the value of their observation but the traits of ability, benevolence, 
and integrity are not sufficient to trust someone. We do not believe in this person because 
we miss the human ‘crack’ on the surface. We do not see any vulnerability.  
Pre-rational trust 
A number of the concepts related to trust such as control, understanding and knowledge 
are rooted in rationality and reason. In the chapter before, I show how and why they fail to 
explain the nature of trust. In this section, I link trust not to the Said, which is reason and 
knowledge, but to Saying, which belongs to the beyond being. I will therefore explore the 
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related concepts of responsibility, vulnerability, sensibility and enjoyment, which to Lévinas 
belong to the realm of the pre-rational. Finally, I return to the role of the Third party.  
The frequently cited ABI (ability, benevolence, integrity) model supposes knowledge 
about the other I am about to trust (Mayer et al., 1995). But is it actually possible to know 
the Other? I may listen more carefully, may reflect on my perception, be critical about the 
conceptual boxes (Weick, 2006) I use for the Other, or reflexively think about my influence 
over the Other, but the Other is still unknowable. To some extent we are able to translate the 
Other into our own categories as Lévinas translates the Other into the same or the Said. 
However, the nature of the otherness of the Other – being foreign to myself – does not allow 
for a complete translation. Hence, the Other will always stay a stranger to me. Consequently, 
I am unable to understand the Other. Although I may try and employ even more sophisticated 
strategies to understand the Other, I cannot succeed (Grosse, 2015b). Therefore, some trust 
is always required. 
Knowing the Other 
Mark IV 
When I visited Mark’s office for the first time I thought, he is definitely a 
showman - the expensive car, the well-furnished office, especially the big 
screen. What sort of cultural signs are these? Whom does he want to 
impress? All that costs a lot of money; money he might have earned, 
hopefully. Does he want to impress his clients? "look I am successful, and 
you will also be in my company." Or are the clients the ones with a lot of 
money and he wants to show them that he is one of their group? That he 
belongs to that group. What does that mean to our relationship? Do I also 
belong to this group? Should I? I don't think or feel so. I sought to meet him 
on a different level - on a different playing field. 
126 Emmanuel Lévinas  
Henning Grosse  
When we employ reflexivity, we try to reduce the otherness and the unfamiliar in the 
other person. I seek to step into the shoes of the other to understand him better. What does 
he think, under which pressures does he act and what are his preferences? The metaphor ‘to 
step into another one’s shoes’ implies that these shoes are the same size as my own - that 
they fit me. But that is not a given. I may act, think and feel a bit like the other but there is 
still a unique otherness in him which cannot be translated into a sameness (Lévinas, 1961). 
I could never really understand Mark’s taste in cars, clothes, and furniture. I could find 
some reasons for his choices, but they remained strange to me. In the end, I must admit that 
I cannot see everything and that I am unable to grasp the whole picture (Berlin, 2013). One 
may argue that this is just a professional relationship, however, I do not fully know my 
friends; I only know them as friends. It is a truism that I only know people from a number 
of very particular perspectives.  
My inability to understand everything is only part of the story. Or as Möllering (2006) 
argues, we have difficulty acquiring knowledge about others, and often this information is 
inconsistent. It is not only that I struggle to translate what the Other is from one register into 
another register, thereby seeking to narrow the liminal gap in-between the two registers (Iser, 
2000). According to Lévinas, it is not about that gap. Regardless of whether or not I know 
something about the Other, this person stays a stranger.  
For Berlin (2013) it was my inability to see, sense or to comprehend [see also 
‘Knowledge’ p. 26], but Lévinas guides us to the fundamental difference of the Other that is 
impossible to overcome. There are still parts of the Other that will always remain strange to 
me. It is the fundamental Otherness of the stranger. The Other will never fit into my limited 
categories, he infinitely overflows them. Again, the Other “escapes my grasp by an essential 
dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my sight” (Lévinas, 1961, 
p. 39). It is the Other’s essential otherness – alterity – that makes it impossible to see them 
in full. Therefore, I must revise my earlier writings.  
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In Trust and construction projects - An auto-ethnographic exploration (Grosse, 2015b) 
[see ‘Appendix C’ p. 302] I sought to understand the engineer, his pressures, and constraints 
to make better judgments whether and how to trust him. Ultimately, I was unable to 
understand him and his action fully. The reason for this incomplete understanding I located 
in the hermeneutic nature of our world. We see only a part and our understanding is evolving 
all the time because new insights cause new readings. Now, I have to revise these 
conclusions. I attempted to make the Other the Same and, therefore, according to Lévinas, 
to kill him. 
This is problematic in two respects. The first problem is related to my understanding of 
the Other the second to my understanding of trust.  
The first problem arose when I sought to translate his otherness into sameness which is 
never completely possible (Lévinas, 1961). This being Other implies that I must fail to 
understand the Other completely. It is beyond my abilities to grasp him in his whole 
complexity and constant flux. Although I may develop and employ ever more sophisticated 
methods of understanding and knowing, it is our very Otherness that inhibits me – and him 
as well – to understand one another. 
The sophistication of my methods is situated within the Said, my knowing and 
understanding, as I used the terms in Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b) reside 
in the realm of ontology. Therefore, I will fail since I tried to understand the infinite otherness 
of the Other. But it is impossible to translate Saying into Said as infinity cannot be finitude.  
I wonder whether I am just dealing with my self-conception of the Other, or in Iser’s 
(2000) terms - a translation of the Other into the register of the Same. Then what I actually 
see and comprehend is not the Other but rather my representation of the other in the register 
of the Same, which cannot and never will be the Other. It is only a re-presentation of the 
Other and not a presentation of him.  
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However, on this basis, we seek to control the other. Rousseau et al. (1998) highlight both 
functions of control in relation to trust. “Control, as manifested in laws and reputational 
sanctions, acts as a deterrent for opportunism. These mechanisms, however, can serve as a 
springboard for the creation of trust” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 400). At the same time 
“institutional controls can also undermine trust” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 400) or as O'Neill 
(2002b) puts it: through ever more control “we find in fact growing reports of mistrust”. But 
this ever more fine-grained control inevitably results in more and more inconsistencies in 
our understanding of the other since it refers to my inaccurate translation of him. 
Control operates in the realm of the Said. Control relies on ontology. But the Other and 
the Other’s presentation to me, his or her Saying escapes the Said. The problem seems to be 
that by identifying traces of the Saying in the Said, I make myself believe I could control the 
Other. But in our interaction the Saying is beyond control and so is the Other. 
The second problem became evident when thinking about understanding the Other and 
trust. My efforts to understand the Other and his context (Grosse, 2015b) only give me 
internal legitimacy to act on the trust I have or to refrain from doing so. It is to assess the 
likelihood of the desired outcome – whether the Other acts as I would like him to act or does 
not. This leads to the second problem - that I tried to rationalise trust. As we have seen, trust 
escapes calculation and cannot be pinned down to one reason or a set of reasons. It is not 
found in ontology – in the Said – but beyond ontology. Therefore, I am going to explore 
whether I can relate trust to being’s other and hence separate it from ontology.  
The Value of Otherness  
It sounds as if we were lost because we have no means to control the Other fully and 
therefore must live with a permanent uncertainty about the Other’s intentions and actions, 
but there is immense value in this infinite alterity. 
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The Other as Other is not only an alter ego; the Other is what I am not (Lévinas, 
1947b, p. 83) 
Cohen reflects on this sentence in the following footnote: ‘For Lévinas this formulation 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion […] that alterity is only encountered through 
negation. […] alterity encountered through negation is merely relative, not absolute, alterity. 
To grasp alterity outside even negativity, and thus in a truly positive “sense,” is perhaps the 
essence of Lévinas’ entire effort.’ (Lévinas, 1947b, p. 83) 
The Other is neither for nor against me; the Other is disinterested. The Other sees, thinks 
and acts differently. The Other can see, think and do other things as I could. This is the high 
value of the Other to me. I can achieve things with him that I could never accomplish alone. 
This is the creative power of trust that Barbalet (2009) refers to. This creative power is not 
only the sum of two individuals but what they can achieve together. Trust is not just scaling 
up our capabilities, it also offers the prospect of synergies. Two can achieve more than the 
sum of what each can reach alone. This does not imply equality between me and the Other 
or that I can demand something from her or him.  
To Peperzak (2013), for the task at hand, I become part of the Other, and the Other 
becomes part of me. But this relation cannot be one of sameness nor of equality. We both 
stay individuals – the Other is not at my disposal. He must not be at my disposal as this 
would mean stripping him of his otherness, or in Lévinas’ words, to kill him. 
To benefit from the Other, I am required to let him be fundamentally different and not to 
make him the Same. Only when I give the other this freedom can I benefit from the Other. 
One may argue that work relationships are different from the encounter between the Other 
and me in Lévinas’ thought. But I would argue, that similar to Caputo’s example (2000), 
underneath the structures of the work environment there is ethics since we are still human 
beings. I may distance myself from the Others and only see masks, but as soon as I get closer, 
I will see the Other’s face (Bauman, 1993). This calls for responsible actions. 
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I return to the story of cracks in the column [see ‘The Cracks’ p. 109]. The architect was 
very busy and only came to the building site for a couple of minutes. There were piles of 
work on his desk, and one meeting followed the other. He could not really afford to develop 
and overlook the solution, especially because the real extent (the depth and the length) of the 
cracks only emerged when my bricklayers repaired it. The architect would have had to stay 
on or come to the building site several times a day. To discuss each step with the architect 
would have been utterly impractical– for him and us. Therefore, by trusting each other, we 
could make our work much more comfortable and achieve much more. He could do his work 
in the office, and my bricklayers were much faster. 
But the more significant value surfaces when I think about the different perspectives the 
Other can provide. I do not, and probably will never see, the world in the way the Other sees 
it. This is an aspect of the cracks example [see ‘The Cracks’ p. 109] that I return to again 
later. 
Preconscious Trust 
The Other must not be killed or translated into the Same. We cannot subordinate him to 
rationality but must understand this relationship outside of rationality. We find this already 
in Løgstrup’s “claim that trusting and calculativeness are different modes of engaging” 
(Løgstrup (1997) cited in Frederiksen, 2014, p. 35). 
Zucker (1986) also hints in a similar direction. She conceptualises trust as preconscious 
expectation. For Simmel (1907, p. 179) “very few relationships would endure if trust were 
not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation.” Then trust has a 
preconscious nature in common with Lévinas’ encounter with the other and the notion of 
‘Saying.’ 
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Mark V 
When I think about my trust of Mark, it’s a story of ambivalence. I have 
the feeling that he is a guy I could go out with for a beer – having fun on a 
weekend’s night. But I am not sure whether he sticks to his word. During the 
project, I had little evidence to the contrary. He did what he said. My gut told 
me to trust, but my head said: be careful. 
But who governs the head or the gut? Perhaps I only saw what my gut 
allowed me to see. Or although my head told me to search for something that 
justifies not trusting I could not find anything. 
To Lévinas, the Said is the theoretical and ontological function of interacting (Atterton & 
Calarco, 2005). We can then relate the Said to reason and knowledge. My assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the Other (Grosse, 2015b) was then an approach to establish trust by 
means of the Said. But explaining my trust in terms of the Said became difficult. I merely 
reduced my risk and so the word ‘trustworthiness’ becomes slightly odd. I do not follow 
Möllering (2006) and assess whether the Other is worth my trust, I rather look for a reason 
to act on my trust. The Other seems to be always worth my trust. I am responsible for my 
“persecutors,” “for [the Other’s] fault by me.” (Lévinas, 1974b, pp. 111, 118). I have to trust 
and approach my persecutors. I have to speak to them as they are worth my trust before I 
can think about it.  
Hence, I separate trust as an attitude towards the other from the very action I take. Then 
it is not about whether the Other is worth my trust but whether it is reasonable and likely to 
be beneficial to act on trust. However, should one think of trust as ethics in terms of benefits? 
That is difficult if not altogether misplaced. Because benefits belong to the realm of the Said 
but not to ethics or the Saying. But relating trust to Saying other than being might help to 
elucidate how the leap of faith (Möllering, 2006) must be understood. Therefore, I now seek 
to shed more light on the shortcomings of the Said in helping us build trust.  
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The ‘Said’ is what is already expressed or communicated in language. It is the written 
word which is controlled, given or granted. Both the ‘Said’ and the ‘Saying’ are closely 
related to each other as everything that is written (or otherwise recorded) needs to be 
expressed in the first place. ‘Saying’ produces the ‘Said’ and dissolves in the very moment 
of this production, but leaves its traces on the ‘Said’ (Lévinas, 1974b). Trust and control are 
a closely related pair. They exist close to each other and belong to each other. But both 
cannot be in the same ‘place’ in one moment. Considering trust and control, I find patterns 
similar to Saying and Said. Too much control inhibits trust (O'Neill, 2002b). Control (Said) 
can be too dominant leaving no room for trust (Saying). If the control serves as a springboard 
it has to leave considerable space to grow trust – a vast penumbra, as Farrell (2009) wrote . 
To be sure, the above-cited authors show that more control – a form of the Said – is not a 
source or reason for trust. 
When Möllering (2006) speaks of a ‘leap of faith’, are we left with some sort of black 
box? We accumulate knowledge to a certain degree and at some point we struggle to make 
any more progress (Grosse, 2015b). At some point we cannot know any more about the other 
and at that point we suspend our rationality and have to trust (Möllering, 2006). But can we 
stop thinking? “If one has to philosophize, one has to philosophize; if one does not have to 
philosophize, one still has to philosophize (to say it and think it). One always has to 
philosophize.” (Aristotle cited by Derrida, 1967, p. 152) But as we know, one “cannot trust 
at will” (Baier, 1986, p. 244); i.e. one cannot rationally choose to trust. Trust must then be 
located in another dimension. Again, when the ground for trust is not found in reason - in 
Said - we have to look for it in the Saying – in otherwise than being.  
We have seen above that Saying is responding to the Other. It is permanently there. As 
Derrida (1967) describes, it is the wave that constantly hits the shore without pause. It is 
there before we are aware of it. We therefore do not choose Saying and do not choose to 
trust. We must look differently at trust. When "being must be understood on the basis of 
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being's other." (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 16) and when reason cannot sufficiently explain trust 
then trust needs to be understood in terms of reason’s other.  
Responsibility 
We should step back again and approach the topic from a rational perspective. 
Machiavelli (1515) argues as follows: 
While you do them good, they are yours, offering you their blood, property, lives, 
and children, as I said above, when the need for them is far away; but, when it is close 
to you, they revolt. And that prince who has founded himself entirely on their words, 
stripped of other preparation, is ruined […]. And men have less hesitation to offend 
one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a 
chain of obligation, which, because men are wicked, is broken at every opportunity for 
their own utility, but fear is held by a dread of punishment that never forsakes you. 
(Machiavelli, 1515, pp. 66-67) 
When we stick to the Machiavellian conclusion that we should not trust anyone who does 
not have a self-interest in acting trustworthily, we ought to be prepared to attack the other 
pre-emptive. Bailey (2006, p. 1) writes, “when I am not confident that others have enough 
such fear, I should be prepared to pre-empt” their attacks with attacks of my own. That would 
lead to vicious spirals of distrust (Bailey, 2006). But we do not attack or approach each other 
with mistrust and suspicion. We walk through our towns and cities without the fear of being 
attacked and we do not attack others on the basis of Machiavelli’s conclusion. Rather we act 
most of the time benevolently towards others and approach them with responsibility.  
Responsibility for the other, this way of answering without prior commitment, is 
human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 116) 
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Hence, I approach the other with responsibility without having chosen it. This 
responsibility began before we started reasoning. For Lévinas, to be responsible for the Other 
is not my decision. I already have a responsibility before I am aware of it. “The self is sub-
jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything.”(Lévinas, 1974b, 
p. 116). I am not able to escape this responsibility. Hence, I approach the Other peacefully; 
I do not attack him since my responsibility towards him does not allow that. This means I 
am supposed to accept vulnerability. As I have explained before, without being able to claim 
the same from the Other, I have to lay myself bare. 
The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to questions, it is 
proximity. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 157) 
Approaching the Other results in being close to the Other. Being close to the Other whom 
we do not know and being in proximity to him, we act responsibly to and for the Other. Then 
acting responsibly is acting on trust. This might be the basis of trust to be received. “[… The] 
proximity he is describing is not a relationship based on consciousness or knowing.” (Hand, 
2009, p. 54) Hence, we have to locate responsibility in the realm of saying. 
Responsibility for the other, in its antecedence to my freedom, its antecedence to 
the present and to representation, is a passivity more passive than all passivity, an 
exposure to the other without this exposure being assumed, an exposure without 
holding back, exposure of exposedness expressing saying. This exposure is the 
frankness sincerity, veracity of saying. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 15) 
Pettit (1995) shows how displayed trust has a cunning effect on the trustee. When one 
recognises that one is trusted the person has reason to appear as a trustworthy person to the 
other and eventual witnesses and to act as expected. However, he speaks of an ‘intrinsic 
desire’ for the ‘trustor’s good opinion’ (Pettit, 1995, p. 216) which can also be read as taking 
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responsibility. In fact, executing discretionary powers is an act of taking responsibility for 
things handed over (Baier, 1986).  
Lévinas points to the pre-conscious nature of responsibility: "There is a paradox in 
responsibility, in that I am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though an 
order slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in, like an effect of one of 
Plato's wandering causes" (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 13). This resonates with Baier’s observation, 
that “trusting is rarely begun by making up one’s mind to trust, but it often has no definite 
initiation of any sort[…]” (Baier, 1986, p. 240). Fouché (2006) sees the origins of trust 
beyond reason. Therefore, in Lévinas’ terms, trust is our ethical response.  
This clarifies the link between trust and desire and enjoyment [see ‘Sensibility and 
Enjoyment’ p. 97]. Pettit (1995) sees a cunning power in recognition of trust placed in me 
which I might understand as originating in a responsible approach to the Other. Recognizing 
this I cannot but trust the Other as it is beyond will (Baier, 1986) is elusive (Bailey, 2006),and 
there is no point in searching for a reason by the trustor. The trustor inevitably suspends 
rationality and trusts (Möllering, 2006) – he cannot do otherwise. 
Vulnerability and Exposure 
This exposure is the frankness, sincerity, veracity of saying. [...] but saying 
uncovering itself, that is, denuding itself of its skin, sensibility on the surface of the 
skin, at the edge of the nerves, offering itself of its even in suffering - and thus wholly 
sign, signing itself. Substitution, at the limit of being, ends up in saying, in the giving 
of signs, giving a sign of this giving of signs, expressing oneself. This expression is 
antecedent to all thematization in the Said. (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 15).  
To act on trust makes us literally and metaphorically susceptible to hurt. This notion is 
common among trust researchers (e.g.; Baier, 1986; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 
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1998). To be vulnerable is to be at risk of physical, psychic, or emotional pain but also to 
suffer from material loss and to experience economic loss or any combination of these. 
Lévinas says that the exposure to the Other belongs inextricably to the saying. In 
addressing the Other, I make myself vulnerable. Therefore, I must have an assumption or 
belief that the Other will not hurt me and will treat me well. In other words, to say something 
to the Other, I need to trust this Other. 
I have ‘already’ assumed our pre-conscious responsibility which results in the ethical 
encounter with the Other – in Saying. I am responsible for the Other – beyond any doubt – 
the Other is therefore right to trust me by pre-conscious default. However, we trust without 
being able to actively claim for any form of reciprocity. “But to say that the other has to 
sacrifice himself to the others would be to preach human sacrifice.” (Lévinas, 1974b, p. 126) 
Again, “that is his [the Other’s] affair.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 98) To actively claim reciprocity 
would require us to locate responsibility in the realm of ontology, as only a fixed concept 
would allow for such reasoning. In the realm beyond being, concepts lose their validity and 
this claim would be obsolete.  
The Other can merely expect me to fulfil my obligation to him and to act responsibly. 
However, Lévinas points us to an ‘overflow of responsibility’ (Lévinas, 1961, p. 245). This 
means I face the impossibility of fulfilling my obligations. I simply cannot do more. I am 
limited but responsibility is not. But still, the Other implicitly makes demands.  
This understanding of Saying shows that an experienced betrayal can be very painful, 
because in responsibly approaching the Other, in the act an honest saying, and in trusting as 
responsible approaching, one lays oneself bare to others. 
Vulnerability goes beyond reason and the things valued (Baier, 1986). It hurts and scars 
the self as I lay myself bare and exposed to the Other. However, I cannot hold the Other 
accountable for my suffering.  
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The Third Party 
If we had a simple ‘I-Thou’ relationship the overflow of responsibility would be quite 
easy - I would do what I can to fulfil my obligations and the other would recognise this. I 
would actually try to the point of exhaustion. But there is the Third party. 
In an interview Lévinas explained: 
"But, with the appearance of the third, the third must also have a face. If the third 
is also a face, one must know whom to speak to first. Who is the first face? And in this 
sense, I am led to compare the faces, to compare two people. Which is a terrible task. 
It is entirely different from speaking to the face. To compare them is to place them in 
the same genre." (Wright et al., 1988, p. 174) 
It is the Third party that puts my trust into question. On a practical level, it is a question 
of whether I act responsibly towards the Other or the Third and whether the person I trust 
does what I expect or serves someone else – some Third. It is the question of which kind of 
judgments I make. 
I have to decide and execute the ‘terrible task’ of choosing between two persons. I have 
to reduce my relationship with the Other into calculation into being and address the 
relationship with the Third in the same way. I have to be violent and then I make a judgment 
of which obligation I am going to fulfil. 
In Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b) [see ‘Appendix C’ p. 302], I sought 
to reduce my trust in the engineer to a simple calculation. I essentially tried to display the 
trust I put in him, which is saying, in terms of calculation and which is said. I reduced the 
infinite of trust to the finite of calculation. This must result in a betrayal of the saying - of 
trust.  
By the time I addressed it to my limited capabilities and the evolving nature of every 
relation, I still did not account for what is beyond calculation. I believed further 
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sophistication could solve my trust problem and that trust could be part of the totality of 
being. I did not recognise that trust is already there before I make sense of the world around 
me. We have reasons to act in a certain way but they are insufficient: 
"There may be reasons for what one says or does, but not sufficient reasons; and 
someone may be calculable in what he says or does, but never totally calculable, in 
spite of the possibility of imputation." (Waldenfels, 1995, p. 41) 
Trust is an example in point here. We relate it to reason, but ultimately, they miss the 
point. Trust comes from beyond reason. Trust in my understanding is a form of saying which 
is infinite. It is a basic human interaction that emerges at the same moment as it disappears. 
It has an elusive nature and we cannot capture it. We have to imagine trust as the wave hitting 
the shore (Derrida, 1967, p. 398). Calculation, on the other hand, is easy to determine; it is 
hard facts, numbers, arguments, knowledge; it is being and said, it is control. Trust is not 
being. Trust operates outside of being; it is as Frederiksen (2014) argues, a different mode 
of interaction.  
The Third forces us to make these decisions. We can and have to decide because we 
cannot serve everybody – our responsibility is far too great. But at the same time we see the 
other making decisions as well. We recognise the Other’s shortcomings and we realise that 
the Other can also not fulfil his obligations. He breaks trust with regard to us and others.  
Hence, we can calculate his decisions. We actually seek to predict his way of calculating, 
but that has little to do with the basic nature of trust, which operates in another dimension. 
Trust is irreducible to being. There is a constant movement between these two modes of 
interaction. There is the encounter with the infinite Other which is irreducible to being, 
which is saying and trust. Then there is the Third which forces us into consciousness and 
demands us to make sense of the encounter, to compare the other with the third, to reduce 
both to being and to calculate and to judge.  
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Summary 
Lévinas’ contribution to our understanding of trust is simple but far-reaching. Trust is 
ethics and ethics is first philosophy. Prior to calculation, we trust. Turning Möllering’s 
argument around, we do not suspend rationality or take the leap of faith and trust, but we 
suspend trust, stop believing in the Good, and start to calculate – start to believe in 
rationality. 
But since our knowledge - the very ‘facts’ we base our calculation on are born in saying, 
in subjectivity and in trusting, we only superficially cease to trust. The underlying condition 
of trust is not to go away.  
It is this tension between what Lévinas first called desire and then developed into the 
force, that pushes me to the Other. Not feeling at home with oneself and the urge of saying 
and the Third is what calls on me to decide who is the first Other and that calls me to 
rationalise and to subordinate the Others under the Said.  
We cannot avoid trusting Others altogether because we need sociality. This sociality 
makes it possible to assemble the Saying into the Said. As Large (2015, p. 44) says, “the 
world we experience as meaningful would dissolve into apparitions and phantasms” if the 
existing “community of speakers” (Large, 2015, p. 44) were absent. We would have nobody 
who shares the signifier for the ‘thing’ we experience. Similarly, our knowledge is based on 
the accounts other give us and to a certain extent we must trust them to tell the truth 
(McMyler, 2011). Only in this way do the signifiers become meaningful. And these shared 
signifiers are necessary to form consciousness. 
To Lévinas, all sense of being – the constitution of the I – arises from the encounter with 
the Other. In this encounter, we sense and enjoy the face – the presentation of the Other. In 
giving these sensations and enjoyments names, we lift them into consciousness and acquire 
the ability to thematise them. They become experiences we are able to process. 
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However, the act of communication, in whatever form, always consists of two elements 
- the saying (expressive and ethical) and the Said (theoretical and ontological). Both belong 
to each other cannot be translated into each other. The Said is to Lévinas the being, and the 
saying is ‘being’s other.' 
Since our very selfhood is constituted by the encounter with the Other, we are responsible 
to the other without limits. This responsibility originates prior to consciousness and so 
locates it in the saying in ‘being’s other.' Hence it cannot be restricted by ontology and is, 
therefore, unlimited. 
However, the Third to our relationship with the Other is another Other. Therefore, we 
have to decide between the two (or more) to whom we speak first – who is the first other.  
I understand trust as a form of saying, a form of responding to the Other, a way of making 
me vulnerable, of stepping in for the other and of substitution. Me for the Other, ‘après vous’. 
But then trust must be distinct from any form of reasoning. It must operate in a completely 
different dimension. Trust is beyond, beneath and on the hither side of ontology. To me, it 
is basic human interaction which occurs before any concept or consciousness. It is always 
there and does not disappear. It is recurring in its nature. It only recedes temporarily if 
rationality becomes too dominant or if humanity is subordinated to reason and to being. This 
is when the ethical dimension of trust is reduced to concepts and the basic human interaction 
steps into the background leaving the stage for reasoning and control – for sameness and 
totality. 
Methodological Implications 
Ethics 
For Lévinas, society is not comprised of a homogenous mass of people. It is a multiplicity 
of I-s and Others and Thirds which are related to each other in a web of relationships, each 
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constructing his version of the world and refining, comparing, and negotiating the version 
with the Others around him. 
I am only in this net a tiny part. And I seek to refine, compare and negotiate my version 
of the world. Hence, I investigate the “fusion of private and social” (Ellis, 1991, p. 26). 
Lévinas leads me to a similar point. We are only ourselves in response to the other (Lévinas, 
1974b). We need the other to define ourselves. Or as Davis (1996, p. 80) puts it: “Exposure 
to the Other is the bedrock of my selfhood; it is the condition of subjectivity, not an aspect 
of it.” Hence, in the situation from the previous chapter, I distinguished myself from the 
other – the engineer – by insisting not to hand over the demanded the bill of quantities [see 
‘Writing in the evening’ p. 32]. Although to hand over such information had some 
antecedents for me at the very moment the engineer and later the client demanded it from 
me. This caused strong feelings in me. Hence, the encounter with the engineer and the way 
she approached me was the actual cause of my emotions - of my subjectivity. 
It is this area between rationality and subjectivity – between the calculating agent and 
vulnerable self - where autoethnography is strongest. “[A]utoethnographic works present an 
intentionally vulnerable subject.” (Holman Jones et al., 2013, p. 24) But, I would argue, that 
autoethnographers do not intentionally present themselves but are vulnerable. To Lévinas, 
we cannot avoid being vulnerable.  
However, one must be careful. “Indeed, while vulnerability has compelling dramatic and 
evocative virtues, most of us have parts of our lives that we consider too sensitive to reveal 
to scholarly or other audiences” (Anderson & Glass-Coffin, 2013, p. 76). It is the ethical 
demand of the Other – in this case, our readers – which demands vulnerability and exposure 
from us but at the same time, we ought to rationalise the possible consequences of our 
writings – for us and others. However, the consequences – although thoroughly thought 
through and rationalised must be questioned again and again. Ethics cannot be founded on 
some general principle.  
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In this regard, Lévinas’ thinking is of particular help and particular difficulty. It is our 
obligation to constantly question what we do and write, why we do it and our principles and 
to reinvent them according to our relation with the Others around us. I know I will not do 
justice to all others around me but I am obliged to try. It is a utopianism but one it seems 
worth striving for (Wright et al., 1988). That is the essence of reading Lévinas and Derrida.  
Ways of Seeing 
Apart from ethical consideration, Lévinas’ thinking beyond being opens another range of 
considerations. According to Wolcott (1999), ethnography is ‘a way of seeing.’ At 
conferences I recently attended I had some discussions about trust and ethnography. After 
one particular presentation, I could easily relate to the fieldnotes, the presenter read to us. I 
recalled several incidents from my time in business, which followed a similar pattern. But 
when it came to the author’s interpretation, I had a very different understanding. Later, when 
reading the author’s paper, my interpretation of the stories from the field differed even more 
than when hearing the talk. 
The difference was that the authors of the paper had seen a snapshot of a couple of hours 
during a visit to a building site. My experience often covers a more extended period, 
frequently the construction process from the start almost to the end. That gives me another 
angle from which I am looking at these patterns of action. So, given our different viewpoints, 
we came up with different conclusions. 
I wonder, how my reading of Lévinas will, therefore, influence my understanding of the 
world around me. Will I see everything through the ‘Lévinas lens’? In a different context, 
but still, in qualitative research, Kelle (2005) cautions against the possibility of selectively 
collecting and interpreting data. Similarly, Weick (2006, p. 1727) makes us aware, “how 
reluctant we are to examine those conceptual boxes, and how much is discovered when we 
examine those boxes.” I need to suspend concepts to go beyond them. “When we 
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intentionally drop underneath our thinking, we become aware of how quickly we put our 
experiences into tidy and unexamined conceptual boxes[…].”(Kabat-Zinn, 2002, p. 69)  
At that point, Lévinas is of particular help and particular risk. His thinking addresses 
‘grand theories', although I would not call it one. Lévinas goes beyond grand theories as he 
is interested in the beyond ontology, beyond essence, the ‘area’ where no theory applies. 
Perhaps his theory – if one wants to call it theory however questionable that might be – is 
subjectivity. 
However, as Weick and Kabat-Zinn suggest – he goes intentionally beyond the concepts, 
even beyond ontology and being. We are actually subjecting our experiences to a limited 
Said. But we should, as Lévinas (1974b) argues, be sceptical or better open ourselves to 
emerging scepticism. It is deconstruction taking place, “where there is something” (Derrida, 
1988, p. 4). Hence, we have got the means to deconstruct or question our theories everywhere 
but especially at their very foundations and beyond. The Saying provides us with this 
recurring scepticism. It permanently puts me, my Said, and my academic work is such a 
Said, into question. 
It is perhaps this Lévinasian thinking that made me critical of quite a few papers presented 
recently. The authors jumped too quickly on the back of a conceptual horse. All they found 
in the field had to fit into the categories of being. It seemed to me, they only thought in terms 
of the Said and disregarded the Saying almost completely. 
Some made scant reference to observations they found difficult to describe, fluid, or 
intangible. To my understanding, these observations are related to Lévinas’ Saying. 
However, it is our unique way of seeing. I see the world differently after reading parts of 
Lévinas’ work. They see it differently too. But I have to acknowledge where the trust 
researchers come from. They are often concerned with organisation studies - quite a few 
were or are consultants. 
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Trust researchers’ closeness to calculation and rationality, i.e. ontological argumentation, 
comes with little surprise. It is perhaps because they are very familiar with these patterns of 
argumentation. Most of us are. If these researchers are also consultants, something that is 
measurable and that counts is expected from them.  
In this context, Tillmar’s (2012) remark that trust is difficult to measure appears now in 
a different light [see ‘Autoethnography in Trust Research’ p. 23]. As I have demonstrated 
here, trust itself is not measurable since it belongs to the beyond being. Therefore, Tillmar’s 
claim that trust is difficult to measure misses to point - we may probably measure the traces 
– the consequences – of trust but trust itself escapes measuring. Trust is not in our hands – 
we cannot measure nor control it. 
I talked to colleagues about Lévinas and the idea of not controlling, of not being able to 
control, and therefore letting things go their way. I talked about the Saying as the expression 
of the infinite Other. The most I got was raised eyebrows. I can imagine that talking about 
losing control as a consultant to board members could backfire. 
Perhaps it is important to mention here that I see my world more from the Lévinasian 
perspective. I may reflect further on that issue, but I cannot do much about it. Hence, you – 
the reader – are asked to keep in mind who is talking and from where I talk. 
Language 
Ellis writes about the evocative possibilities of autoethnography. For instance, in the co-
authored paper, she writes: 
“Autoethnography,” I begin, “refers to the process as well as the product of 
writing about the personal and its relationship to culture. It is an autobiographical 
genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness.” 
(Scott-Hoy & Ellis, 2008, p. 130) 
 Emmanuel Lévinas 145 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
She speaks of multiple layers of consciousness. Now, in the light of Lévinas’ thought, I 
reinterpret that as a reference to what is beyond being. She not only refers to the final product 
but also to the process of becoming. Later in this article, I understand Scott-Hoy’s words as 
being even closer to Lévinas’ thought. 
This painting represents what I've been trying to put into words, though I do not 
have the words to describe what I see and feel. Just now I doubt words will ever be 
sufficient. (Scott-Hoy & Ellis, 2008, p. 132) 
The struggle to put basic human interaction into words is the very problem Lévinas was 
faced with – and Derrida (1967) pointed to that problem. What Ellis and Scott-Hoy sought 
to address is the problem of the betrayal of the Saying through the language of the Said. 
Scott-Hoy used painting to display the beyond being. Others used performance or poems 
(Richardson, 2001), but all are faced with a very similar problem: Language in its 
straightforward use as Said is unfit to display the Saying. Therefore, Lévinas uses language 
differently. He created text with whom one needs to dance (Critchley, 2015) or that works 
like the waves on the shore (Derrida, 1967). 
I seek to develop a sense of what goes on beyond the facts and what goes on beyond being 
by repetition and reiteration. When I seek to display trust by written language or by a form 
of being, in a language of being or in the Said, I essentially fail to build an understanding of 
trust as a form of Saying. I betray it by using the language of the Said. 
Ethnographic Distance 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) and Sage (2013), for instance, emphasise the value of 
distancing oneself from the observations in the field to develop a better analytic 
understanding. Wolcott (1999) and Anderson (2006) also argue that the author should step 
aside. Certainly, there is analytic value to such distancing. In Knowing the Other [see p. 
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125], I relate this distance (not in ethnographic but in every-day use) to the notion of the 
liminal space between text and interpretation in Iser’s (2000) work. But I would like to 
introduce another reading of the relation between the actual experience and the (auto-) 
ethnographic text about it. This is the experience I see as the saying, the veracity, or as Large 
(2015, p. 44) writes, “the very utterance itself, or more precisely the presence of the speaker 
in their speech”. The ethnographic text, however, is the Said that is produced from the 
Saying. The text has the features of translation in Iser’s (2000) terms, but it is also a betrayal 
of the Saying that happened during the event. 
I see the urge that motivates Anderson and others – a need to pursue an analysis that leads 
to theoretic clarity. However, one has to recognise Bochner and Ellis’ attempt (Bochner & 
Ellis, 2016; Ellis, 1999) to achieve the ethical language which Lévinas calls for. I think the 
critics of evocative autoethnography need to realise the short-comings of their analytic 
pursuit. It is impossible to account in analytic language for the infinity of human interaction 
or what Lévinas calls the Saying. To be sure, I am not arguing against analytic 
autoethnography but for a recognition of the value of the evocative form. 
I aim for my writing to represent my Saying, to reveal the ethical relation between myself 
and the Others around me as a form of the Said. But I depict Saying within the Said, which 
is a betrayal of the ethical nature of Saying. By this logic, ethnographic distancing is an 
attempt to withdraw oneself from the ethical relationship one maintains with the people 
around. It is as Bauman (1993) argues, a movement from seeing the other’s face to reducing 
them to masks. Ultimately, distancing leads to comparing people with one another. I am 
forced to do that as a researcher and a businessman but have to be conscious that it is an 
unethical way of treating human beings, even though it often appears to be necessary. 
Since there is no purely analytic or evocative autoethnography, I see unethical elements 
in both strands of ethnography. Therefore, after addressing the difficulties with Lévinas, I 
subscribe to Ellis’ claim that, if properly pursued, autoethnography amounts to ‘ethical 
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practice’ (2009, p. 317). I argue that evocative autoethnography might be better able to 
transfer the ethical dimensions of our relationships. Yet both must fall short of being ethical 
because the analytic form seeks to display everything in the Said in analytic terms. The 
evocative form can never fully account for the infinity of the Other about whom it reports.  
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V. Looking Back 
When philosophy and life are intermingled, we no longer know if we incline 
towards philosophy because it is life or hold to life because it is philosophy. 
(Lévinas, 1951, pp. 3-4) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I sought to demonstrate my understanding of Lévinas in relation 
to trust. Occasionally, I link my personal experiences to Lévinas’ ideas to translate his 
abstract concepts into tangible situations I have experienced. This furthers my understanding 
and ability to interpret Lévinas’ thought. However, I use retrospection to illustrate my points. 
In this chapter, I continue this ‘backward’ view, yet I try to understand my environment 
better. I seek to find explanations of what is going on around me and try not necessarily to 
draw conclusions about how to cope with the situations but to find suggestions of how to 
deal with them. 
In this chapter, I try to relate Levinas’ thought to what I went through in my daily business 
life. I return to experiences I have already written about and see how I can develop my 
thinking. I may be able to advance my conception of trust, seeing what implications this 
different thinking has on me as person and businessman as I consider the following 
questions: Do I approach others differently? Do I judge and act in other ways? How do I 
deal with this tension between calculation and trust? Do I anticipate that I know only 
something and only on a subjective basis? How do I deal with the anxiety of only knowing 
so little? If I know so little, do I need the courage to trust and how much courage is needed? 
What gives me confidence when trusting? Is the ethical in trust something I can work with? 
What role does forgiveness play? (Lévinas, 1968; 1977) Saying is a permanent recurrence; 
is trust recurring too? Is trust a means to achieve something? Can it actually be a means or 
 Looking Back 149 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
is this a completely misleading conception? What does that actually mean for me as a 
businessman? I have self-interest in (economic) survival but what does that mean after 
reasoning and consciousness? 
I am not trying to reinvent the wheel nor explain what keeps the world from falling apart 
(Goethe, 1808). I seek to understand what makes me trust others and try to think through 
this question in Lévinas’ terms. My thoughts inevitably linger and drift away to related 
concepts such as responsibility, forgiveness and proximity because they are very close to 
trust and I always seek to make connections between them. 
But the connections I am looking for are different from the way of thinking I was used 
to. Civil engineering is applied science – in the sense of the search for a universal truth. This 
was the hallmark at the time I studied civil engineering for my engineering degree. The view 
was limited to positivist thinking. This thinking would not be questioned at all, although we 
had courses in site management which did include managing people. If one goes through 
more recent publications in construction management (e.g. ARCOM proceeding or 
Construction Management and Economics), one may find a more diverse collection of 
publications ranging from positivist to postmodernist philosophical underpinnings. But that 
was not part of my training in civil engineering. We were trained in engineering science, not 
in social science. To become a good engineer this might have been sufficient, but it lacked 
any introduction or basic training in how to cope with social interactions on the construction 
projects we were going to work on. We had to learn as we went along - by trial and error. 
My years in business taught me that positivist thinking manifested in right-wrong-
schemes is unsuitable to manage an organization such as my business. I slowly and 
sometimes painfully learned that others see the world differently and I am not always able 
to convince them that my view is the right one. My view is only one amongst many - no 
more or less right than any others. I learned what social construction is without the 
philosophical underpinnings.  
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I was introduced to research philosophy during my PhD, particularly during the 
methodology modules. This helped to understand my struggles with right-wrong-schemes a 
little better. Of course, there is right or wrong in engineering terms but now this distinction 
is bound to some conditions. For instance, whether a beam on a roof is sufficiently high and 
broad depends on the level of safety or the risk of collapse we are willing to accept. When 
we agree on that, among other determinants, we are in the position to say whether a design 
is right or wrong. This is not only helpful to engineers but necessary.  
However, as I have explained in Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b) [see 
‘Appendix C’ p. 302], even engineers have to make trade-offs between more or less 
favourable solutions depending on personal preferences. Then right or wrong becomes a 
matter of personal choice, ever personal taste. Although I understood by then that reality is 
constructed, I still reduced it to rationality. To me, it was unquestioned that every action had 
a reason and I still related all my thinking to ontology - to a philosophy of being. 
Discovering Lévinas made me think about what is beyond being. I wrestled with the 
thought that there is something which is not being, which comes before I understand 
anything. But after many weeks of reading I slowly began to understand that there is 
something that initiates our thinking and out of which grows consciousness. Or, as Derrida 
(1967, p. 105) concerning Plato’s Republic puts it, the sun of the ‘epekeina tes ousias’ 
(beyond beingness or presence). 
Rationality and Beyond 
Apparently Rational Decisions 
I have to deal with a thinking that traces its origins beyond all categories. For Lévinas, 
this is the response to the other person we interact with. We have to be responsible; we have 
to respond, to and for the other person. Although I cannot avoid responding since I frequently 
interact with people, I am very fast (perhaps too fast) to thing about others in rational terms. 
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This limits our interaction to some form of rational choice, which Lévinas’ considers a 
‘terrible task’ (Wright et al., 1988, p. 174). Reducing it to pure rationality disregards 
fundamental human interaction – sociality (Peperzak, 2013). This reduction to rationality is 
a violent act. 
It is metaphorically violent since I reduce the richness of our interaction, the infinite 
otherness of the Other to a simplistic level to make a decision possible because I cannot cope 
with the ungraspable nature of the Other. It is violent because I have to act irresponsibly 
towards the one against whom I decide. Because of this decision, I do not give what I ought 
to give or even treat him badly. 
But I cannot avoid being violent. I must decide and reduce complexity, otherwise I would 
drown in that very complexity and be unable to act altogether. But where is the balance 
between these two poles? I live in a culture where almost everything is reduced to what it is. 
Rationality and calculation are the hallmark of most people’s thinking. I am part of that 
culture and most of the time this holds true for me too. So, I wonder whether a different way 
of thinking and dealing with the people around me is more beneficial than thinking only in 
terms of ontology. 
Perhaps it is not a question of benefits. It might be that it is a way of understanding better. 
The beyond being belongs to the world I live in as the being belongs to it. Hence, it is a way 
of interacting and it does not matter whether I like to think about it or not. Therefore, it might 
be worthwhile to get a sense of what goes on beyond the curtain of being. I want to explore 
this in the light of the following episode: 
Acting Ethically Costs Money 
Recently, I had a conversation with a business partner. We talked about 
‘Gott und die Welt’ – it literally translates as ‘God and the world’ which 
means we talked about a lot of things without aiming for something specific 
– accidently we also touched our business ethics. He said that acting 
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ethically cost money. First, I thought, he is right. To be fair and 
responsible costs one money. But then I stopped. He had told me a couple 
of minutes before that he advised his staff not to sell the most expensive – 
the most profitable – product to their customer but to look for a good 
solution often selling a spare part rather than a whole new machine. The 
customers seem to value this approach – they come back to him. 
Of course, one may argue that this is rationally driven. It is essentially 
an approach to maximise long-term profits. But when we explored this 
approach a little more, we came to the notion of appropriateness. ‘Does 
it feel okay to act this way? Am I able to look in the mirror and do I like 
the man I see?’ 
He told me then about the struggles he has with competitors from the 
internet. But although internet retailers are often cheaper, he does sell. 
He said, ‘You have to give customers a reason to make the purchase with 
you. But the reason has not to be rational or sufficient; they just need any 
reason.’ 
Rationality is assumed to be the hallmark of our business culture but there is an underlying 
current that is as forceful or even more forceful than rationality. Maximisation of profits 
without any concern for ethics is not the way my business partner runs his business but 
customers do not solely make their choices on the basis of rational arguments. When neither 
act purely rationally, it suggests something pre-rational at play - the beyond being.  
My business partner thinks the customer uses any reason to justify his decision to buy at 
his store. It seems as if the customer picks the reason that suits him and disregards the rest. 
Hence, one may say the customer’s decision is only superficially rational. Staw (1976) 
observes that people tend to stick to their choice they have made in case they feel responsible 
for the chosen action. He argues that if people are committed to their choice by 
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responsibility, they invest even more in a decision to make it work. In the financial sector 
this effect is called ‘throwing good money after bad.’ I understand that by consulting his 
customers, my business partner creates a link to them which generates a commitment. This 
in turn makes it more difficult for the customers to abandon the relation since they feel 
responsible for the one who consulted with them about their problem. 
Staw uses the term ‘responsibility’ to refer to what I would term ‘accountability’. Hence, 
Staw’s use of responsibility is only loosely linked to Lévinas’ use of the word. However, the 
connection between the moral and the subjective (non-rational) decisions are evident. It is 
here again that Lévinas helps me to better understand this connection. 
To Lévinas the Said - our knowledge is essentially the trace of the Saying - our subjective 
experience of the world. This production of the Said in the subjectivity and responsibility of 
the Saying is the pattern which allows the customer more subjectivity and for non-rationality 
when it suits him. To support a choice that is already made choice one searches for reasons 
until it feels satisfactory to go ahead with that choice.  
To understand the search for reason better, I have to step back and ask how the 
knowledge, or reasons on which I base my rational decisions are created. According to 
Lévinas, I primarily sense my world subjectively - I sense and enjoy the Other(s). Within 
this sphere of pre-ontological enjoyment (the Saying) I translate sensing the Same into the 
sphere of the Said. The reasons I base my decision on are created within the subjective sphere 
of Saying. Inherent in the Saying is this urge towards the Other, which Lévinas earlier called 
desire for the Other. The Saying, however, produces the Said, which I regard as knowledge 
and reasoning. Hence, the very ‘facts’ I base my decisions on are produced by the subjective 
encounter with the Other. Then the rationality I claim to apply can only be a limited, 
particular rationality but not a general, universal rationality. I only have limited capacities to 
experience, process, and understand (Iser, 2000) and I cannot comprehend the Other in his 
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essential otherness (Lévinas, 1961). In other words, my finite Said cannot account for the 
Other’s otherness displayed in the infinite Saying. 
In the example above, this is the meeting between the client and the salesperson – both 
are inclined to do business with each other and have the urge to be with the Other. My 
business partner and his client have a relationship between self and the Other. Lévinas 
described this relationship as desire for each other. From the client’s perspective, the 
relationship to another seller of the same goods follows the same pattern. The client and the 
other seller also have a desire for each other. But the client can only do business with one 
even if he might like to deal with both. So, he faces the ‘terrible task’ of comparing the two. 
This is the advent of the Third. The other seller is the Third to the client and my business 
partner and of course vice versa to the client and the other seller. Here it becomes clear that 
the Third is a non-event (Lévinas, 1974b). The Third is implicitly or explicitly always there. 
And the Third or Thirds force the client to make a comparison and choose with whom to do 
business. He makes a comparison based on the ‘facts’ acquired within the subjective 
relations between him and the sellers and quite often this is called a rational decision.  
My business partner tries to find a fitting solution for the client. In searching for a good 
solution he takes care of his clients, act on their behalf and is responsible to them. This 
creates proximity between the two. In giving the client a reason to make a deal with him, he 
gives him a sign. Although the Third is present in the relationship between him and his client, 
by giving reason he creates even more proximity; he demands to be the first to whom the 
client answers. Within this proximity, the client decides whether to do business with him or 
not. 
However, I am cautious to consider this Saying to each other as a sort of equation. It is 
impossible to evaluate whether one speaks more, addresses the client’s wishes better or to 
assess the quality of the Saying. Saying is beyond any countable value. What can be counted 
or measured is the Said which is produced by Saying but is completely different. The 
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problem is I see the results (the Said) of something (the Saying). I can describe the results 
very well but I struggle to describe the source of these results by ontological language. I 
cannot get to grips with the Saying which always remains elusive. 
These thoughts make the civil engineer in me tremble and the positivist engineer feel very 
uncomfortable. But the businessman in me is used to that feeling as losing control is a daily 
occurrence. I need this sometimes-naïve optimism to do business and sometimes I think: 
‘Things are going to turn out well. I don’t know why it works, but it does anyway. Let’s 
keep doing it this way.’ 
Perhaps, I have to stress the dancing allegory again. Although I am a lousy dancer, with 
some partners it works while with others not. I do not know why it does or does not. The 
same is true when I think about trust. With some it works immediately – we trust each other 
right from the beginning – with others it does not. What my business partner does when he 
consults his clients about solutions is this dancing or saying, and he does not know the reason 
why it works or why they keep buying in his store, but they do. It works anyway. 
The example of my business partner shows a single interaction, but my business partner 
referred to ongoing relations with his customers. He said that they prefer to sell the best 
solution than the most profitable product, e.g. a repair kit rather than a new device. However, 
one has to keep in mind that even the repair kit could be purchased cheaper on the Internet. 
He continued, ‘they know that we sell the best solution for them and they come back.’ The 
approach he maintains in his business is more about building a relationship with his 
customers than making the maximum profit out of each deal. 
There is more at play here than just maximising of profits. It looks as if my business 
partner has some idea of how things ought to be and how they should be handled and how 
we should treat each other. He knows that he could make more money with each sale, but he 
told me, ‘it does not feel okay to sell such an expensive new product when one could easily 
repair it.’ He hopes or believes that his customers come back to him because of his 
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responsible approach to doing business – apparently, they do. His customers deal with him 
even on the basis of weak evidence – he gives them ‘some reason,' and they readily accept 
it. 
His customers do not look for evidence not to do business with him as they trust him and 
seek to support this trust in searching for the ‘right’ evidence to do so. It is this basic 
interaction between the client and the salesperson which lays the foundation for the business. 
Customers come back because of the way they are treated. This is not measurable and 
perhaps not even a fact. It is a way of interacting. 
I have not talked to him about the fact that some customers do a kind of cherry-picking. 
For instance, they may buy the repair kit at his business, but when it comes to the new 
machine, they prefer to go for the cheapest offer on the Internet. I have similar patterns with 
some of the architects I work(ed) with. They give me jobs that are difficult, complex, and 
not profitable. But when it comes to comfortable and rewarding jobs they do it with someone 
else. 
This cherry-picking is, in my opinion, a form of comparing people that happens in the 
realm of the Said. It is a purely rational choice (almost) regardless of a relationship based on 
the Saying. It is the distancing which Bauman describes. When we are in proximity, we 
encounter the face of the Other, but when we distance ourselves from each other, we only 
see masks. It is these masks that we compare (Bauman, 1993). 
Trust as Rational Argument 
However, the majority of architects we do business with are not cherry-pickers. They try 
to do business with us in all cases. Although they are not the ones who make the ultimate 
decision, they seek to influence their clients (the (future) house owners) to give us the job. 
It is often important for them to work with someone they know and trust. 
In Chapter 2 on ‘Trust’, I tried to highlight how rationality fails to explain trust as a final 
consequence. Here I turn the argument around. Trust is apparently now a ‘variable’ in the 
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equation rather than an outcome. These architects use trust as if it were measurable - as if it 
were something of the Said. They make an argument to work with us although our offer is 
more expensive than the competitor. If we are more expensive than the other company trying 
to win the contract, any previous dealing with the architect helps a lot. 
New Project 
The other day an architect called to talk about a new project. 
We did business with him before, and it finally went well. Although, the 
project was on the brink of going terribly wrong. We were commissioned to 
build the ground floor walls of a house. The walls were some 40cm thick, 
insulated sandwich walls. The outside and inside surfaces consisted of 
prefabricated 5-6 cm reinforce concrete. Behind the exterior concrete 
surface, the supplier mounted a 14cm thick thermal insulation. When erected 
on site we filled the remaining gap with concrete.  
The architect expected us to deliver a finished high-quality surface. But 
something went wrong in the production process. The connectors of the inner 
and outer concrete surface produced small but very visible holes of 2-6cm 
diameter. The walls looked terrible – they were covered by a carpet of holes.  
The architect took some risk when tendered the project. In his tender, he 
asked for concrete sandwich walls with an internal insulation. But he did not 
ask for a specific surface quality. He did so because the suppliers of sandwich 
walls decline to make an offer promising any specific quality. 
However, the walls they produce are with almost no exception of very high 
quality because these walls are produced on a steel ‘table’ which is plain 
even. So, what one usually gets is exactly the quality the architect wanted, 
just that the producers do not make a promise on that. 
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So, this expectation we communicated to our supplier and the 
salesperson made a weak verbal commitment but not a written one. 
When I approached him about the holes, he first tried to retreat to the 
fact that there was no written commitment. However, when I made the 
point that we just expected the usual quality and that these walls fall far 
behind this standard, we could start talking about how to fix it. 
The days after the architect saw the holes for the first time, we met on 
the building site. He was in a kind of aggressive mood. I think he was 
angry, understandably, because we did not deliver the quality he expected 
and probably promised to his clients. First, I allowed him to let off steam. 
Then we talked about how to solve our problem. 
First one of the supplier’s staff filled the hole with some mortar. 
Technically it was fine but not aesthetically. It was still an ugly carpet of 
holes. The supplier insisted that this was the quality which is promised in 
the contract. The architect then said something along the line: ‘But you 
knew what I wanted.’ And I have to say, of course, we did. So, it did not 
feel fair to insist on the contract. We ought to do something about it, 
although we were not legally accountable for it.  
Later, we got a specialist to do the job. One who was specialised in 
recreating concrete surfaced, in fact, a restaurateur. The problem was 
that the surface had to look the same as the rest of the wall. It was not just 
filling the holes it was essentially ‘concrete cosmetics.’ That means 
recreating a concrete surface as if it were original filled into a cast but 
was not. In some respect, it is faking the original. Yet the aim is that it 
looks as if and the specialist did a good job. In the end, it looked as we – 
the architect, the supplier, and I – expected. 
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Of course, we did not promise him the quality he expected, as our supplier 
did not too, but we knew that he expected this quality. So, we felt committed, 
and we communicated this commitment to the supplier. Hence, in the end, we 
delivered although we were not bound to this quality by the contract. 
A couple of months later the architect called me and talked about this new 
project. The building site was some 3 hours’ drive away from his office. He 
asked me to make him an offer, arguing ‘I won’t build this house with 
someone I don’t know, with someone I don’t trust.’ 
This architect certainly did not rely on any facts. He instead believed that we would get 
along well. I think he believed that we could solve most possible conflicts on the building 
project because we have a certain – not necessarily special – way of dealing with each other. 
I felt we were on the ‘same wavelength.' This essentially means that we understand each 
other and that we assign similar meanings to things. This wavelength is rather about the way 
people interact and how they avoid deadlocks rather than how they resolve them.  
I would even suggest that it is not about speaking the same language. One may find the 
same wavelength between strangers in different languages. I have experienced this sort of 
interaction with some foreign workers who only spoke little German, and in some cases 
hardly any. They find a way to communicate and work together. 
When the architect contracted us for the next project far away from his office, he used the 
same text in the contract as he did before. Again, the surface quality was not specified and 
so he ran the same risk again. From a legal viewpoint, our position was the same as before 
but he took even greater risk since a legal battle away from his hometown is far more 
expensive. But we knew how we deal with each other and we had established a way of 
dealing that went beyond contract clauses and legal procedures.  
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The architect once said, ‘But you knew what I wanted.’ And I have to 
say, of course, we did.  
It was this notion that made the difference. That is why we refrain from insisting on our 
contract. This lack of insistence - this suspension - occurs when concepts dissolve (Derrida, 
1992). The moment when space is opened is when Saying occurs and becomes visible. 
Through our suspension of the contract on this matter we turned away from ontology and 
made the leap into the unknown, - the unknowable of the beyond being possible. I would 
regard it as an ethical business decision. 
One may argue that all parties were involved because they saw the mutual benefit. The 
supplier could sell more of his products, the architect could more efficiently manage his 
building sites and we had won another contract. But apart from the economic advantages, it 
is also enjoyable to work in such an environment. Similarly to Rooke, Seymour, and Fellows 
(2004) who researched in Britain, I experienced the German construction industry as being 
prone to conflict. But that does not mean that people in the industry enjoy fighting. I enjoy 
successful project deliveries, thankful clients, and architects praising my staff. There is little 
satisfaction in getting a favourable verdict from a judge because that is often the last time I 
see the people involved. I will not do business with them again. 
I identify two important aspects to this episode. One is the enjoyment we have working 
together, the other is that because we suspended our concepts and went beyond our contract, 
we made trust possible. The unknown is the space trust needs. Now the architect uses this 
trust to argue for us when it comes to new projects. Interestingly, trust becomes for him a 
sort of fact or an argument in his rational calculation. 
One may argue that I also mixed both the rational argumentation (we saved costs) and the 
non-rational (trust). That is certainly true to some extent since both relate to each other. The 
rational and the non-rational (Lévinas’ Saying and Said) influence each other. To me, it is a 
constant movement between the two - a permanent ambivalence. Am I the generous, 
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responsible person I ought to be or do I act selfishly? Is my selfishness just there for the sake 
of being able to later fulfil responsibilities, i.e. do I need to save some money to pay my 
workers better? The infinite responsibility is inevitable and always there. However, I have 
to make decisions to get on with my life. Always yielding to my responsibilities would be 
paralysing. It is tempting to mix the rational and non-rational (Saying and Said) because they 
always appear together. Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish between trust (the 
enjoyment of trusting and being trusted) and its consequences (cooperating trustingly and 
enjoying doing so). This is the very nature of life. 
Methodological Reflections: My Research Practice  
As I have written before (Grosse, 2015a), writing for me is a “nomadic inquiry” and I 
often arrive at new thoughts and questions (Adams St. Pierre, 2002, p. 5858). I quote two 
sections from Appendix G and J (Grosse, 2017a, 2018) to illustrate how I collected my 
material because I think it is there I have best described the way I write about negotiations 
and other business interactions.  
Often, I sit down in the evening and write about the day. Sometimes it is just short 
notes, sometimes longer stories. This writing is my means of recording what happened 
that day. I often focus on a single event, I write how it unfolded, what happened, what 
I thought at that moment. Sometimes I stop there with a description of one or two 
events during that day. 
However, quite often it is only the start of a process. The event triggered some 
feeling, so I seek to explore this feeling. And then I recall earlier events, maybe weeks, 
maybe years before. Often, I write and rewrite, expand and reduce the stories. Then I 
try to connect these events to my readings in the literature. I ask how to connect these 
events to theories. The writing often begins quite focused on a particular event, but it 
becomes messier the longer I write. 
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Emerson et al. (2011) talked about a sense of significance which the 
ethnographer needs to develop. When I choose the event to write about it is often 
the events that impressed me most that day. However, while writing a detail, some 
side-note becomes more important. Reflecting in the light of my readings often gives 
some interpretations a new twist or turn. It is this open process of wondering (or 
perhaps wandering) that makes auto-ethnography so valuable for me. This way of 
making sense of my life is not a straightforward process. One has to imagine it as 
a constant back and forth between the stories and the interpretations. It is 
essentially a hermeneutic circle in which an understanding gradually emerges 
(Iser, 2000). But the process of understanding is, as it is inherent in hermeneutics, 
never complete and finished (Iser, 2000). 
I may have, therefore, disappointed readers who sought for detailed procedures 
of how I collected my field-notes and made sense of them. The procedures are less 
important to my approach.  I prefer to follow Richardson and Adams St. Pierre 
(2005) and understand my writing as a method of inquiry. A stringent regime of 
writing is not important but rather curiosity about my experiences and their 
meaning and a constant scepticism about my understandings. 
In conversation, we may sometimes hate the “yes, but …”. However, this “but” 
is key to reflexivity in auto-ethnographic accounts. It is questioning how I as 
researcher or practitioner (with some vested interests) influenced my interpretation 
and how researching influenced me. After each new insight, each new 
understanding raises at least one “but.” As soon as I think something, I may 
question it – Lévinas (1974b, p. 168) talks about scepticism which “follows” 
thinking “like a shadow” –which forms the bedrock of reflexivity. Reflexivity as 
scepticism is a substantial part of my ‘writing as inquiry’. Then any description, 
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any claim, any understanding is followed by a new question – ‘why?’, ‘how?’, or just 
a blatant, ‘really?’. 
These questions help to reveal how I look at my own experiences - as a businessman 
of 15 years in the industry,  tired of exhausting conflicts and stressed out by different 
demands. I have an interest in people trusting me and me trusting people. Without a 
great deal of trust, I would not be able to cope with my life. That fact frames my 
research. Does it render my approach as invalid? No, it does not, it sets out a 
subjective framing that I try to make explicit so the reader can take it into account and 
read my work in the appropriate way. 
I research my experiences, which is certainly a limitation of auto-ethnography. 
Futhermore, I only take a look at my very close business environment which further 
limits my vision. Hence, my work is very strongly influenced by what I am. However, 
the narrow focus allows me to look close and to dig deeper. This is where auto-
ethnography can contribute most – by close examination, by introspection. I can far 
more easily explore my emotions and thoughts than that of others. “Such introspection 
offers intimate knowledge” (Pelias, 2013, p. 387 387) which other methods have 
difficulty to yield. But still, I present my interpretations of events, in the light of the 
theories I reviewed, yet others may come to a different reading of the events I 
encountered. I may understand them differently later. (Grosse, 2017a) 
As I wrote above, writing fieldnotes does not follow a precscribed route or procedure. I 
tried and stuck with what worked. It was very much a learning process, which took a while 
to ‘fly’. I drew one particular idea from running. There are days when I have very little 
motivation and energy to run. On these days I go running anyway but to get started I set 
myself a minimum target of about 20 minutes. Often I end up with much more more and run 
an hour on these evening. I approached writing fieldnotes in a similar way.  
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Fieldnotes written about these negotiations are my ethnographic material 
recording the negotiations but also what I thought and felt at the time. They deal 
predominantly with recent experiences, thoughts and feeling but also contain 
recollections on informal conversations. I often use a voice recorder to take initial 
notes about recent experiences and later sit down to describe them more fully and 
give my reflections. Writing fieldnotes is very similar to keeping a diary. Usually, I 
set myself a word limit of about 500 words to start writing. If this “warm-up” is 
successful, I write more than my minimum and I am surprised where my thoughts 
and recollections take me.  
My ability to write fieldnotes developed during my research journey. At the 
beginning, it was difficult to know what I should include, but as I progressed, I 
wrote the fieldnotes much more freely. I included the event I wanted to report but 
also reflected on prior experiences to explore my thoughts. I used the notes as a 
method of inquiry (Richardson & Adams St. Pierre, 2005) and an analyzing 
technique (Emerson et al., 2011; Richardson & Adams St. Pierre, 2005). The 
writing and subsequent reading form a hermeneutic process of investigating my 
research field in increasing depth (Van Manen, 1990).  
Looking at my fieldnote writing over a longer period shows that my research 
focus shifted. I was initially interested in improving my negotiation skills to selfishly 
get better outcomes for myself. However, the more I learned about negotiating, the 
more I understood that trust plays a central role, and this became my focus. As 
Emerson et al. (2011, p. 24) put it, the “field researcher can focus on their personal 
sense of what is significant.” To start with such a narrow focus on negotiations 
might seem difficult to an autoethnographer, but as a practitioner, I inevitably 
brought a very specific problem to the research arena. This showed that I needed 
to change the way I look at my environment. Writing fieldnotes about a broad range 
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of interactions with my business partners enabled me to shift focus and widen my view 
by observing and reflecting. As a construction professional, I used to deal with any 
problem that I encountered in turn and was quite comfortable when everything seemed 
to run smoothly. As a researcher, I actively looked around for the problem.  
The particular knowledge acquired by autoethnographers has further implications 
for the research questions. Given the nature of autoethnography, the notion of a 
research question is even more difficult. Autoethnographers should observe and 
openly explore their field with only a rough idea of what they are interested in. For 
instance, Ellis (2009) wrote notes about her dying partner without a clear research 
question. The emergent nature of autoethnography (as well as ethnography in general) 
does not require, or almost forbids, clearly stated research questions. Only during and 
toward the end of the process of ethnographic work does one realize to which questions 
or problems one might now be able to contribute. Although I started with a narrow 
focus, I developed both my research agenda and the research problems. (Grosse, 2018, 
pp. 5-6) 
This movement from a narrow focus on negotiation towards a broader understanding of 
trust and its implications, is visible thoughout the thesis. However, in the following two 
chapters this movement takes full force.  
Moving Beyond Rationality 
Picking up the example ‘New Project’ [p.151] above demonstrates that interactions take 
place within the said - within concepts, but interactions also takes place beyond concepts. In 
the following example I stress this point again. 
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Wrong Concrete 
One hot summer morning around 6:30, my mobile rang. Nobody calls 
me at that hour without an urgent need to talk to me. I was sure problems 
were looming. 
A foreman from a building site reported that the fresh concrete the 
plant delivered was not suitable for the foundation he was about to lay 
that day. In the background, I could hear a concrete pump. Two concrete 
mixer trucks were already there, and several other mixer trucks were on 
their way to the building site. Each of the mixer trucks was carrying some 
nine cubic meters of the wrong concrete. 
My foreman and I briefly sought to figure out who was responsible for 
the wrong order but could not determine who it was. However, he insisted 
he ordered the right concrete when he called the concrete plant. Of 
course, the foreman at the concrete plant had a completely different 
opinion and expressed it loudly. 
Minutes later, I called his manager. He already knew about the mess 
up and had anticipated our conviction that we had placed the order 
correctly. We knew we could not immediately determine who was 
responsible, but we put all our efforts into limiting the cost of this mistake. 
Their manager diverted the mixer trucks to another building site where 
the concrete could be used, and he managed, with considerable effort, to 
get another concrete pump later that day. We were both able to convince 
our staff to put in some extra hours. That evening, the concrete pump 
arrived again on the building site and this time we got the right concrete.  
A thunderstorm was forecasted for that night. If the foundation was not 
laid immediately, heavy rainfall could have caused severe damage to the 
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insulation below. It would have simply been flooded. The forecast was right 
that day, but I was relaxed when it started raining.  
In the days that followed, we were able to determine that the actual 
mistake was almost certainly made by the foreman on the concrete plant. 
Some weeks later, I met with the manager of the concrete plant for a coffee 
in my office, and we discussed the issue. He offered us an additional discount 
on future deliveries in order to cover our extra costs which resulted from the 
wrong delivery. (Grosse, 2015a, p. 8) 
I suggested solving the problem first and finding out who was accountable later. I would 
not use the word ‘responsible’ now, but I did then as at the time I had not adopted Lévinas’ 
use of ‘responsibility’. I thought that it would be purely rational action minimising the 
damage, i.e. containing costs, because each one’s share of the cost is smaller. In other words, 
the smaller the loss, the easier it will be to share it. This is not wrong but a purely calculative 
approach might have achieved something else. I should have assessed the likelihood and 
amount of loss on my part and then compared it to the effort I invested in minimising the 
damage. I would then probably have limited my efforts to minimise the damages but I did 
not make this calculation. Instead I insisted on solving the problem as smoothly as possible. 
I had to search for another explanation for my actions. At this moment I suspended 
rationality – pure calculation –and opted for an approach that put our relationship first. I 
assumed without proper examination that it was most likely that the costs would be lowest 
if we solved the problem together. We assumed responsibility in a Lévinasian sense and 
opted for a ‘mini-epoché’. We suspended the search for who was accountable – in an 
ontological sense – and tried to bring the concrete on the building site that day. In the absence 
of rational thought regarding who would benefit or care for each other, we lifted the ‘we’ 
above the ‘I’. 
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To put the ‘we’ before the ‘I,' and to give the ‘we’ more importance than the individual 
might be seen as a moral action. ‘We’ tried to lay the foundation of this house together. The 
supplier mixed and delivered the concrete, he ordered the concrete pump and my staff 
brought the tools and sought to lay the foundation plate. But it did not work out. It went 
wrong at the first attempt as we got the wrong mixture on site. In this event, searching for a 
solution for ‘our’ problem, rather than searching for who was accountable for the mess ‘we’ 
were in, can also be seen as a moral response. It is good to solve the problem because one of 
us would benefit although we did not know who it might be. We did something together, 
from which one of us would profit in the future.  
Being for the Other is, although not in reciprocity, being for me because I foster a sociality 
that benefits me and without which I could not live. By acting socially I enlarge benefits (or 
contain costs) that is about to be shared and, following Peperzak (2013), by working together 
trustingly we enlarging benefits more than each of us could on one’s own. Hence, it is likely 
that the share I get is larger too. Yet, calculating the size of my share and thus claiming 
reciprocity cannot work, because acting trustingly is not for my direct benefit but for the 
sake of sociality. 
Of course, it had to do with the fact that I like working with this man. I had known him 
for some years and I wanted to do business with him in the future. In this case, behaving 
utterly opportunistically would have dealt a significant blow to our relationship. To minimise 
the costs of someone’s failure demonstrated that I cared for our relationship. 
One may argue that minimizing the cost is utterly rational since the chance was high that 
both of us would pay a share of it and we were just minimizing our exposure to risk. That is 
not wrong, but the point I like to emphasise here is that rationality is only one aspect of the 
interaction. There is more in it. It is the nature of the response. I did not calculate but I did 
respond with an ‘I am for’ you (Bauman, 1993, p. 76) or better ‘the-one-for-the-other’ 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 96). Furthermore, although it was both of our own ‘affair’ (Lévinas, 
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1982) we both answered in the same way – We took responsibility, we cooperated to contain 
costs. 
The behaviour or course of action that I employed was in stark contrast to that of the 
foreman on the plant. He employed a defensive and counter-offensive strategy almost by 
reflex. He insisted that he had delivered the concrete we had ordered and claimed that, as in 
most cases, it was our mistake. Stepping out of this pattern and saying ‘wait a minute, let’s 
solve the problem first, perhaps then we don’t have to argue at all’ apparently had a huge 
impact. This stepping out is to some extent Levinas’ basic ‘scepticism’ (Lévinas, 1974b), 
fundamental reflexivity and an abandoning of concepts that may open new perspectives. 
This abandoning of concepts was not considered in the rational explanation I gave myself 
for my action on the day it happened, yet this ‘mini-epoché’ amounted to an implicit 
‘command’ (Lévinas, 1954, p. 43) which I will develop further in the coming pages. 
By concentrating on the problem we stopped fighting over the causes. The striking 
outcome was that all involved got ‘infected’ by this virus of problem-solving – what the 
Americans call log-rolling. The plant manager found mixer drivers to work in the evening, 
a concrete pump was also on site and my staff and the laboratory staff did not complain about 
working extra hours.  
When we met weeks later to discuss the matter and negotiate the cost, there was a mood 
of problem-solving and appreciation of the collective effort. How to share the remaining 
costs was a minor issue. 
The suspension of an argument about accountability was a dominance of the Saying over 
the Said. The Said did not become too powerful because we kept the cost low. This resembles 
Lévinas’ notion that only one who has eaten can be responsible (Lévinas, 1961). I have had 
experience of costlier failures when the rational (the Said) - arguing about accountability 
was far more important than the relational (the Saying) - maintaining a good relationship 
and taking responsibility. A suspension of the Said - this form of ‘scepticism’ that is Saying 
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(Lévinas, 1974b) becomes more and more difficult when the stakes are higher. The people I 
dealt with in costlier failures were fair and ethical up until then but they became extremely 
selfish when their businesses faced existential threats. Metaphorically, they became afraid 
that they would not get enough to eat (Lévinas, 1961). 
The General Contractor 
For a couple of years, I did very good business with a general 
contractor. The projects we did together were often quite difficult ones. 
We always maintained a good relationship. Of course, there was 
bargaining and haggling over prices and discounts, but it was rather a 
ritual. Yet when we faced problems on our projects, we supported each 
other and always found a solution that both could live with. Often, we 
didn’t even write down anything. Just our word was enough. However, 
the mood deteriorated when the partner faced severe economic 
difficulties. One of his clients, he told me, would refuse to pay large sums. 
Ultimately, his company went out of business. 
During the phase of looming insolvency, we argued fiercely about 
payments, and I constantly had the impression that he recalled past 
agreements differently from the recollection I had. It seemed as if his 
recollections altered more in his favour the more difficult his situation 
became. And perhaps my perception diverged too – only in the other 
direction – since his economic difficulties hit me hard too. 
I wonder whether the contractor himself believed the claims he made in the example 
above – to me they seem totally unrealistic. Does a person’s perception of what is going on 
alter so much in favour of their economic survival? Sometimes people seem to have a very 
skewed understanding of a situation – this certainly applies to me. 
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The examples above seem to support Lévinas’ position that there is a connection between 
Saying and Said - that we see the traces of the Saying in the Said. The clients come back, 
the architect argues for commissioning us, the plant manager engages in problem-solving 
and we succeed. Does this make a case for comparing the Saying and Said? 
Rational versus Responsible 
The rational and the responsible operate in two different universes so I cannot compare 
them; rationality is ontological, but responsibility is pre-ontological. However, the Saying 
leaves its traces in the Said, therefore, responsibility does affect rationality. Actually, 
rationality is impossible without responsibility. Again, my self is not defined by ‘I am I’ but 
by ‘I am for’ (Bauman, 1993, p. 76) 
When I translate this to trust, it makes a difference whether I act in a trustworthy manner. 
But if I cannot say what is essentially good, can I say what it means to act trustworthily? It 
cannot be measured by any standards but it is what Mayer et al. (1995) call ‘integrity and 
benevolence’. So, in contrast to what Mayer et al. (1995) and many others suggest I would 
suggest placing trust on the hither side of ontology. The actions and outcomes following 
from integrity and benevolence are traces of the Good - they are the traces of trust but not 
trust itself. 
The very assessment of one’s abilities – whether my client is able to pay my bill or 
whether a bricklayer is capable of plastering a wall sufficiently well – is a matter of ontology. 
It is derived from my categories. I can read the confirmation of client’s bank and I know 
whether my bricklayer plastered a wall before, but I cannot know with the same certainty 
whether they are genuinely good people. 
But this is probably the wrong question since it would suggest there are genuinely bad 
people, which I doubt. Like Lévinas, I draw on Plato: the genuinely good is the light beyond 
the light. Hence, being good is beyond the order of ontology.  
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[…] Greek metaphysics conceived of the Good as separate from the totality of 
essences […] it caught sight of a structure such that the totality could admit of a 
beyond. (Lévinas, 1961, p. 102) 
Whether they act out of opportunistic reasons such as fear of legal battle or losing their 
job or they act just because they feel that it is their genuine responsibility to do so or are 
meandering between both, being good and weighing the consequences of their action 
remains unknowable.  
This question cannot be answered, at least not in the realm of ontology. I am not sure 
whether I act trustworthily because I hope for reciprocity or because of an obligation to do 
so. I may believe that acting benevolently and honestly might inspire others to do the same 
but does that actually work and do they regard my actions as good? Again, I cannot know. 
It is the Other who judges my action and who does or does not regard me as trustworthy.  
I can be terribly wrong, even with the best of intentions. I may assume due to my own 
values that taking care of things is the right thing to do but the Other might have a 
fundamentally different view. Baier (1986) gives us a less severe but illustrative example of 
the postman who reads the postcards he delivers. It could be understood as an act of caring 
or an invasion of privacy. Hence, I can be wrong because the Other compares my action with 
the actions of the Third and translates it into his same - his Said that is limited and has 
different categories. This explains why trust is broken. Trust measured by the categories of 
the Same is a sort of gamble. I am trying to gauge the Other’s categories to find some 
familiarity- things that suit the Other. If I hold his deeds against my categories - my Same, 
it becomes the question of whether the Other has done what I wanted and expected him to 
do. If so, my trust was placed ‘rightly’ but since I do not know who the Other really is, I do 
not know his categories, and he does not know mine; we are doomed to disagree at some 
point. Most people make judgements about trust in this way but it is problematic.  
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There is a better way to approach it. Trust is best placed in a person that strives for the 
Good and acts benevolently towards the Other. Yet, I can never really know what is good 
for me because Good is beyond being - beyond my categories. Good is infinite and limited 
as I am, I cannot grasp infinity. Therefore, I cannot grasp what the Good is and what is good 
for me. It exceeds my comprehension. 
“I understand responsibility as responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility 
for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me, or which precisely 
does matter to me is met by me with as face. (Lévinas, 1982, p. 95) 
This responsibility goes beyond any concept and that in two ways. First, I am responsible 
although I am ontologically not linked to the things at stake as they are not ‘my deed.’ Again, 
responsibility is there before I even think about it or contemplate thinking about it. Second, 
responsibility is only about the Other’s concerns. The only thing that matters is what the 
Other needs, wishes or demands. Responsibility only concerns the Other and not me at all - 
I am supposed to step back completely. It is not my values or concerns but only what the 
face of the Other says to me that matters. 
I am responsible for what does and does not matter to me. It makes no difference to 
responsibility whether what is at stake matters to me or not. It is this disinterestedness that 
makes up responsibility. I am responsible whether or not what I have to care for is important 
to me. This in turn makes up trust – I think of the Other as caring for me. 
If I seek to trust people more, I have to face the reality that someone - the Other, cares for 
us. The Other does not necessarily know what is best for me but he makes his best effort to 
achieve what he thinks is best for me. If that is not what I expected, it is no reason to abandon 
trust. He tried his very best to do Good to me and this should be the guideline against which 
I hold his actions.  
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It is very similar to the example with the cracks in the column [see ‘The Cracks’ p. 109]. 
The architect left it to us to decide, saying, ‘Do what you think is best.’ This in essence, is 
genuine trust - ‘You’re not me, but I believe you’ll do your best.’ He left it to our genuine 
discretion Baier (1986). 
But trust is to some extent only a partial retreat from knowledge. In the example of the 
cracks, my foreman would not have come up with the idea that there ‘ought to be something 
done’ about the cracks without knowledge. The very fact that he recognised the cracks and 
the potential threat they posed required some knowledge. And the architect understood this 
problem only because he was familiar with the problems the cracks may cause. Furthermore, 
he assumed that we knew what had to be done. Hence, the suspension of knowledge went 
hand-in-hand with quite a lot of specialist knowledge. But still, the very nature of trust is 
suspension and the belief in the Good of the Other. 
Yet constant back and forth between knowing and not knowing makes it difficult to 
distinguish between them. This shows naivety on the part of the trustor, as she gives herself 
to the caring hand of the trusting but also on the part of the trusted because she does not 
retreat to measures of accountability. She naively takes on responsibility for everything. 
Now, I return to the point where trust is a belief in the Good of the Other and by no means 
a rational calculation. It cannot be a rational calculation because we cannot get the ‘variables’ 
to calculate. If they could be found they would lie beyond being and this is not the place 
where variables settle. 
Bauman also guides me on this point: 
“The awesome truth about morality is that it is not inevitable, not determined in 
any sense which would be considered valid from the ontological perspective; it does 
not have ‘foundations’ in the sense that perspective would recognize. The ethics 
that leaps into the Great Unknown of ‘before being’ does not do it in order to find 
or build foundations that no expedition starting from ‘being’ has managed to reveal 
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or build. Ethics looks in the ‘before’ of being […] because it knows that it is precisely 
the act of looking there which founds the moral self […].” (Bauman, 1993, pp. 75-76)  
This lack of any ontological foundation of morality is also apparent in trust. I trust because 
I do not know ontologically, and I believe in the morality of the Other. Morality demands 
the Other to do what ought to be done. Trust is the belief that I will do for the Other what 
should be done. Lévinas describes this fusion - the becoming one which Peperzak (2013) 
later addressed to trust; 
To show respect cannot mean to subject oneself; yet the other does command me. I 
am commanded, that is, recognized as someone capable of realizing a work. To show 
respect is to bow down not before the law, but before a being who commands a work 
from me. But for this command to not involve humiliation - which would take from me 
the very possibility of showing respect — the command I receive must also be a 
command to command him who commands me. It consists in commanding a being to 
command me. This reference from a command to a command is the fact of saying "we," 
of constituting a party. By reason of this reference of one command to another, "we" 
is not the plural of “I”. (Lévinas, 1954, p. 43) 
Acting morally is essentially demanding trust from the Other. But I am in no way entitled 
to do so explicitly. It is a gentle request, as if I hold a door open and say, ‘After you’ – ‘Après 
vous’. Whether he trust me or not is his affair and I can only ask humbly and implicitly. I 
offer my morality, and the Other may or may not accept it.  
Personal Remarks 
I recall a quote, referred to earlier. The Other is like me but he is infinitely different at the 
same time: 
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“I, who have no concept in common with the Stranger, am, like him without 
genus.” (Lévinas, 1961, p. 39).  
Who is this Other and why is he so important to me? Lévinas is different from other 
thinkers as he leads me right away to the central and very crucial questions. For example, 
Foucault (Gutting, 2014) asks whose agenda we follow and who leads the discourse and 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 2008) asks what kind of capital do I and others hold and what are the 
implications. But Lévinas goes immediately to the fundamental questions - Who am I? Why 
am I? How can I know I am? and What is being? Lévinas questions a philosophy obsessed 
with being. He points me to thinking about the origins of thinking.  
This makes it difficult if not impossible to find conclusive answers. I would even go so 
far as to say I believe I know. Hence, all I claim to know is not much more than a belief. I 
think this makes me a bit humbler as I can only claim to know something. However, I can 
also feel arrogant alongside people who claim to know something, especially those that are 
only a little reflexive. When a person such as a business partner does not act respectfully 
towards others, I immediately disrespect him. Although, I should be humbler in my 
judgement since it is subjective and not much more than a belief founded in some 
observation and judgement. 
This is a consequence of reading Lévinas. To him, all knowledge is founded on 
subjectivity. I sense more than I can ever know. Therefore, all I think that ‘is’ is merely a 
consequence of the unconscious. Yet this urges me to constantly question what I believe I 
know and what actions I pursue out of this belief of knowing. I am haunted by this ‘revenant’ 
scepticism, and its ’refutation’ (Critchley, 2015).  
Moon (2006) asserts that there is no logical endpoint to reflection but fortunately there 
are many Thirds who demand decisions from me. I have to make judgements and I need to 
strive for just decisions. I do not have endless time to think and reflect as they demand action 
from me. Justice, as Derrida (1992) writes, must come immediately and it cannot wait. 
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Hence, the infinity of Saying must be broken by the Said in the form of decisions I have to 
make. 
Standards versus Arbitrariness 
Entering the world of Lévinas also left me a bit puzzled. What does it actually mean to 
be responsible prior to concepts? What are the consequence of “Plato's wandering causes” 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 13) when I struggle to give this cause a proper name and address meaning 
to it. Meaning and names are not created yet. On this side of the distinction between being 
and beyond being, names and meaning do not exist. The creative source lies in the saying. 
The very process of meaning-making happens at the edges of both. When traces of the 
Saying become so strong that they make up for a signifier they become visible in the Said. 
At this moment, when the names are born, they are supposed to leave. They are thrown out 
of this paradise of naivety.  
The notion of paradise is quite significant. One has to leave paradise, as soon as one 
begins to know. This state is reached when one is able to make a distinction, to know and is 
not naïve anymore. Perhaps, there are parallels to my own history in business. In some 
respect, I started my business life in a naïve way and learned the hard way that it is not 
paradise – by losing money. When I learn something, I leave the paradise of naivety and 
then I am able to and subsequently have to decide. 
This also applies to my relationships with business partners. The more I know about them, 
the more decisions I have to make. Each bit of knowledge I gain about the Other I am 
interacting with forces me to make a judgement. It is a judgement I have to stick to for the 
moment, although I have to be sceptical about it. The scepticism of the Saying demands me 
to put this judgement constantly into question. No principle is eternally valid as each is 
basically arbitrary. How can one live with this total relativism?  
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Waldenfels (1995) clarifies that the responsibility prior to concepts not accountability and 
the very notion of care is the one that must guide action. But a constant drive to scepticism 
and questioning, the incompleteness of the Said and the permanent recurrence of the Saying 
(Critchley, 2015) must lead to paralysis. At the moment, I make a judgement I am aware of 
its imperfection and of the judgement being unjust. How then can I act at all? I am supposed 
to rethink. But does that help? A decision must be taken immediately otherwise it is unjust 
(Derrida, 1992).  
I am supposed to do something but doing nothing is also an action. The very avoidance 
of acting is acting. And it can be unjust with the knowledge I have at this very moment? I 
do not know for certain as it is just an a-proximation towards justice that I am performing. I 
know I cannot be just but I know to do nothing or follow another course of action can 
increase injustice. 
This is another of the more profound thoughts that Lévinas incites. Is not scepticism a 
sort of care for the very way I care for the Other? Is it not necessary to be sceptical when 
one knows how fast one sometimes jumps to conclusions? Is scepticism then not the 
recurring force that keeps me caring because it tells me that care can never be finished? Then 
scepticism is the driver that keeps my care and my responsibility on course towards justice 
although I know I am never going to reach it.  
I am not sure whether the course of action I have chosen is the most just, therefore, I need 
the recurring scepticism. Is a moment of reflection necessary or is it a permanent action? I 
do not believe that an action can become permanent. I think of a repeated, withdrawal, a 
second of thought, a minute of talk, some minutes in the park or a night of sleep… you name 
it. [for a further discussion see Appendix J – An insider’s point of view (Grosse, 2018) p. 
384] 
I wonder what being an ethical person in the Lévinasian sense looks like in practice. How 
can one cope with this unfulfillable task? How can a person deal with the constant struggle, 
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with the nagging of knowing to be unjust and to be unfair by default? I enjoy being with the 
Other as Saying is pure enjoyment, but I am guilty and limitlessly indebted. This is the 
terrible dilemma. 
The Third and the Retreat to the Said 
First come first served 
We are in the meeting room of the architect’s office. I did not know the 
architect before, but it seems as if he were a person who is fine to work with. 
With me is a carpenter I met on other project and we worked together a 
couple of times, He introduced me to this architect.  
We sat together for some 90 minutes and have talked through the project 
the architect needs construction company for. First, the architect explained 
what the aim of the project was and then we discussed several design 
solutions. I explained what our job on that project could comprise of. We 
agreed on another meeting the following week with a structural engineer to 
discuss some more detailed designs. Everything seemed to go in the direction 
that we get the job. And everybody on the table seemed fine with that. There 
were only two things left- our price for the job and the date when we can 
start working on the building site. The price we were going to calculate 
within the next couple of days. Nobody expected me to make an offer at the 
meeting table. But the architect asked when we could start the job on the site. 
I used my standard formula: ‘First come, first served.’ I explained that we 
could start within the next six weeks, but if someone else signed a job with us 
prior to the architect's client, this project would be deferred to a later time.  
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Although we were four at the table, the talk that afternoon was predominantly a discussion 
between the architect and me. It was, for the most part, an encounter between the Other and 
me. The situation had numerous elements of what Lévinas describes. We were polite to each 
other, employing an ‘après vous’ attitude:  
One thing we discussed was the demolition and closure of the old 
chimneys in the upper floor. He asked me to include filling the remaining 
chimney with sand. But sand in rinsing is almost like water. Usually, there 
are holes in the wall of the chimneys on each floor. When one for whatever 
reason perhaps pure curiosity opens the cover of one of these holes, a 
massive flow of sand will spill out.  
I knew that this could become a problem later on long after we may 
have left the building site. So, I thought it would be fair to tell him. I 
proposed to mix some cement to the sand, all dry. That mixture would flow 
through the chimney as well, but after a couple of days, it would get stiff. 
At least stiff enough that it did not spill out anymore.  
And there were other occasions with a similar pattern. I saw something 
that could not work or posed some difficulty, and I shared my knowledge.  
This sharing of knowledge is a form of taking responsibility although there was no direct 
personal benefit from doing so. Instead, it was something I ought to do - what should be 
done (Waldenfels, 1995). It was Saying or ethically responding to the Other. This bears some 
similarities to the example in the chapter on Lévinas [see ‘The Cracks’ p. 109] where my 
foreman and I took responsibility for cracks we were not accountable for. We felt we ought 
to do something about them.  
In this example here as in ‘The Cracks’ [p. 109], we did not benefit directly. Here, we 
metaphorically started dancing and began some sort of exchange of gifts. I told him 
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something and he told me something helpful for the project. We began this move back and 
forth and at some point he proposed meeting the structural engineer to move the project 
along even further. I am convinced that that would not have happened if my response had 
been less in the realm of the Saying than the Said. The way we interacted – this intangible 
Saying – had consequences – we left very tangible traces in the Said. 
But although I considered this meeting to be dominated by the Saying, at one point the 
Third party lurked and dragged the whole talk for a moment into the Said. When I mentioned 
my principle of ‘first come, first served’. It was as if I was refusing the very responsibility I 
assumed before. The mood up to this point was that we just needed one or two meetings for 
my offer to be signed and for us to start working. But introducing this principle was to tell 
him he was not the only Other I was responsible to. This is the practical manifestation of 
Other as a ‘non-event’ (Davis, 1996) 
I conveyed this notion so that he could easily assume my position. I used phrases like 
‘What else could I do?’ or ‘That would be unfair to other clients’ or ‘I am in a dilemma, I 
must make a choice.’ He could therefore see that I had to act in this way but if we had not 
learned to dance with each other before, had not found a way for smooth conversation or if 
there were no dominance of Saying in our conversation, it could have dragged the whole 
meeting into a defensive mood.  
Trust the Other, Trust the Third – Forcing Trust into Rationality 
I am led to compare the faces, to compare two people. Which is a terrible task. 
(Lévinas in an interview with Wright et al., 1988, p. 174) 
This is a terrible but necessary task. By setting the architect from the example above in 
my position, I could make him anticipate how I felt and how I sought to resolve my dilemma. 
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The following episode is from an internal conversation in my company. The pattern is 
similar, but I want to focus on the view of the decision maker. 
Haggling over Manpower 
It’s Thursday again. We talk about who will work on which building 
site next week. One site manager asks me to assign two additional 
bricklayers on his project. Then I talk to a foreman about whether he can 
manage the next week with two fewer workers. He can’t, he says. He says, 
the architect will bite his head off if there are only two next week and he 
lists the jobs he has to finish soon. 
Going back to the site manager I tell him that there is no one available, 
he insists, ‘but we promised’ to the client. 
It is a terrible task to compare as I know that one of them is going to suffer. I cannot serve 
everybody. In these situations, I try to be rational. I ask questions regarding the potential 
damage and inconvenience to the client, what it would mean for the company if the client is 
upset with us or what we actually promised and what was written in the contract. I gather as 
much information as possible and then make a judgement. 
Unfortunately, this often fails to resemble the actual situation of the foreman on the 
building site or of the site manager talking to the client. I may take them into account as best 
as I can, but there is only a sketchy picture of the foreman’s or site manager’s reality. I am 
not them. Even more problematic is the fact that I often have relationships with the project 
architects or clients. Some are very close and others I have never met yet, I have a 
responsibility towards all of them. They still have a ‘face’ in Lévinas’ terms. But which face 
do I respond to first and to whom do I speak? 
Being closer to one person is often the deciding issue. Some of the people I have to deal 
with respond to interactional arguments. When I explain my dilemma that I do not have 
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enough workers to do all the work that should be done in time, they can anticipate my 
situation. That is true for foremen but also for architects and clients. But some do not want 
to see my situation. As Plato says, “But could you persuade us, if we won’t listen?” (Plato, 
1997, p. 973). They literally do not respond to me. 
But there is seldom a complete failure to respond. When clients fail to listen it often 
coincides with a retreat from our contract. I often hear, ‘but we agreed to the contract on…’ 
etc. In these situations, it is often helpful to challenge the clients with the fallacies of the 
formulations in the contract. For instance, when they insist on a certain date for the job to be 
finished but I remind them what they should provide and care for to make that happen, they 
immediately see that they are not holding their own contractual commitments. Or, when I 
demonstrate how widely a formulation in a contract can be interpreted, which is sometimes 
a complete game changer, they realise that an almost stubbornly intolerant demand is not 
leading anywhere. 
This is reminiscent of Derrida's (1992) deconstruction of concepts. The concept I am 
dealing with is the contract I have with that particular client. When I question the client’s 
adherence to the agreement, I undermine the authority of this agreement and speak to his 
responsibility. Essentially, what I am saying is, ‘since we know that our contract is not all-
encompassing, shouldn’t we act responsibly towards each other regardless of our contract?’ 
The more we abandon the contract, the more playful the relation becomes. The more one or 
both of us insist on the nitty-gritty details of the contract, the nastier and more hostile the 
relation becomes. 
I would argue that this is a movement between two extremes. One shows the Same or 
Said of the contract with its rules hammered in stone and fixed into a structure to the extent 
that it is dead. The other shows complete flow, everything in flux, no rules or structure and 
limitless responsibility. This is also overwhelming and impossible to live with. It has some 
resemblance to Weick’s (2006) notion of the area between smoke and crystal in which life 
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is only just possible. Smoke for Weick is chaos or entropy and crystal is structure or order. 
Although, I constantly seek to structure my life, life has a tendency towards entropy. One 
may understand this move towards entropy as the constant nagging of the Saying – what 
Lévinas calls ‘Saying’s scepticism’. 
The corrective of the Saying takes away the uncompromising nature from the Said 
because it suspends them when contracts are regarded by both parties as unethical or not fit 
for purpose. But if one of the parties in the contract does not like to dance or does not want 
to move or open up to the Saying, it is difficult to open up the space for communication on 
the terms of Saying. 
The Saying has an element of playfulness. It is a moving with the Other and a kind of 
dancing or a wave that Derrida (1967) describes. Perhaps this is one of the points where 
Lévinas is more aligned to Eastern than European philosophers. Hermann Hesse also refers 
to Siddhartha’s attitude of playfulness in (Hesse, 1974). Here, the young Buddha learned to 
let go to achieve his goals. He learned to let go of structure and planned and correctly 
executed action to achieve greater success. He also understood the structures in which he 
moved but the key was not to stick fiercely to these structures but to allow for the 
deconstruction or inherent reflexivity to take place [see Appendix J – An insider’s point of 
view (Grosse, 2018) p. 384].  
My understanding is that these two poles in Hesse’s Siddhartha can be seen as Lévinas’ 
Saying and Said. Saying and Said coexist and I need both to act as human – the Saying to be 
humane and the Said to resolve dilemmas stemming from the responsibility of the Saying.  
The Said is exactly where I locate Weick’s (2006) crystal – like a structure that does not 
allow for life. Saying is Weick’s steam – unknowable chaos which is overwhelming and 
uninhabitable. Life happens in between these extremes. Control is Weick’s structure - the 
Said. It is comparing two people in the realm of ontology. Trust is Weick’s steam - the 
Saying. This movement between comparing and responding is well described by Bauman: 
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When the Other dissolves in the Many, the first thing to dissolve is the Face. The 
Other(s) is (are) now faceless. They are persons (persona means the mask that – like 
mask do – hides, not reveals the face) I am dealing with masks (classes of mask, 
stereotypes to which the masks/uniforms send me), not faces. […] Masks are not as 
reliable as faces, they may be put on and off […]. The innocent, hopeful confidence of 
the moral drive has been replaced by the never quelled anxiety of uncertainty. 
[…](Bauman, 1993, p. 115) 
What makes me trust is the ‘innocent moral confidence’ rather than ways of structuring 
and comparing. Life within structures - within the Said or within being – would not be life 
at all. Life needs to break with structures and the Saying makes this possible. Trust is the 
belief in more than structures. It is the belief that things get solved beyond structures and 
beyond the totality of being. It is not reducing complexity as Luhmann (1973; 1975) but a 
way of living with complexity because trust operates in a different mode. 
Trust is the-way-of-living-with-anxiety, not the way to dispose it. (Bauman, 1993, 
p. 115) 
To trust someone means doing – trust must be understood as a verb. It is extremely 
difficult to understand the nominal meaning of trust. To trust is to act, feel and think rather 
than a state of being. It is trembling - ‘schaudern’ (Goethe, 1832). When I understand how 
little I know and how little control I have, I get goose bumps. 
Principles: Their Upsides and Downsides 
To act on certain principles is highly regarded in the business world and in society in 
general. But there is an underlying problem with this attitude: it does not account for the 
particularities of a situation. Take, for instance, the concept of “principled negotiations” 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981). Fisher and Ury propose the introduction of an objective principle on 
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which both parties in a negotiation agree and then solve the disputed issues according to this 
principle.  
This sounds straight forward, and it is. But using a principle can lead to the negotiation 
becoming very stifled. The parties must retain the option to question this concept in case it 
does not fit the issue at hand otherwise the application of the concept can become unjust. A 
one-fit-all concept does not exist because the Other is different to me. Hence, we have to be 
constantly sceptical about the concepts we apply. 
When one applies the approach of principled negotiating there is shift in emphasis from 
the Saying – the responsible approaching of one negotiating partner – to the Said – the 
application of general predefined concepts. Ultimately, one agrees with his negotiating 
partner to abandon the mutual responsibility for each other and replace it with a system of 
accountability to a ‘higher’ order concept - the principle the partners apply. We rely on this 
principle rather than genuinely trusting our partner. 
To rely on one or other principles is a good choice, from a managerial perspective and 
even more from a legal perspective (Fisher and Ury researched for the Harvard Law School). 
Once the principles were agreed on the partners were relieved from the messy nature of 
responsibility – the Saying is discarded – and they could account only for the principle – the 
Said becomes dominant.  
When business partners interact on the basis of principles, they do not actually trust each 
other, they just rely on the principles to be followed and sometimes even followed blindly. 
These principles might lead to very unfair outcomes. For example: 
Pricey Bricks 
An architect, I had known for almost my entire business life, called me 
and asked for help with a project. The contractor, her client, 
commissioned, could not finish some work on time. So, she asked me to 
finish part of the job. One part of it was exchanging old broken or defect 
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bricks from an early 20th century façade. We agreed on a price for a single 
replaced brick by a new brick. In the end, we multiplied the estimated number 
of bricks to be replaced by the price per brick and got the sum of the contract.  
We started to work, and after some time it turned out that the price was 
far too high. The actual cost of replacing a brick was only a fraction of the 
price in the contract. My site manager when he wrote the invoice offered a 
substantial discount on the price for the brick. 
When we discussed the issue, he said something like: ‘Of course, we want 
to make a profit, but that seemed too much. We can’t do that. We’re still 
making a good bargain, but ‘let’s keep the church in the village.’ 
The site manager could have insisted on the principle – our contract – but it seemed unfair 
to him. The principle applied to a particular situation was inappropriate. He uses the 
metaphor ‘keep the church in the village’ which reflects the fact that churches are usually 
situated in the middle of a village, and all the houses built around it. So, it feels odd and 
misplaced to build (or move) a church out of a village. Germans using this metaphor often 
refer to something that is very inappropriate or very out of touch with reality. 
This inappropriateness also comes out in his wording. ‘Wir können das nicht machen’ – 
literally‚’we can’t do that’ but with a slightly different intonation in this context; ‘können’ 
translates as ‘can’, but here it means ‘we should not’ or ‘we are not allowed to’. Of course, 
given our contract, we could charge the client for the whole sum, but we should not. There 
is no proper rule or principle, but it did not feel okay – it is what ought not to be done 
(Waldenfels, 1995) 
I was fine with his suggestion to abandon a principle for the sake of showing 
responsibility. In the end we acted a little more ethically. It cost us some money – as it cost 
my business partner money not to sell the priciest solution – but I think we kept our 
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interaction with the architect and the client very much in the realm of the Saying. We sent a 
clear message - ‘Look we don’t stick too fiercely to principles so don’t do that either!’ 
I think this made us appear trustworthy. We were not just reliable on principle, but flexible 
to adapt to a particular situation and we showed responsibility. We took care of our partners 
- only to the extent that we had ‘enough to eat’ but we shared from ‘our mouth’(Lévinas, 
1961). 
There is a big struggle when one fights for economic survival. This person might be the 
one that has not eaten and cannot share from his mouth (Lévinas, 1961). This poses two 
problems. How do I know when one has eaten and how do I speak to a person that has not 
eaten? 
What does it actually mean to fight for survival? It is perhaps better described as ‘being 
in a desperate situation,' – a situation which might be the brink of bankruptcy or the loss of 
a valued property, but also perhaps the breakdown of a marriage. Eating as I understand it is 
in the first place a basic need, for food, shelter and sleep. But it also becomes a socially 
constructed need and the distinction between whether something is a need or not is difficult 
to make (see ‘Desire’ page 96). 
Vulnerability 
The Said offers some security – although deceptive. If one acts on the grounds of the Said 
it seems as if everything is calculable. It reduces the complexity of human relations to a 
manageable level. If one acts on principles, e.g. organizational rules, one cannot be wrong. 
One makes oneself only accountable for one’s action with regard to these very principles 
and nothing else. Hence, it looks as if one’s responsibility were limited but in fact it is only 
accountability which can get limited. Responsibility goes beyond even the most complex set 
of rules. 
One may think that he is not accountable for the consequences of his actions because he 
did respect the rules but responsibility goes way beyond that. One might see that the rules 
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produce unjust decisions and still stick to the rules. Hence, one can claim to be unaccountable 
for these unjust outcomes and refer the accountability to the source of these rules. But this 
person still bears responsibility since he was aware of the consequences of the application 
of the rules. 
However, sticking to a rule, a principle or a contract is quite easy. Not doing so out of 
responsibility is a tricky business – in a world of ‘accountants', For example, in ‘Experiences 
with Auto-Ethnography – How to Write when Emotions Run High?’(Grosse, 2015a), I 
discussed the following:  
Deadlines 
I had several meetings with a client and the project manager that were 
marked by ongoing conflict. The building process was three weeks behind 
schedule because some drawings were delivered late and others were still 
not done. In one of these meetings, which was exceptionally cooperative, we 
agreed on some changes to the design in order to meet the approaching 
deadlines. Our work went on and we met the deadlines. However, in a later 
meeting, both the architect and the client blamed me for not delivering the 
originally agreed upon quality. I reminded them that we had deliberately 
altered the design in the above-mentioned meeting, and hence the quality, in 
order to finish the work on time. Now, I learned that the whole responsibility1 
had been shifted to me with no acknowledgement of the fact that this had all 
transpired following the architect’s delay in delivering the drawings on time. 
(Grosse, 2015a, p. 3) [see ‘Appendix B – Experiences with Auto-
Ethnography (Grosse, 2015a)’ p. 289] 
                                                 
1 Again, today, I would not use to word responsibility in this case. I would call it accountability. But at the 
time of writing this paper I used the word in the sense of ‘being accountable for’. 
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It was not my job to deliver design - it was the architect’s. I did not have a contract for 
doing it, nor would I get paid for it but I did want to progress the project. I badly wanted to 
make it a success for us as a company and for the client. Therefore, I did not hide behind the 
wall of what I am accountable for but took responsibility in Lévinas’ sense. I made proposals 
and tried to find a solution with the client and the architect. This cooperative meeting was a 
case of Saying to the others. 
But it also made me vulnerable because I went beyond what I had to do as the fulfilment 
of my contractual obligations – what is fixed in the Said of the contract and the applicable 
laws and regulations. I offered more – by Saying I face my responsibility. I sought to open 
a space for an interaction so that the situation became positively creative - to make the 
situation tremble and to move it forward. Had I stayed in my ‘trench’ and not taken 
responsibility for their project, it would have almost certainly gone wrong. 
[Saying] is in the risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of 
inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability. 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 48) 
Now, I had to defend my proposal. The measures against which I had to defend it were 
that of the contract. Hence, it was quite easy to make me accountable for it but only in the 
realm of what was written in the contract, not with regard to acting responsibly. I had to 
justify my proposals. Why did I suggest changing the original design, how did I suggest 
changing it and did all that comply with the norms and regulations and with the client’s 
demands? I was suddenly dragged into the realm of the Said – rules and contracts. As the 
Saying is not present in the Said, I could not argue, claiming I sought to take responsibility; 
it was my best effort. My effort felt betrayed, as the Saying is betrayed by the Said, and I felt 
betrayed myself. 
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It is not possible to avoid such situations. This would mean finding a rule, concept or 
theory which provided me with the means to fight off the Said and to make the Saying 
something permanent. Both Saying and Said function in two different philosophical spheres: 
being – of concepts, theories, the Said and beyond being – of responsibility, genuine care, 
the Saying. But being does not know what beyond being is. Hence, the very remedy for the 
betrayal would be of the nature of being. But being does not speak to the beyond being, 
hence, it cannot operate as remedy. 
Summary – Trust as Saying 
If a person seems to be driven only by self-interest it is hard to trust them. I assume that 
this person will exploit me at the first opportunity. It is similar to the person who fiercely 
and uncompromisingly sticks to rules and regulation. I do not trust them and expect them to 
abide by the rule and not use the power to act responsibly. Here, the concept of responsibility 
returns. It goes beyond pure accountability; to be responsible and to act responsibly 
incorporates far more than just being predictable and abiding by certain set of rules.  
I think when we talk about trust we have to think about a judge. The person I trust is a 
judge who makes a decision on my behalf. It is not simply that this person makes the same 
decision that I would have taken. I think that would be a too simplistic idea of trusting. This 
person has to care for the things or tasks given to him. This caring is different from just doing 
what I would have done. He should do something for me, and I must believe he is able to do 
it and have to show him.  
[T]he command I receive must also be a command to command him who commands 
me. It consists in commanding a being to command me. (Lévinas, 1954, p. 43) 
If I want to be trusted, I have to trust the Other. It may sound as if it were an equal 
relationship I need to maintain with the Other, but it is not. The Other commands me to do 
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the work I am capable of doing i.e. to care for him and to act responsibly. But at the same 
time, this command reflects back on him as I am his Other. He needs to respect me, to care 
for me and to act responsibly towards me too. I might expect him to do this, but it is not 
something I can order him to do as that would make the Other essentially equal. I am 
responsible for him and I seek being good to the Other so how can he not be good to me? 
Therefore, before we start reasoning, we have to trust.  
When Peperzak (2013) says that to trust means to be with the Other and to become one, 
it is certainly not in the ontological sense. He dismisses the ‘all-encompassing’ ontology of 
the basic human encounter. This basic human encounter is marked by a being together of 
two strangers – strangers that are infinitely Other to each other. One ought to think of this 
encounter or of this being together as mutual comprehension and knowing each other but 
one has to understand it as an ambivalent meeting: 
The true union or true togetherness is not the togetherness of synthesis, but a 
togetherness of face to face. (Lévinas, 1982, p. 77) 
The central difficulty of this thought – of being together in alterity – is the argument for 
being good to each other. We may or may not act morally but we have no ontological reason 
to do either. 
The awesome truth about morality is that it is not inevitable, not determined in 
any sense which would be considered valid from the ontological perspective; it does 
not have ‘foundations’ in the sense that perspective would recognize. (Bauman, 
1993, p. 75) 
When I think about trust as a form of Saying or a moral response to the Other, it has to 
belong to the realm of beyond being. But the implication of it is far-reaching. There is no 
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ontologically valid foundation for trust. It is a moral obligation which has begun before I 
thought about it and before I became conscious of this ethical answering to the other. 
I may therefore just trust by ‘default.' Being a moral person and an ethical person means 
to trust – and not to ask why I trust. I just do it. 
This is, admittedly, a very odd statement in a world of accountability, claims, laws, rules, 
numbers, measures and measurements. But nobody can proove me wrong as I have left the 
field of ontology. To any challenger, I may say: Come to the beyond being and all you’ve 
got ceases to be. You’re naked. You cannot do anything but trust and respond in the realm 
of beyond being.  
Prior to thought – morality beyond ontological argumentation 
Lévinas says that the Good is primordial - it is there ‘il y a’ before anything. The good or 
the responsibility for the Other is there before I am aware. It stems ‘prior to any meaning’ 
(Lévinas, 1974b, p. 10) I am actually awakened by my responsibility. “Responsibility 
conjures up the Face I face, but it also creates me as moral self. “ (Bauman, 1993, p. 75) 
However, I have no means to argue for responsibility or the Good before being. 
Ontologically, there is nothing but being. If there were it would be a being otherwise not 
otherwise than being. When the foundation of morality lies within the otherwise than being, 
one cannot argue ontologically for or against it. (Bauman, 1993) 
It therefore makes no difference in ontological terms whether I am responsible or not. 
Logically one cannot argue for or against it. It is the same with trust. If I am behaving badly, 
others will respond accordingly. This does not necessarily mean they will act badly to me, 
although it is possible. It means I am defining the sphere we are acting in with my own 
actions.  
More importantly, when the Good is beyond being or it is something not represented by 
ontology, I cannot definitely define what good is. I can say this is fair with regard to a certain 
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standard or convention, but this is subjective. Hence, we need a constant scepticism against 
our standards of what is fair, just and good. 
And there is no just standard. A concept or rule cannot be universal enough to fit all 
circumstances. A concept is always a representation in the sphere of the same and so it is 
limited. Therefore, it cannot account for the Other’s infinity and must always fall short of 
this ideal. However, Lévinas makes the following point: 
There is a utopian moment in what I say, it is the recognition of something which 
cannot be realised but which, ultimately, guides all moral action. This utopianism 
does not prohibit you from condemning certain factual states, nor from recognising 
the relative progress that can be made. Utopianism is not a condemnation of 
everything else. There is no moral life without utopianism – utopianism in this exact 
sense that saintliness is goodness. (Wright et al., 1988, p. 178) 
It is perhaps the guiding function of morality that makes it so pervasive. Extending the 
arguments of others (Bauman, 1993; Eikeland, 2015; Eikeland & Saevi, 2017; Peperzak, 
2013; Saevi & Eikeland, 2012), I argue that trust is a form of Lévinas’ Saying. Trusting ‘is’ 
an activity to be understood as a verb but not a noun. Trust escapes concepts and although it 
is used as an argument, it is not a fact but always elusive. Trust is a way of dealing with the 
Said’s anxiety, but when we try to rationalise it becomes an anxious endeavour. Trust forces 
me into constant questioning and scepticism. Last but not least trust is the natural sibling of 
responsibility. Given their close relation and their shared properties and traits, I understand 
trust to be what Lévinas calls ‘Saying’. 
Methodological Reflection 
Qualitative research is a messy business - a ‘nomadic’ enterprise (Adams St. Pierre, 
2002). I tried to get my thoughts straight, but I could not. I start with one thought, move to 
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the next, to yet another and occasionally come back to the first. The thinking develops, and 
I move these thoughts a bit further or in another direction but I am not sure if it ever becomes 
any clearer. Sometimes it seems as if the mess is only getting messier. But then a huge wave 
comes which takes me a couple of meters away and everything clarifies. One of these big 
waves was when my foreman said we had to do something about the cracks [see ‘The Cracks’ 
p. 109] and another when my site manager said, ‘we can’t do that’ [see ‘Pricey Bricks’ p. 
186]. But then complexity builds up again. The next projects with that architect were not 
that easy and smooth. So, is my interpretation of the quality of our relationship wrong? Not 
quite. It was probably a good representation of the moment as I lived through it. But life 
moves on and so must my writing.  
Large (2015, p. 44) speaks of “the presence of the speaker in their speech.” When I retreat 
to write, as I often have recently, I do not think I fulfil the role of the present speaker very 
well. I am often not there and not meeting clients, staff, suppliers etc. And Lévinas taught 
me that presence cannot be replaced by structures, written rules or guidelines.  
I want to be here sitting, writing and thinking but I want to live the life of an entrepreneur, 
acting, dealing and moving forward. Again, I am drifting away in my thoughts. It is perhaps 
navigating this dilemma which is so similar in autoethnography and running a business. I 
have a rough idea where I want to go with what I am doing in both business and research, 
but I seek to stay openminded to new development. One never knows what one might come 
across either in research (especially in qualitative, explorative research) or in business. The 
interaction with people in my business holds an infinite number of new possibilities for me. 
Isn’t that great? 
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VI. Looking Ahead 
In this chapter I examine the implications of Lévinas’ thought. What does it mean to 
regard trust as a form of Saying? Where do I go from here?  
I am not entirely sure what it means for my life. At the very least, it has left me with the 
impression that I cannot explain everything. After exploring Lévinas’ thought and my 
experiences in the light of this, I only know a little more about why I cannot explain and 
cannot know. It is not that I am unintelligent, inattentive, or incapable of understanding 
enough, but only that I am just not the Other I am interacting with. I cannot step into the 
Other’s shoes. 
This realisation makes me relax a little. Relentless efforts to understand will not solve the 
puzzle of the Other’s actions. The Other is entirely foreign to me and never at my disposal. 
This also means that I do not have the capacity to control him and never will have because I 
cannot know him. I know a bit of him - what I can translate into my Same, my Said. But that 
in no way accounts for the infinity of his otherness, of the ongoing encounter, the infinite 
Saying or the ‘il y a’ or ‘there is’. This is the permanent ‘trembling’ (Goethe, 1832) that 
makes up our social world. It is as if I can let go a little more. I may be terribly wrong in my 
judgements about what the Other I am interacting with is going to do but I cannot do much 
about it. Therefore, it makes no sense to be terrified as it would just paralyse me and I would 
just squander my days contemplating what could or could not happen. 
I could naively believe in the good of others. This would be as justified as not believing 
in it. The good is beyond proof and beyond being and I cannot prove its existence. The good 
is inherent in the Saying and it is better to believe in the good of others than not as it gives 
me the opportunity to forgive. This is not a superior kind of forgiveness but a humble one. 
The Other is not fundamentally for nor against me (Davis, 1996): The other might come to 
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the decision to be with the Third against me but I must still speak to him. I have to respond; 
I am still responsible. 
This responsibility is manifested in the constant effort to solve conflict. An architect I 
very much enjoy working with once said to me: “Never stop talking to people.” He insisted 
that even in bitter conflicts one should not abandon the conversation. Although he might 
have thought in ontological terms, this advice can also be interpreted in terms of the pre-
ontological. In interacting we create proximity and we respond to each other; we engage in 
Saying. Therefore, a different Said is likely to be produced. It is almost certainly different 
because of the Saying’s infinite difference it must create new knowledge and different ‘facts' 
- a different Said. This is where the solution to a conflict might be hidden.  
In other words, interacting or Saying in its subjectivity produces new interpretations. The 
Saying leaves new traces in the Said and the Said is altered. Conflicts are always rooted in 
the Said - in comparing. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that a solution is possible within 
an altered Said.  
The Problem of Rationality 
A calculation of my accountability would have allowed charging the full price for the 
bricks [see ‘The Cooperative’ p. 219], but I think pure reason leads us to be technocrats. If I 
only made a calculation of accountabilities, I would only apply laws. Hence, I would be an 
emotionless technocrat. 
Williamson (1993, p. 453) clarifies that compared to other social sciences “the economic 
approach to economic organisation is decidedly more calculative.” Yet a purely calculative 
approach often neglects social cohesion. This notion is nicely reflected by Weir (2011). He 
demonstrates the shortcomings of a western conception of management by only 
concentrating on an evidence base. It is – as I have shown in my Lévinas readings – only 
one aspect of human interaction. Hence, if management only builds on evidence, it misses 
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an important part of human interaction. Weir, however, emphasises the importance of caring 
in management, which to a western-ontological belief falls behind the supremacy of 
profitability. 
If maximising profits - the very notion of the economic man - is the only thing that guides 
human interaction, we may abandon trust altogether. It is evident in Williamson’s (1993) 
analysis of calculativeness and trust that trust cannot be explained by pure rationality, and 
we also find this notion in earlier works (Simmel, 1907). 
It becomes a pure risk-assessment and whether the other acts in my interest or not is pure 
Machiavellianism [see ‘Responsibility’ p. 101]. Under this premise, I do not assume the 
Other in any case to be genuinely benevolent to me neither do I assume he is a genuinely 
good person. He is only benevolent to me because it suits his interest. This, in fact, is not 
what I understand as benevolence - it is window-dressed opportunism. 
Ultimately, this is what Weir tells me about the western approach to management - the 
way management was taught to me at university in Germany and is perhaps done so 
everywhere. But my experiences in business are different. There are underlying patterns that 
I cannot reduce to pure calculation. There are of course people with a tendency towards 
opportunistic behaviour but there are also a lot of people I did business with of the opposite 
kind. They acted very benevolently although it was not in their economic interest to do so – 
at least not in the short, foreseeable future. Hence, there is something beyond rationality. I 
think people emphasise rationality in their decision-making process differently. Some act, it 
seems, on pure calculation and are therefore often opportunistic, others follow more what 
they might call their feeling or instinct. This feeling might be what ought to be done 
(Waldenfels, 1995).  
The people that tend to mere calculation are the ones I am reluctant to trust as I know that 
they are just looking for what suits them best. I may work with them as I do not have a 
problem with people being opportunistic - as long as I realise it. But if I believe I can trust 
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them I will probably be exploited. If I anticipate this I can I put it into my calculation. It is 
then pure risk-assessment. I can cope with it although I may not like to work in such a climate 
because I have to keep my business partners at arm's length (whether the word partner applies 
here is yet another question). I must not expose myself to too much risk. This allows only 
for small and/or simple transactions. Ambiguous, large contracts are beyond discussion with 
these people. They would be far too risky and exhausting. 
Working with someone who emphasises the ethical side of interaction and does not purely 
rely on opportunistic calculation is a very different matter. I assume this person to be 
inherently benevolent and at least in principle good to others - to me. Hence, if something in 
our contract is ambiguous or not regulated in our contract we are going to find a solution 
that is fair for both of us and not just beneficial for one of the parties. 
This is a nuanced picture. People tend to one or the other side and may sometimes change 
sides. To me, it is enjoyable to deal with people who act ethically as I can be quite relaxed 
with them because I am not afraid to be tricked or exploited. These are actually the ones I 
look to do business with. 
Lawyer 
One autumn Sunday morning I went jogging in the Tiergarten which is 
one of the largest parks, if not the largest, in the city centre of Berlin. Some 
metres in front of me was another jogger running at almost the same pace as 
I did. When I reached him, we greeted each other and began to chat. First, 
we talked about running in the park, after some time the conversation turned 
more into our daily lives and what we do for a living. I found out that he was 
a lawyer with his business in Berlin. 
And then, of course, we talked about the legal practice, how litigations 
run, how some lawyers lure their clients into lengthy processes and so on. At 
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some point, he said what left quite an impression on me. ’Clients tend to 
find the lawyer that fits them.’ 
I discussed this statement with different lawyers and they all agreed. Regarding myself, I 
have to admit it fits in multiple respects. I think my lawyer suits me well as do the others I 
do business with e.g. my clients, the architects I work with, my suppliers and last but not 
least my staff. I have come to believe that there is an underlying pattern that guides me in 
the direction of a certain branch of people or that we align our behaviour with the others we 
are interacting with. It might be a bit of both. 
I am quite forgiving about a lack of abilities. For instance, if one takes a seemingly stupid 
decision, does not know something, acts clumsily or thoughtlessly etc. I do not have a lot of 
problem forgiving that person. But I struggle to forgive if the person acts obviously (or 
apparently) ill-willed to me or is utterly opportunistic and anticipates my loss. I may trust 
that clumsy, thoughtless, unskilled person and this person might be nice regardless. This has 
nothing to do with the person’s abilities. Whether one can write proper German does not 
necessarily make them a good soul. I can calculate the risk – I would be rather reluctant to 
hand the clumsy person my valuable china - but that has little to do with trusting. 
Trusting is beyond calculation. Calculation does not matter in trust’s regard. This is the 
essential difference between trust and control. If the person is unable to fulfil the job, I want 
him or her to do, it does not matter whether I control this person or how good-willed this 
person may be. They cannot do it. 
The distinction between trust and control becomes clearer when I think about a person I 
do not know enough about. If I guess that a person is able to fulfil a certain task and it turns 
out that they could not it is quite easy to forgive this failure if it was due to a lack of 
knowledge, skills, etc. as long as I learned that the person did her or his best. I may be angry 
about the fact that it did not work out but not with the person.  
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But it is very different if it turns out that this person was able but not willing to do what I 
wanted and what we had agreed on. I could have exerted more control over this person to 
coerce him or her to do what I want. But to trust means that I believe the other person follows 
an inner obligation to do me that service. This person assumes responsibility for the task, 
essentially for me to do the job sufficiently well. Even the clumsy person does his or her best 
not to break my china, and in most cases, might be successful. To me it is less important 
what they are actually able to deliver but whether they wanted to. This good-willed but 
incapable person might assume responsibility for not delivering, the opportunistic certainly 
not. 
I believe that each person is a moral person to some extent. If we were not good at all, we 
would kill each other pre-emptively [see ‘Responsibility’ p. 101]. Hence, I believe in a bit 
of morality in every person and therefore trust everyone to some extent. But I try to avoid 
doing business with the ones that seem to act more opportunistically and seek the ones with 
a more obvious moral attitude. 
Therefore, people that base their decisions on regulations regardless of the particularities 
of the situation and people who are stiff in their applications of rules and too inflexible to 
make these rules serve human sociality, are the ones I trust only a little. I may rely on them 
because I can predict what they are going to do with a likelihood close to certainty, but in 
ambiguous situations, I would prefer to work with a flexible person who acts according to a 
primordial ethical obligation rather than a given law. 
A person can both stick more or less fiercely to regulations and norms and tend to more 
or less selfish behaviour. I do not really like to do business with people who are very strongly 
committed to rules and regulations because if rules do not fit the particular case, there is no 
way that something can be dealt with in a responsible manner. If the contract says something, 
these people follow it regardless of whether it is appropriate or not.  
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However, if these people also tend to act opportunistically it is my idea of interactional 
hell. It is the opportunism that makes it really problematic. Even if they do not stick fiercely 
to rules and regulations, the tendency to opportunistic, selfish behaviour makes it difficult 
for me to interact with them. Of course, I love to deal with flexible and ethically sound 
people, but this might be to do with the construction industry I work in. In the retail business, 
many issues are clear-cut. It often boils down to one question: ‘This is the goods or service, 
and that is the price. Do you want it?’ 
My industry is far more ambiguous. Often project files lack important specifications for 
a variety of reasons (people involved, longevity of projects, changes in regulations and 
demands etc.) These things change during the construction process. I have not seen a single 
building that was built as it was initially planned. There are changes everywhere. 
Given this ambiguity, there is a lot of room for discretion. On building sites and in project 
teams I enjoy people who are flexible because we can advance the project by moving beyond 
rules, but it has to be coupled with a good portion of Lévinasian responsibility. When the 
person I interact with assumes the responsibility that is opened up by dismantling concepts 
(rules and regulations) (Derrida, 1992), then it works fine for me. But if not, as in the case 
of the architect and client shifting responsibility to me (Grosse, 2015a), it frustrates and 
angers me.  
I may be inclined to look in the first place for people with the fitting moral attitude. 
Whether they are flexible with regard to rules and regulations is not that important. I can at 
least count on them to follow some (even inappropriate) rule. I may not like it but at least it 
is predictable. 
To make a partnership successful – business or otherwise – it is most important to find 
the person or people that have the most suitable balance between being moral and being 
rational. For one person it might be best to work with one who does exactly what is written 
in the guideline, rule or law and very seldom deviates. For others, it might be best to have 
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one person at hand that does what it is best for the purpose or the particular situation 
regardless of what the contract says. 
The new Bricklayer 
Some years ago, I hired a new bricklayer. As it turned out, he was well 
qualified and skilful. After around a year I promoted him to be foreman. We 
talked through the project I had assigned him on and discussed a number of 
details. At some point, the question of who may order the material from the 
supplier came up. I said to him “you do!” 
He was surprised. He told me that in the firm he worked for before, he 
never did that. It was always the boss’s task. The boss wanted to be in control. 
However, I replied, that I think he knows best when and how much material 
is needed. If he had any questions, he could, of course, approach me. 
I think this shows two quite contrary approaches to management. I trusted the foreman 
and did not control him. However, his former employer felt the need to control. In a later 
conversation the foreman told me that his former employer made all the arrangements so 
that he knew exactly when the reinforcement, the concrete, and the bricks would arrive on 
site – even four weeks in advance.  
I may assume that the employer did not feel comfortable to trust his employees and so 
controlled them to a great extent. I felt quite happy to leave a lot of decisions with my 
foremen because I believed they would do their best. Therefore, I need people around me 
that have this attitude and who assume responsibility without explicit commitment. I am 
there for them (or at least I try to be) and I believe that they are there for me.  
Giving them power is essentially what Lévinas says when he mentions the implicit 
command [see ‘Rational versus Responsible’ p. 171] “[T]he command I receive must also 
be a command to command him who commands me.” (Lévinas, 1954, p. 43) Leaving these 
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discretionary powers with my employees is a way of inviting them to use these powers 
responsibly. It is an implicitly communicated expectation. 
In some respect I have the opportunity to choose the staff members with whom I work. 
This is also the case regarding my clients and partners, yet I cannot always choose with 
whom I am going to work, nor do I know enough beforehand to make an informed choice. 
Sometimes it turns out that the person I thought of as being very moral is very selfish and 
does not regard morality as a high value.  A person may even seek to give the impression of 
being moral although they are not. How do I deal with them? On the one hand, I could try to 
adapt and be selfish as well but that can lead to a downward spiral – a vicious circle of 
atrocities and counter-atrocities. On the other hand, sticking to my moral values can leave 
me vulnerable and make the situation much worse for me. The problem I describe here (trust 
and vulnerability) is difficult or impossible to resolve. However, I have to deal with the 
dilemma because I cannot solve or avoid it.  
Forget about Control 
In the previous chapter, I sought to understand my own experiences and I tried to find the 
traces of Lévinas’ ideas in my business practice. As the aim of this investigation suggests, I 
predominantly dealt with concepts surrounding trust and trust itself. I have argued that trust 
should be understood as what Lévinas calls ‘Saying’ – an ethical response to the Other. The 
difficulty is that ontological thinking about trust is rendered extremely difficult by this 
understanding, if not impossible.  
But when trust is intangible in a classic sense and very elusive, it is not measurable. We 
only see the effect of trust on us rather than what trust is itself. I may develop a trusting 
relationship in the same way I develop a way to dance with a partner. We can account for 
the comfort we experience in such a relationship; we can account for the joy we experience 
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in interacting with someone we trust - at least I can. But it is impossible to pin trust down or 
to hold trust itself.  
I wonder why I struggle to find any structure in all the writing I did. Trust seemed so 
tangible when I wrote about it as Saying. I had the knowledge, the Same, my concepts and 
categories - I had ethics, the inexhaustible spring of Saying, caring and trusting. But I live 
between those two poles. Neither pure Saying nor pure Said are achievable. Both disrupt the 
other and therefore form a relationship with each other. 
Trust is therefore related to knowledge. My foreman in the ‘The Cracks’ example [p. 109] 
only acted ethically because he knew, and the architect only appreciated our approach 
because he knew and he only trusted us because he thought we knew. It is this recurrence 
that haunts me. The Said and the Saying are permanently recurring. This constant movement 
between the two makes it terribly difficult to deal intellectually with trust as Saying. I can 
say it, but when I write my thoughts down or when I show you the Said, you might not see 
it any better than I. 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions on how to build trust. Should we be ethical, care 
for the Other or try not to be too hard? I am talking about something one cannot learn from 
a textbook. It is not as simple as, do this and not that and then others will trust you. We are 
given advice like this all the time. For example, I recently heard Paul Zak giving a keynote 
at the FINT workshop in Dublin (November 2016) and he measured what to do to make 
others trust you.  
One of his claims was caring for others makes them trust you. I would agree that care 
plays a major role when one wants to be trusted but as e.g. Baier (1986) emphasised, care 
must be fine-tuned. The right amount of care might lead to trust from the Other but intrusive 
care or a disrespect of privacy can result in the opposite. It is only by responding to the Other 
that we may find the right ways to care for him. But it is still impossible to measure this very 
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subjective appropriateness. It would mean measuring the Other’s alterity and that would 
amount to gauging infinity. 
For advice to help it must be of a different sort. It should be more about a general attitude 
than concrete action. I know that I am moving in a direction which is not well regarded in 
managerial science as managers want to know about best practice and how things have to be 
done. But this is not what I can offer. I can only advise myself to be deeply reflexive.  
The thing I can suggest is to question yourself. I am the only person that I can change. It 
is caring for the Other which makes them trust me and this caring must always be directed 
towards the Other. Care because the Other is there and not because of me and care for the 
Other on the Other’s terms, not on my terms. It is the turning to the Other that Pillow (2003) 
emphasises but in a way that hurts; turning to the Other until I am exhausted. 
And this care is for the Other’s sake and not mine. I should not care for the Other because 
I want to be trusted but because of the Other’s wellbeing, not mine and not because I want 
him to trust me. This may come or may not but it is very likely that when I only care for 
Others because of selfish interest –the selfish interest of being trusted – it will lead me 
nowhere. I cannot demand trust. The Other has no means to will to trust me (Baier, 1986). 
My demand would, therefore, be meaningless. 
Because it is only the Other that concerns me, I must forgive him. This is what Lévinas 
calls ‘substitution’ – me for the Other. ‘Apres Vous’ – after you. Hence, being upset or being 
angry and unforgiving would render my efforts to care for the Other impossible. Forgiving 
is the very act of putting the Other before me. Forgiving makes me less important than the 
Other. 
This conception is in strong contrast to that of trust as a means to achieve something. For 
instance, Paul Zak stressed in the keynote on the FINT Workshop that trust is an outcome of 
an equation. And he made the point that trust serves as a means to an end, i.e. if your staff 
trusts you, they will work harder for you. However, for me trust is a value in itself. It is a 
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value that my care for others has rewards and as long as I am in the position to trust, I should 
do so. 
It might even be worth enduring the trust-vulnerability-dilemma I discussed at the end of 
the last sub-section. Perhaps, trust is the anti-concept to the continual optimisation of our 
society and business life in particular. It relates to Peperzak’s (2013) observation that we 
miss an important point of sociality if we only insist on rationality. Being kind to others 
brings the reward of being trusted and trust rewards us perhaps with reciprocal trust but also 
economically. We might get back what we spend. 
This sounds altruistic and it is to some extent. I should be good to people as long as I can 
and although I cannot get guarantee it, I am likely to be repaid. Acting ethically costs money 
but acting unethically has a personal cost that cannot be measured in any currency. Being 
ethical is rewarded by being trusted. This is a value in itself, and it creates real benefits in 
the ontological sense.  
One may argue that a lot of people behave untrustworthily and make a lot of money from 
doing it. But I would not be able to look in the mirror if I considered myself to be extensively 
exploiting others. This attitude is not uncommon among my business partners and friends 
working in different industries. Yet all struggle with a similar problem: the issue of finding 
a balance between altruism and selfishness. If in doubt, I tend to choose altruism.  
However, I should clarify that given that I run my own business in a western society, I 
am not in the position to regard myself as an altruist. Of course, I exploit people, perhaps 
not the ones close to me, but I have to admit that the life I live is based on exploitation. It is 
exploitation not through my own hands but numerous proxies. However, I try to make at 
least a small difference. 
Trust to my understanding is the anti-concept to modern management. Managers are 
asked to control things. To control is to check, to verify, test facts, etc. It is knowledge about 
processes, people, groups, etc. but it also means to steer and to be in control of the process, 
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the people, the group, even the whole organisation. But I think we are well advised to drop 
that thought as it only leads to disappointment. 
The German translation of ‘to disappoint’ is ‘enttäuschen’. It is a composite word. I 
translate ‘ent’- as ‘de-’, ‘dis-’, or ‘un-’ i.e. to reverse or better to undo something done before 
and ‘täuschen’ as ‘deceive’, ‘delude’, ‘fool’ or ‘cheat’. The word predominantly refers to 
myself. I delude myself with the belief I can control things, people or organisations. I am 
supposed to reverse this belief and ‘entäuschen’ (de-fool) myself. I must abandon the belief. 
At first sight it seems as if it would be nice if I could control, but only from my selfish 
perspective and on a limited scale. 
I am far too limited to understand enough. However, I have dwelled on that to show that 
trust is necessary and here I dwell on it again. I am not in the position to take such a huge 
responsibility. I could not do justice to everyone I control since I am simply too stupid to 
understand enough. Better I let them decide for themselves. I cannot understand what their 
needs and desires are and I cannot feel their feelings or think their thoughts. The Others are 
just that - not me. Therefore I cannot subdue them under my totality. To believe I could 
control or steer them in a responsible way would just be foolish. 
Secondly, if I claimed that right for me, how could I prevent someone else claiming the 
same right for himself? When I seek absolute control, others might seek absolute control too. 
I have two options; either to fight for the upper hand and we submerge ourselves in a 
devastating battle or to simply surrender. In other words, either I engage in a fierce battle 
which with all likelihood causes more harm than gain on all sides or I give myself up entirely. 
Therefore, I think we have to let go of the idea of controlling people and should aim 
instead for management of care (Weir, 2011). I refer to management in its widest sense. In 
some respect, I manage not only my staff, subcontractors, and suppliers but also my business 
partners and clients as I want all of them to do something for me. I want my staff to work 
for me, my suppliers and subcontractors to deliver goods and services, the engineers and 
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architects to design buildings and help me to get contracts, and the clients to treat me fairly 
and pay their bills. All of them want something in exchange. 
And it always goes beyond what I wanted beforehand as I want and need more than I 
knew before. Opportunities for business are not created by controlling but where control is 
missing. The very development which is stifled by crystal, needs steam that is not controlled 
(Weick, 2006). This is Barbalet’s creative power of trust (Barbalet (2009). 
I reconnect this creativity to Lévinas’ notion of Saying. It is the Saying that creates and 
produces and not the Said. The Said is stiff, breathless, and dead. It rests in its totality. If I 
could control others completely, I would rest in my own totality and not move anymore; I 
could not create and more importantly the others I control would not create either. This 
would be a very bleak prospect. 
I need the Saying to escape this destructive totality. I need to break out constantly to 
create and produce and, more importantly, I need the Others to produce and create. Again, I 
am moving between the two extremes of Said and Saying. Pure Said is totality, or to Weick 
(2006), stifling crystal, and pure Saying would be total chaos because it lacks all structures 
– like Weick’s steam. 
If I seek limited control, I reduce risks although I must be aware that I will never eliminate 
risk, i.e. vulnerability. The setbacks I encounter are inevitable, but it is about moving on. It 
would be counterproductive to seek to eliminate them and it is dangerous to embark on a 
failure avoidance strategy since it inhibits creativity. We need to try new things or we will 
never discover anything. The Saying in social interaction is the source of the new and the 
emerging - the very creation of something.  
To my understanding it is counterproductive to think about laws or rules or when to trust 
and when not. It results in a failure-avoidance-strategy that prevents organisation and 
individuals from taking risks and subsequently from taking chances, hence from striving. 
210 Looking Ahead  
Henning Grosse  
To trust is to take a step in the dark – but this darkness is not necessarily negative. It is 
just what is beyond what I know or what I can know. Hence, I can be far more relaxed about 
betrayed trust because I took a chance in the lottery and I did not win. However, most of the 
time I will win, or I would always lose, if I did not dare to join this lottery. I could even go 
so far as to say I would not even be me because without trust I would not encounter Others. 
Lévinas argues that we must let go to gain something. I cannot know and it is better to 
acknowledge that than to stubbornly and desperately seek to control and know the 
unknowable. This is quite different to most approaches to management, especially evidence-
based management. But I would say this inability to control must be seen as positive. 
Otherwise there would be a single right way to manage and hence we would face the prospect 
of totalitarian management. 
Trust and Courage  
I clarified that trust is founded in the unknown. One cannot argue for or against it. Hence, 
to trust someone one requires courage - courage for the leap into the unknown. Without the 
guts to trust someone, I can go nowhere. 
Courage is not an intellectual virtue. The meaning seems closer to self-
confidence. But this also is inadequate. It is not self-confidence about one’s 
carpentry skills. It is a confidence that an individual can do what is fine or best in 
difficult circumstances, that one can face a threat, be it physical or social, for the 
sake of a worthwhile cause. Clearly, a cause may inspire such confidence, but a 
positive view of one’s own ability is required to act on it. (Putman, 2001, p. 464) 
A positive view of my abilities is needed to be courageous. But a positive view of his 
intention and moreover, his morality is necessary for the courage to trust the Other. But 
morality is beyond knowledge and so it becomes risky. 
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Still, risk is often, if not always, related to the probability of loss and has some negative 
connotations. I seek to avoid risk but I risk something to gain something else. I often can 
only gain something if I risk losing something else – be it as little as the time and effort I 
spend engaging with someone. 
I take the chance to gain – whatever that might be – by trusting the Other I am dealing 
with. I give something and hope to get something back without knowing whether I get 
something at all and what that something might will be. 
I consider trust in positive rather than negative terms - not so much as the risk of losing 
or getting hurt as the chance of gaining. I can then take chances and act trustingly - taking 
risks for the sake of getting chances. To me this is the potential benefit of acting on trust and 
that motivates me to be courageous and to take risks. 
There are situations when my acting trustingly was perhaps misplaced. As I show in the 
‘Deadlines’ example [see p. 189, and ‘Appendix B – Experiences with Auto-Ethnography 
(Grosse, 2015a)’ p. 289], when I sought to advance the project but my efforts were not 
appreciated and were instead exploited even more or when the engineer [‘The Engineer’ p. 
62/67, and ‘Appendix C – Trust and Construction Projects (Grosse, 2015b)’ p. 302] did not 
act as we agreed on. I consider my trust as wrongly placed, at least in the former example. 
However, I wonder whether it was wrong to trust. Although my courage did not pay off, I 
would perhaps act trustingly again. If I did not, I would have closed all options to gain and 
would be stuck in control mechanisms. Hence, although I failed in this attempt to create a 
mutually beneficial situation, I may try it again and risk something more in order not to close 
off the possibility of gaining. 
Courage by definition involves risk, so the confidence one has in one’s skills, or 
abilities cannot be simply a passive confidence. It must be confidence that includes 
extending oneself in an effective manner. (Putman, 2001, p. 465) 
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The actions which result from trusting tempt me to link courage to trust. It is the courage 
that leads to an extension of oneself. I would like to connect this back to Peperzak’s (2013) 
notion that when I trust someone, I extend myself through the other and the trust lets me 
become one with the other. Together we are bigger than the sum of our parts. Courage is 
necessary because to extend I have to give up something of myself. I also find this in Lingis: 
Courage and trust have this in common: they are not attitudes with regard to 
images and representations. Courage is a force that can arise and hold steadfast 
as one's projections, expectations, and hopes dissipate. Courage rises up and takes 
hold and builds on itself. Trust is a force that can arise and hold on to someone 
whose motivations are as unknown as those of death. It takes courage to trust 
someone you do not know. There is an exhilaration in trusting that builds on itself. 
One really cannot separate in this exhilaration the force of trust and the force of 
courage. (Lingis, 2004, p. xi) 
To me, the courage involved in trusting is what makes me an entrepreneur. The strength 
I show when I trust another is what makes me powerful. But it is a strength not in the sense 
of being in control of everything but of having the courage to act, even if the control is 
absent. One may understand it as a weakness when I retreat to some impersonal rules or 
control mechanism. 
It is this doubling of responsibility and trust that makes me consider it as so important. 
‘Entrepreneur’ translates in German as ‘Unternehmer’ – literally, ‘undertaker’. When I look 
up ‘undertake’ in dictionaries, I find the following notions: ‘commit oneself to and begin (an 
enterprise or responsibility)’, ‘promise to do a particular thing’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2016b), or ‘to take upon oneself’, ‘to put oneself under obligation to perform’ (Merriam-
Webster Dictionaries, 2016b). All the entries suggest that the entrepreneur undertakes 
something. I put myself under some commitment, promise, obligation, or responsibility.  
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The core of my entrepreneurship is taking on the obligations I can handle, making 
reasonable promises, committing myself to a certain goal and being held accountable for my 
deeds and yet remaining responsible.  
The Price of Morality 
Does it cost money to be moral? In the short term, it seems so. I saw this in the example 
of my business partner selling repair kits rather than new products to make customers come 
back [‘Acting Ethically Costs Money’ p. 151]. The two problems are assessing the initial 
question of whether acting ethically costs money or it pays off, financially. My business 
partner chose the ethical option so I cannot know whether the clients would have bought the 
new product and can only assume they would have done. This was what he supposed but I 
do not know whether being treated fairly was the reason they came back for their next. I can 
only assume. 
Would I go to a place where I felt treated unfairly, exploited, or badly counselled? I would 
only do so if I had no other choice, but my business partner’s clients had other choices. Is it 
useful to think about business ethics in terms of return on investment? I may be able, at least 
in theory, to track cause and effect of the particular action. Because my foreman spoke out 
about ‘The Cracks’ [p. 109] in the column, the architect could choose whether to use us for 
his next project, and he did. But I am relating effects and symptoms. Speaking out was only 
the manifestation of our inner urge to treat him fairly. Speaking out was the symptom but 
not the urge itself. Or in Lévinas’ terms, the Said is measurable, countable, ontologically 
valid, the essential message and the signifier – but our Saying is not, it was the inner force 
that made us expose our thinking, it was this feeling that ‘there has to be done something.’ 
The Saying only left its traces – in this case what we said about the cracks. The ethical is 
Saying – signifying – and therefore not measurable.  
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Furthermore, can we identify an ethical way of acting? It is problematic since I have no 
criteria to judge ethical behaviour. Ethics is what happens before theories (Caputo, 2000). It 
looks arbitrary, but it is not. The demand is spelt out by the Other when I encounter that 
person - the Other’s face. 
Again, I am responsible for the Other, but I cannot claim anything. This was very much 
the case with my business partner’s clients and also with my clients and architects – I feel 
responsible for them, but they are not obliged to respond to me. It is nice if they do and come 
back to do business with me but I have no right to claim it. It is their choice. 
I try to employ ethical behaviour to be regarded as a fair partner and it is important to me 
to give this impression. For further discussion of this [see ‘Appendix E – An Insider’s Point 
of View (Grosse, 2016a)’ p. 333 and ‘Appendix J – An insider’s point of view (Grosse, 
2018)’ p. 384]. It is important to me as I want my business partners to regard me as a fair 
and to be trusted by them. I do my very best not to disappoint them and most of the time I 
believe I am successful. However, as in the case with the architect of my paper mentioned 
above, I realise how hard it is for me to discover that others do not trust me or think I am 
acting unethically. 
I believe that people do business with me because they know that I seek to act ethically 
and am reluctant to exploit others. Some may think I am a fool; why should one be ethical 
in a world of selfish people? But looking at the long-term implications, it seems that this 
perspective is flawed. I would not be able to do business and would act purely by selfish 
considerations. I would ruin the relationships with my business partners one after the other. 
In the example of the wrong concrete [see ‘Wrong Concrete’ p. 166], if I had not 
highlighted the importance of our relationship, we would have ended in bitter litigation. But 
working together to keep the costs down for one of us helped. I seek to act morally sound 
and ethically whether or not I succeed or am perceived as doing so. 
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To me, economic success is only one goal. But I do not seek to achieve this goal by any 
means. I can act selfishly as I have to care for myself and cannot just care for everybody 
else. That would be self-sacrifice which is not what I am about. However, I could never act 
purely selfishly and so I never make an inappropriately high profit.  
This is the dilemma I am in. The problem is to permanently strike a balance between 
being ought to do something and making money. I want to live a decent life, I want to spend 
some money on my kids and partner and I want to have a bit of luxury. 
Reflexivity makes this terribly hard. I know that every personal gain I make takes 
something away from someone else. Claiming anything else is denial. So, compared to many 
others, I live in a very luxurious world. There are people next door earning far less than I do, 
not to mention others in poorer countries. But I could also compare myself to people that 
earn more than I do - it sometimes looks as if there is an almost infinite number of them.  
If ethical behaviour is a means to earn more money, it is not ethical anymore. The ethical 
must come from itself not from the drive to earn money. I want to do something good 
regardless of the consequences for me. I want to do good because of the good itself. It just 
feels good and it gives me some comfort.  
By solving the problem of the wrong concrete, I was acting in a way that was beneficial 
to me, but to be ethical, this must not be the reason for doing so. The personal benefit should 
be a side-effect because trusting others must not be motivated by the wish for being trusted. 
It must be sufficient to itself - I trust you, and I don’t care whether you trust me or not. It is 
your business. 
I act trustworthily because I believe that it is a good thing to do. This is Saying in its 
essence - making oneself vulnerable without retreat. There is nothing behind Saying. If there 
is, it is not Saying and not trusting.  
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Forgiveness 
“Here we have a reversal of obligation. It is the offended party who worries 
about forgiveness that the offender does not concern himself with. […] the offended 
party walks back and forth in front of the offender to give him an opportunity to ask 
for forgiveness.” (Lévinas, 1968; 1977, p. 22) 
Baier (1986, p. 238) writes, “[i]n any case of a questionable exercise of discretion there 
will be room both for forgiveness of unfortunate outcomes and for tact in the treatment of 
the question of whether there is anything to forgive.” (p.238). I think that forgiveness plays 
a major role for two reasons. First, forgiveness is directed towards the Other. I think myself 
in the situation of the trusted having done something which the one trusting me does not 
appreciate. If the trusting now blames me adamantly and makes me accountable for all the 
consequences of my deeds, I cannot take on any slightly ambiguously defined task from this 
person because I run the risk of being blamed again for any slight deviation from their 
expectation. 
This reminds me of a conversation with a friend. He supervises a couple of staff members 
in his department. When he ran into an overflow of work, I told him he should delegate more 
to his staff. He replied that if he did so it would take him almost the same amount of time to 
supervise than to do the things by himself. I argued that he would teach his staff and develop 
their skills, and after a while he might get something very close to what he expected. This 
would be ‘good enough’ and he would win a lot of time for more important things.  
The notion of ‘good enough’ is to me a practical translation of forgiveness. If it works 
why should I strive for something close to perfection? Perhaps even more importantly, I have 
to stress the Other’s otherness again. It is this deviation from my Same, from what I expect 
that resembles the creative power of the Other. 
 Looking Ahead 217 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
The second aspect of forgiveness is no less important. We often stand in the way of 
ourselves. In some sense, I have to make peace with the Other. Forgiveness helps me to calm 
down. When I presented Experiences with Auto-Ethnography at the Ethnography 
Symposium (Grosse, 2015a), I talked extensively about how I tried to cope with the strong 
emotions resulting from a breach of trust. One person from the audience asked what it would 
mean to me to forgive them. Actually, it did not matter to the person who I believed had 
exploited my trust. They did not care whether I was angry with them or not, but it mattered 
very much to me. I felt no more need to be ‘violent’ against them and the whole paralysis of 
overwhelming strong emotions resolved. It was a process rather than an immediate switching 
off but slowly I let go of the feelings. I am still angry and sad about how they treated me but 
it is different; I learned to cope with it. It is what Ellis (2004, p. 19) described when saying 
autoethnography “helped me organise my life, figure out what was going on, and then put 
away events and feelings to deal with what happened next.” I would not trust these people 
regarding my business interests and I would be very careful in how to deal with them to 
safeguard my position. But there is a relief that comes with forgiving and I stopped thinking 
about how to take revenge. 
To forgive others who treat me badly is the first step in taking responsibility for them. 
What they do to me is their affair (Lévinas, 1982) but what I do about them is my 
responsibility and this responsibility for my perpetrators (Lévinas, 1961), if I may call them 
this, begins with forgiving them. It may be the smallest incident, such as my neighbour 
forgetting to water my plants, or as for Lévinas, forgiving Germans for what they have done 
to the Jews (Lévinas, 1968; 1977, p. 25).  
In the Nine Talmudic Writings Lévinas stresses the notion of forgiveness and aggression. 
“The aggressiveness of the offender is perhaps his very unconsciousness. Aggression is the 
lack of attention par excellence.” (Lévinas, 1968; 1977, p. 25) My lack of attention was to 
some extent resolved by the comment, I got during this conference. “Why don’t you forgive 
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them?” This helped to resolve my aggression against them as I became conscious of how 
meaningless this aggression is. I know that I am turning Lévinas’ argument in the opposite 
direction – from the view of the offender to the view of the offended. However, when I am 
aggressive, I become an offender too. But more importantly, to Lévinas, it is always my 
responsibility and not the Other’s. Hence, I must contemplate what I can do and not what 
the Other could do. Some lines further Lévinas dwells further on this thought:  
But perhaps there is something altogether different in all this. One can, if pressed 
to the limit, forgive the one who has spoken unconsciously. (Lévinas, 1968; 1977, 
p. 25) 
 I had not read this piece by the time I began to forgive them but believing that they spoke 
unconsciously made it possible for me to forgive them. They should have known that it was 
unfair when they shifted the whole accountability to me. But it is my standards and my 
thinking that this is unfair. They might have though it is the way one does business and it is 
just sport to trick the other. Or they may have some other explanation to justify what they 
did. I have to let the Other be in his alterity and to deal with it. I am responsible and I have 
to make choices. Whether I act on my trust in them or not is my affair. 
Without this aggression, I could ‘talk to them’, as my business partner advised me and 
keep the conversation running. It is hard to think in this way when feelings are hurt, but it is 
utterly pragmatic. I may even be able to rebuild a relationship after a perceived breach of 
trust. In German we call this ‘jumping over one’s own shadow’ - to do a seemingly 
impossible thing or to be ‘untrue’ to oneself (Watzlawick, 1983). It is to abandon thinking 
of wrongs and rights and to think the situation is as it is so let’s make the best of it. 
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Care  
Weir (2011) refers to Lévinas’ notion of the infinite responsibility yet, he emphasises the 
shared responsibility in the finance business in Arab countries. He points out that there is no 
fixed interest rate and that the lender has to adjust his interest to the borrower’s capabilities. 
This has some similarities to my business experiences. Years ago, I had difficulty paying 
certain bills on time, yet some partners allowed for a delay. I was left with the impression 
that each one cares for one another, at least to some extent. In this environment, one can rest 
assured that when business goes wrong, others help out.  
I have done similar things in my business and had good experiences with it: 
The Cooperative 
We worked on a social housing project. The owners of the estate, a five-
floor building in Berlin with space for some 20 families, was a cooperative. 
The ones who wanted to live in this house were obliged to be members of this 
cooperative and did not actually own one flat but rather the right to live in 
one for rather low rent. Hence, they had shared responsibilities and some 
advantages. Apart from that, they had to do quite a lot of building work by 
themselves to keep the cost of constructing the buildings low. 
When we came to the end of the project, it turned out that we had to charge 
them more than our initial quotation included, since we had to do more work 
than initially thought. 
We sent the architect we worked before our final bill, and he gave his 
approval. But then the money did not come. We had sent them a couple of 
bills before, and they never paid late. So, I was a bit surprised. One day I 
called the architect because he had close ties to the cooperative and asked 
why they did not pay. 
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The problem it turned out was that they ran out of money. The architect 
recommended to call the cooperative directly and gave me the number of 
the accountant. 
I did call. The accountant quite frankly admitted that they were short 
of money and that she could not pay. 
One has to know that the families living in the house are low middle 
class - not really poor and in need but also by far not in the position to 
buy a detached house in Berlin's surroundings. They are working class. 
They can afford to pay the monthly rent and may have paid some to the 
cooperative. But apart from that their financial situation appears to be 
strained. 
During the phone call, I raised that there is a monthly income on the 
side of the cooperative - the rents will come each month. So, I suggested 
that we find an agreement where each month a small amount of money is 
paid, and I offered them a very low interest. She discussed it with the 
board of the cooperative, and they agreed to my proposal. 
Of course, I could have insisted on my right to get paid immediately. 
But at this moment that seemed not fair to me. No question, I wanted to 
get my money. But I did not need it immediately at that time. So why should 
I 'point a gun at their chest?' I got my money with quite some delay, on 
top of some interest, and they were happy too. 
They did not really ask me to give something but I would have caused them a lot of trouble 
if I had insisted on immediate payment. So, they asked whether I could help them to solve 
their problem. I am not sure whether it was to do with the repeated phone calls and the 
pleasant atmosphere between the accountant and me. It was not some far-off corporation or 
faceless client I had to litigate but people with a phone number I knew, with a voice I heard 
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and with a face I had met. This was not only true for the accountant but also for a number of 
the cooperative members. I had seen them working and had a beer and a grilled sausage with 
them at small events on the building site. They had a face that I had I encountered and that 
is the very moment they dissolved an indistinguishable mass of masks in the distance, to use 
Bauman’s (2008) terminology, and became faces in my proximity. 
It was this proximity that made the difference. I dealt with real people and if I had pushed 
through and claimed immediate payment they would have suffered. I would have been 
violent to the guy at the barbecue, to the one who collected the rubbish on the building site, 
and to the accountant I had had a nice chat with. I was not able to do that. 
It would have been different if I were under financial constraints. If I had had no money 
in my bank account and a pile of bills to pay, I would not have been so generous. I would 
have pushed harder to get my money faster. The question is, how hard would I have pushed? 
I think I would have looked at other options. From whom can I demand what? How hard can 
I be to one business partner in comparison to another? 
It is here that Derrida (1992) comes into play. I have to make a judgement. Lévinas says 
that we are infinitely responsible towards the other and we are violent when we compare the 
two others but we must. We have to take ourselves into consideration and satisfy our basic 
needs or we cannot give. In this tension between multiple poles, we are entangled and have 
to weigh them. We cannot make a perfect a just decision, Derrida tells us, but we have to 
try. 
In this case it was very easy and also very enjoyable. I had enough money and did not 
have to fight with people I liked. I could do them a favour. But there are many situations 
when it is not that easy. There had been times when I had struggled to make ends meet, when 
I paid my own salary late and when I could not pay my bills on time. Then it becomes a 
question of who will survive. This very tough and I wonder where the ethical is found in 
such situations. When I offered the 'loan' to the cooperative, they could not pay the bill. What 
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should I have done? Should I have said, ‘that's your business, not mine’? I do not think so. 
It would have ended in litigation and a ruined relationship. I would not have been 
accountable since it was not my fault that the cost overran the budget but I could not have 
denied my ultimate responsibility. Hence, I would do the same again if it was in my power 
to do so. 
Four Dimensions: Trust and Control, Responsibility and Forgiveness 
I choose not to control and I stop attempting to do so. I cannot control, and I should not 
control as I have demonstrated. I must trust others, and I should trust them. When I do so as 
a business leader, as an ‘Unternehmer’, I let the Other do things her or his own way. That 
might be different from the way I would have done it but it might be beneficial or even 
creative. If I do not let them do it would just be done as it always were without creativity 
and without additional benefit. 
It is then that I am not so much the ultimate leader but the coach, mediator, consultant, or 
carer. It is not that I say how things should be done but rather that I offer help and perhaps 
some guidance. But still, I take responsibility by caring for the things. Again, to take the 
quote Lévinas himself likes so much from the Brothers Karamazov, “We are all responsible 
for all for all men before all, and I more than all the others.” 
Through my years in business I came to a similar conclusion myself. Often I say to 
myself: “The only one who can change things here [in my business or my life] actively is 
me. Don’t wait for anybody to come and do things. It’s just you.” Lévinas’ interpretation of 
Dostoyevsky goes even further. It is not only me who can do things, and it is me who should 
do things, but it is me who is to blame for everything. To Lévinas there is no point in blaming 
others. We are even responsible for our perpetrators (Lévinas, 1961). 
In extreme terms, I can apply this to the situation of when the client and his architect made 
me accountable for a lower quality than we had previously agreed on (Grosse, 2015a). Why 
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did I let myself be in this position? Why was I angry about what they did? Shouldn’t I have 
been aware of that very possibility? There is a shifting responsibility for what happened to 
me that may seem to overwhelm me. But at the same time, it opens the possibility to forgive 
them. It might be their action and their responsibility but it is their ‘affair’ (Lévinas, 1982) 
and not mine. I cannot demand them to treat me in a particular way I can only change things 
myself. It is all up to me, and I am ultimately responsible. 
To cope with the overwhelming nature of this responsibility I just need to be conscious 
that I cannot solve the dilemma as it is always too much to cope with. However, I have the 
means to forgive myself. This is Lévinas’ central message; I am not in the world towards 
death, but I am in the world for the Others (Large, 2015). Whatever way the Others approach 
me and however they treat me, I am supposed to surrender to them. I have to get along with 
them even if this means ‘comparing people’ or includes harsh decisions. 
I may consciously break trust when my calculation tells me to do so. And I may be wrong 
because my Said - what I comprehend - is limited. I make a decision which I know can be 
wrong. When Lévinas talks about the terrible task of comparing people (Wright et al., 1988) 
this is the terrible part of that comparison. The decision is actually wrong – at least for the 
Other. Because it must be wrong for the Other who understands the world differently from 
me. It is bound to be wrong decision for someone. I have decided to be with the Other and 
not with the Third, who is another Other. 
Yet, I must forgive myself for this wrongdoing because I know I cannot avoid it. This is 
the terrible dilemma I am in. But it is a good thing to be haunted by this dilemma. I have to 
consider, to contemplate and to be sceptical. I must not stop in my efforts towards the Other 
and I must seek justice. 
I am trapped between trust and control, between responding to the Other and translating 
the Other and between Saying and Said. It is forgiving Others and myself which makes the 
dilemma liveable and saves me from being overwhelmed.  
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Reflections about Otherness 
Weir (2011) picks up the notion of the Other and urges the reader to respect their 
otherness. But to me, it is not just about respect for the Other’s otherness. It is also valuing 
the Other’s alterity - both practically and spiritually. 
I have dwelled on the spiritual notion of alterity already which make it possible to me that 
I am. It is the spiritual encounter with the Other that makes my selfhood possible. But there 
is also a practical side to the alterity of the Other. 
The alterity which Lévinas talks about is not connected to special traits, personal features, 
abilities, etc. It is just about being someone else. But this being someone else gives the other 
different insights, different knowledge and different thoughts about the world. It is here that 
people who think differently about a problem come up with different solutions than I would. 
These alternative solutions may have great value for me and it is this rearranging, reinventing 
and approaching things differently which makes creativity possible. 
Let us look again at the last example of my bricklayer foreman. How could I know better 
than him what goes on at the building site? He had much more experience than I did and 
could far better estimate when the work would be done and when they needed certain 
materials and how much of them.  
Controlling him, stripping him of his alterity or not leaving him the space to flourish 
would have robbed me of many opportunities. He could contribute to the process not only 
through his physical labour but also through his thoughts and opinions. 
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VII. Reflections on my Research Journey 
Research in general is a practice and therefore, a process (Sergi & Hallin, 2011). This is 
even more important when talking about qualitative research and especially 
autoethnographic and practitioner research. The researcher is implicated so much in the 
research product (Bochner & Ellis, 2016) and vice versa and so one has to look at the 
development of my thoughts and their implications in my research ‘products’. To reflect on 
the process, it helps to look at the whole journey and remember where one started. To do 
this, I began rereading my initial research proposal and went through the papers I gave on 
conference and workshops.  
My initial research proposal was formulated in 2012. Apart from my naïve optimism 
about the time needed to prepare the thesis – I thought I could submit in 2015 – I am 
astonished by the development in my thinking since then. It actually felt strange to re-read 
it – as if the author of this piece was another me. 
The proposal from 2012 demonstrates a prevalent thinking that I find particularly 
bewildering today. I wanted to look at a ‘typology of negotiation styles’ and establish an 
‘influence of these styles on the outcomes’ of the negotiations. Furthermore, I wanted to 
research and look at the long-long term consequences. One particular question I raised makes 
me uncomfortable today: ‘Is there a correlation between success and negotiation style?’ 
This way of thinking about my business and about research is the point of departure in 
my research journey. I was thinking in terms of definitive relations. In other words, I wanted 
to find the right negotiation style to build long-lasting business relations. I was convinced 
that such relationships are the best alternative to develop a sustainable business. My research 
was supposed to ‘prove’ such correlations. But this was never going to happen, and I learned 
something completely different. 
 The first thing I bring to mind when thinking about my research is ‘serendipity’. I would 
be lying If I claimed that my research was well planned and executed accordingly. I did not 
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even plan to do a PhD in the first place and certainly did not stick to a well-considered and 
defined plan. Instead, I moved around accidentally and learned from what I came across. In 
some way that is the sense of significance an ethnographer needs (Emerson et al., 2011). I 
happened to notice an advertisement for my university in the Berlin metro (Grosse, 2017b). 
This brought me to the program in the first place. I then followed a suggestion of a senior 
lecturer to think about autoethnographic research and I followed Edward’s advice to read 
Lévinas. Skimming through the mailings from our research department, I applied to 
conferences which sounded interesting to attend etc. However, once I embarked on one or 
the other idea, I did so with considerable commitment.  
These unplanned twists and turns are both the main assets and difficulties in my thesis. 
They are assets because I would not have learnt what I did if I had planned for everything. 
But it was problematic to deal with so many different topics, including autoethnography, 
phenomenology, construction management, and trust, to name just a few. Working on one 
theme influenced my thinking about the others. It is therefore challenging to summarise my 
thoughts on each theme because I cannot discuss one without mentioning the others.  
It is important to reflect on my papers and the process I went through as I worked on 
them. These reflections are an effort to critique my own work. I wrote them in the winter of 
2017/2018 while revising the main body of the thesis and the “Reflections” chapter. The 
journey (to use this metaphor for the development I went through) is not so evident in the 
thesis itself as it is blurred over by numerous revisions. However, the development of 
thought can be seen within the conference papers I gave during the journey. Each paper 
depicts my thoughts during the time it was written. Therefore, I offer my reflections on these 
papers and try to show how the understandings made their way into the thesis. To make a 
clearer distinction, the reflections on the papers are printed in italics, whereas my thoughts 
on the thesis are printed in standard letters. 
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I still wonder whether the preparation of the paper for the conferences or the presentation 
of the talk itself had the greater benefit. Much of the brainwork goes into writing the paper 
and preparing the talk, sometimes accompanied by a rigorous review process, yet the 
feedback and the conversation with likeminded and un-likeminded colleagues is also very 
useful. However, as writing papers and going to conferences belong inextricably together, I 
leave the question of which part is more beneficial unanswered. 
 I try to show how my thinking developed over time with the earlier papers. It is quite 
easy to demonstrate how different I understand things now than I did years ago. However, 
with the later papers it is the more “serious business” (Derrida & Caputo, 1997, p. 75) of 
deconstructing my writing and opening up my thoughts. I try to find breaks and fissures to 
add complexity and do a ‘second’ reading to find questions previously overlooked.  
I would like to try to categorise the papers. There are those on negotiations and trust 
(Grosse, 2014, 2015b, 2016b, 2017a) and those on autoethnography (Grosse, 2015a, 2016a, 
2017b, 2017c). If asked to judge them I would argue that my knowledge (and skills) in 
methodological issues are stronger than the knowledge about trust. My engagement with 
methodology certainly led to a stronger interest in philosophical questions. This ultimately 
guided me on the postmodernist plane. However, it also created a feeling of unease with 
quantitative research. This led to me speedreading quantitative research on trust and 
negotiations. Speed reading means thoroughly reading the introduction (because it is often 
very inspiring), skimming the methods and data collection sections (because I was very 
critical of them) and again reading with interest the findings (but with a fair amount of 
scepticism). Often, I said to myself ‘Interesting thought, but you would not ask this question 
quantitively!’ 
On the one hand, I have to say that this lack of interest in quantitative research on trust – 
perhaps even a disregard for it – is a weakness in my research. But on the other hand, my 
thoughts about Lévinas and trust dismiss a quantification of trust. If trust is beyond being 
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and ontology, how could one attempt to give it a figure to it? Certainly, one strength of this 
work is a different methodological approach and the strong incorporation of philosophy. It 
sheds light on the issue of trust from a particular standpoint and inevitably does not account 
for a quantitative researcher’s view on trust.  
The papers are sorted according to their publication date. This way one can see how I 
developed my thoughts both on autoethnography and trust. The development happened 
almost in parallel as I was often working on two papers at the same time. The mutually 
fertilising effects surface at some points in the papers but more importantly perhaps took 
place in my thinking.  
Therefore, I turn to the next section of the conference papers I gave during my journey. 
In between the reflections on the papers itself, I summarise their contribution to the thesis 
and highlight the insights gained during the respective period. Towards the end of this 
chapter, I highlight my findings and discuss what may follow from my study.  
Where did I come from and where did I arrive? 
Perhaps, as I suggested in the introduction, the ethnographic journey began much earlier 
than this piece of writing might suggest. More than ten years ago I followed my friend Theo’s 
advice, and began taking personal coaching sessions once a month. I had the feeling I could 
no longer cope with the demands of my job. In some respects, this was the first step to 
becoming an autoethnographer. 
In these coaching sessions, the coach and I often dealt with relations between me others. 
I had to ask myself what others may think, feel, or experience. I had to step into their shoes 
and look at myself. Only when I embarked on the autoethnographic journey did I learn how 
helpful this reflection on practice would be for the researcher I was about to become. 
Thinking about the impact of these sessions and the conversations with Theo, I would even 
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go so far as to claim, that without him and the coaching sessions I would not have come to 
write this piece. 
During the first year of my PhD program, a senior lecturer asked whether I had ever 
considered doing autoethnography. In the paper, for the FINT doctoral workshop in 
Coventry, I developed this argument further and made a case for researching trust using 
autoethnography. 
Reflecting on: Trust in Negotiations: An Auto-Ethnographic Approach (Grosse, 
2014) 
Within this paper, I see the movement away from positivist thinking. However, in the 
opening paragraphs, I still pursue the idea to negotiate “optimal outcomes” or reconcile 
interest in “optimal way” [p. 277]. Given my understanding now, it is not about ‘optimal’ 
outcomes, solutions, or practices. ‘Optimal’ refers to a single perspective. I can seek the 
highest profit, the maximum gain, the least time etc.; ‘optimal’ is for me strongly related to 
differential calculus. But this thinking assumes that there is one singular truth from which I 
refrain now about interpersonal relations. 
Some pages further [p. 281], some traces of this thinking are also to be found. In the 
methodology section, I talk about limiting the “influence” of “my personality”. From 
today’s perspective, the section sounds odd to me. On the on hand, I seek to limit my 
personality’s influence – which is bracketing of critical realist orientation (Gearing, 2004) 
– on the other hand, I seek to make its influence explicit while acknowledging the 
impossibility of excluding it – which goes more into the postmodern thinking (Chiseri-
Strater, 1996). 
Given the ideas I held two years earlier, this is a major development in my thinking. 
However, for me, it was and still is difficult to abandon thinking that aims at a singular truth 
since I work in business and I need to judge decisions by right and wrong. That is an 
expectation I am constantly faced with. Staff members want to know which the right course 
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of action is to take. Often questions boil down to: “Shall we do it or not?” Postmodernist 
thinking leaves one in a permanent limbo of not knowing or better relative knowing. But a 
yes/no decision is absolute. Even if it is conditional, the conditions in business practice must 
be limited and cannot be limitless as they are within postmodern thinking. 
This goes in line with the problem solving and problematizing divide between 
practitioners and researchers outlined by Bartunek (2007). As a researcher, I am supposed 
to dive deeper and deeper into my subject to know more and more about it. The aim of the 
researcher, especially if it is one of the qualitative sorts, is to problematise, whereas as a 
practitioner I often have to find a solution for the pressing problem within a short timeframe. 
These demands require different thinking, and it looks as if this struggle is reflected in the 
paragraphs of the following paper. 
Looking at my thinking about trust at the time, I recognise two issues. The first is again 
related to the research philosophy and the practitioner thinking: I wanted to “predict” [p 
283-283] the future actions of the person I am trusting. As of today, I would be very reluctant 
to render my research intentions this way. I would refrain from using language that is so 
strongly tied to law-like relations. I would instead say ‘anticipate’, but even this word would 
have a connotation related to a reasoned expectation which is difficult. Prediction looks like 
controlling the other person who is from an ethical standpoint strongly questionable because 
I deprive the Other of her or his otherness. 
The other issue is the notion of ‘mutual understanding’. It suggests – especially in 
connection with prediction – that it is, at least in principle, possible to understand another 
person in an unambiguous way. From today’s perspective, I strongly doubt it is ever 
possible. Rather I translate my experiences into my own concepts of the Other which are 
constantly changing. Yet when the architect in the paper [p. 302] talked about “to know 
someone” it indicates toward a similar way of thinking: that we can form a conception of 
the other person – to understand him or her – and subsequently forecast this person’s action. 
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Here the tension between Lévinas’ Saying and Said becomes evident. I may form an 
understanding (Said) of the Other, but it will never do justice to the Other in his or her 
infinite otherness expressed by Saying. I still grapple with this tension between my urge to 
put the Other into concepts and frames and my incapability yet the undesirability to do 
exactly that.  
Although, the thoughts were at the time very immature, the feedback was helpful. I recall, 
for instance, being posed with ethical concerns about the covert nature of my research which 
led me to think about these concerns in more depth [see ‘Researching and Running My Own 
Business –Ethical Consideration’ p. 40]. Apart from that, presenting to an audience of 
doctoral students and some senior researchers was an interesting and challenging 
experience which took away a lot of anxiety and gave me much self-confidence. 
What stands out in this paper and even more in the research proposal I submitted to enrol 
at the university (not included here) is that at the beginning of my doctoral journey, I was 
very concerned with getting things right. I wanted to understand phenomena and to find 
solutions to the problems I encountered. I aimed to learn something about negotiation and to 
apply it to my practice. I had the somewhat naïve idea that doing some research would enable 
me to find practical solutions to the problems I encountered in my daily practice. This sort 
of thinking is also reflected in ‘Trust and Construction Projects’ (Grosse, 2015b) [see p. 302] 
where I seek to find a way to better understand the Other – in this case, the engineer. Yet, 
already in this paper my underlying problem – if I may call it a problem – begins to surface: 
I could not comprehend the Other but only begin to understand the Other’s otherness and its 
consequences.  
The more I delved into the subject, the more I understood that finding general solutions 
to negotiating problems was not going to happen. The more I studied, the more I understood 
that the solution to a negotiating problem would require some singular truth and to develop 
this one would need one axis or point of reference to which all social interactions refer. The 
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writings about qualitative research and postmodernism in particular clarified that such a 
research objective is unattainable. 
During this period I first read Iser (2000) and then Berlin (2013). Although both were not 
directly concerned with qualitative social research and not at all with autoethnography, their 
understanding of reality had a huge impact on me. From Iser, I learned that the interpretation 
of a text cannot be finished and so the interpretation of our experiences cannot end, from 
Berlin I learned that the very social environment we inhabit is far too complex to be ever 
understood to its full extent. 
Both ideas were quite disturbing for an engineer who never likes to lose control. However, 
they were also liberating as I realised there was no need to try as I could never achieve full 
control. Yet both Iser and Berlin, while acknowledging their limits, showed ways to advance 
their understanding of the subjects they were dealing with [see ‘Understanding the Other’ p. 
64]. So, I proceeded not with the aim of a final understanding but of deepening insights. 
In 2014 and 2015 I wrote fieldnotes on a very regular basis – almost every evening. The 
writing helped me to develop my thinking further and to ground it in experiences and 
reflections about these experiences.  
The two papers that followed are products of this intense fieldnote writing. The first 
‘Experiences with Auto-Ethnography” (Grosse, 2015a) [see p. 289] is a reflection of 
difficulties in emotionally charged situations within which I felt strongly about being 
betrayed. In the second paper ‘Trust and Construction Projects” (Grosse, 2015b) [see p. 302] 
I seek to analyse experiences of perceived trust breach. Needless to say, although worthwhile 
endeavours, they were early attempts and not well developed. 
Reflecting on: Experiences with auto-ethnography – how to write when emotions 
run high? (Grosse, 2015a) 
While re-reading the paper [see p. 289], the first thing I recalled was a reviewer’s 
comment on the second paper (Grosse, 2015b) [see p. 302] written during this period. In 
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both papers, I experimented with the layered text account (Rambo Ronai, 1995). The 
reviewer argued that because of its structure “it is difficult to read or engage with the text.” 
This is certainly the case for this piece. I still like the idea of a layered text since it reflects 
my thinking very well. It represents different angles from which I look at the phenomenon. 
Yet I see the difficulties in following the account, the permanent switch between perspectives 
and the very short thoughts make it difficult to follow. Re-reading it, I get a feeling of being 
lost, having too many thoughts to follow, and none of them thought through thoroughly. This 
makes the text of course “difficult to engage” with.  
The layered text was meant to facilitate a reflexive approach. In some respects, I 
succeeded, but I think I failed in one major respect: I depicted myself as a victim – the poor, 
exploited entrepreneur. I depicted myself as powerless prey to architect and employer. That 
makes me sad now because there was certainly the possibility to explore my own actions and 
opportunities much better. The account sounds as if I were trapped in a dilemma with no 
possibility to escape. Even if I felt so in the very situation, I should have been able not 
necessarily to get out of it but at least show ways of easing the situation. Today, I would 
rather try to endure the situation in a stoic manner (Aurelius, 1992) and to be alert to 
possibilities of dealing with it. Although I used the word ‘try’ very consciously because of 
all efforts I still cannot control my thoughts and feeling in every situation, and I do not 
believe I ever will. 
In the paper, I fail to identify my personal responsibility and therefore fail to guide a way 
out of the conflict. Hence, it obstructs learning for later conflicts and misses the opportunity 
to understand this conflict and my contribution to it better. In this respect, the paper is not 
sufficiently reflexive. More self-critique would certainly have meant that some strong 
emotions and aggression had been mitigated, in doing so I would have been able to pay more 
attention to my own actions and emotions and, therefore, write better fieldnotes. 
234 Reflections on my Research Journey  
Henning Grosse  
Perhaps, one listener after the talk, asking me whether I had thought about forgiving them 
was a hint in that direction. Only years later, I understood how important forgiveness can 
be because I cease to be the passive victim and become an actor in the situation.  
Reflecting on: Trust and Construction Projects - An Auto-Ethnographic 
Exploration (Grosse, 2015b) 
Regarding the reviewer’s comments on the layered text account, the paper is slightly 
better structured than the previous one (Grosse, 2015a), I dwelled slightly longer on each 
perspective, and it is, therefore, easier to read. This is certainly owing to the fact that I 
revised the first submission. Hence, editing and revising are as important as writing itself 
perhaps even more important (Zinsser, 2006)  
Within the paper but especially within the final thoughts, I find a substantial development 
away from positivist thinking. I talk about the engineer’s and my understanding. I developed 
an interest in the other’s perspective and how the other’s perspective reflects on me. I 
understood a distinction between ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ is misleading. However, I use the 
word ‘misjudgement’ which suggests there is a ‘right’ judgement. Here, I fell back into right-
wrong schemes. 
I still assume a ‘knowability’ of the other. As for instance, when I sought to know “who 
he is” and in which “context” he acted (p.1286). The thinking behind that was of a possible 
knowability of the other (even if only in principle). Although, I recognise that 
“comprehensive” understanding is in practice impossible and that understanding must be 
“incomplete” (p.1288) this belief in a theoretical knowability lead me to a “trust 
evaluation” (p.1286), something I would certainly refrain from given my current 
understanding. I assume a calculus-based approach to trust which I now think is misleading. 
Although I understood full comprehension and complete knowledge of a person and the 
person’s context is impossible, I did not explore the problem of knowability in more depth. I 
was quite comfortable with assigning it to the “changing” and “constantly evolving” nature 
 Reflections on my Research Journey 235 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
of the social world we live in (p.1289). Yet interestingly, in the last couple of paragraphs 
(1288-1289), I drew a practical lesson from it. I came to understand that “tactful action” 
(Van Manen, 1995, p. 7) is required to cope with the lack of understanding. 
I wonder about the deeper meaning of ‘acting tactfully’. At first sight, it is probably being 
respectful, humble, and perhaps a little reserved. It is judging out of a gut-feeling but rather 
taking moderate and measured but not divisive and harsh action. It is thinking that goes into 
the direction of Lévinas’ saying (1974b), yet it falls short of acknowledging the full ethical 
dimension of responding to another person.  
 
I began writing my thesis while working on these two papers. I looked for endorsement 
of my idea for qualitative exploration of trust and negotiations in other research and found 
many in favour but also a few against it. The most important issue was to identify the criteria 
against which my work should be evaluated. Of course, my research is not replicable and I 
cannot claim to have found law-like relations, a singular truth or ‘the one and only’ 
explanation. But I argue that my research is different from what is available in trust research 
and in construction management. Depending on how narrowly one defines the term, 
autoethnographic studies are rare or altogether absent in these areas. And certainly, no 
business owner has undertaken autoethnographic research into trust or construction 
management.  
Uniqueness and particularity in research have both value and limitation. After a 
conference presentation [presenting (Grosse, 2017a) see p. 354], I was faced with the 
question of whether what I am doing is research or mere personal storytelling. Considering 
the background of the one asking the question this was a fair objection. For most researchers 
with an engineering background and, therefore a positivist understanding of research, an 
approach like autoethnography does not count as serious research. I must admit, before 
stating my PhD, I would have struggled to see autoethnography as serious research. Yet the 
research methods social and human science are often fundamentally different from research 
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methods in natural science and engineering. This leads to widespread objections, among 
researchers from different fields but especially among people unfamiliar with research 
because they often cling the image of a researcher in a laboratory and not someone who 
observes daily interactions. However, one of the reviewers of my submission to CME 
(Grosse, 2018) suggested I should stop defending my method and instead describe what I 
did. 
The focus on the environment close to me and the introspection I sometimes used (Ellis, 
1991), contributed immensely to my understanding of trust. While writing these two papers 
(Grosse, 2015a, 2015b), I formed an understanding of trust ‘prior’ to Lévinas [see ‘Trust’ p. 
49]. Trust is first of all difficult to define. It coexists with control but too much control 
inhibits trust rather than fostering it. Yet neither full control nor complete absence of control 
and total trust are possible. They always get alongside each other. Control always requires 
knowledge about the one controlled, yet this knowledge cannot be complete. This lack of 
knowledge and, therefore, the inability to control, makes it necessary to trust. In turn, trust 
is a belief that builds on a lack of knowledge, otherwise it is not trust. Additionally, trust has 
a moral component. Without the possibility of betrayal, a relation to the Other cannot be 
called trusting.  
The moral component and belief (Simmel, 1907) involved in trusting called for an 
understanding that goes beyond ontological explanations of trust. It must have something to 
do with ‘leap of faith’, as Möllering (2006) argued. This led me to follow Frederiksen (2014) 
and Løgstrup (1997), locating trust outside of a calculative realm. These considerations and 
some gentle hints form Edward Trezise made me think about Emmanuel Lévinas’ work in 
relation to trust. Subsequently, in 2015 I began to read Lévinas, but only in 2016 did I start 
to deeply engage with his work. 
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However, I kept on thinking about autoethnography and its role in construction 
management research. I had a vague notion that autoethnography helped me run my business 
and I sought to explore the personal benefits of autoethnographic research. 
Reflecting on: A Fine but Often Blurred Line – Distinguishing Insider Action 
Research and Auto-Ethnography (Grosse & Rose, 2016) 
Writing and presenting this paper was great fun. It reflects very much how Michael and 
I talked during our frequent phone calls in that period. We were inspired and encouraged 
by two senior tutors from our university, yet we only followed their example partly – our 
conversations were less structured, not scheduled, and not in person but on the phone 
(Simpson & Trezise, 2011). Nevertheless, they had a significant impact on our learning. By 
representing the conversations, we succeeded in crafting an easy read. And it was an 
exciting experience to work with someone else on a paper which is seldom the case for 
autoethnographers. 
We raised a lot of issues reflecting our experiences while researching and managing. But 
the number of issues were too many to say something significant. We rambled around – as 
most of our conversation did – but we did not dwell on one or two issues in real depth – 
which only some of our conversations did. The reflections only scratched the surface, but we 
did not dig deeper. Therefore, I have to say that the paper was a good exercise but 
unfortunately only that.  
 
These early thoughts were not yet developed but I returned to them later and worked on 
them further e.g., the notion of responsibility and the impact of doing autoethnographic 
research on the researcher’s professional practice. Hence the paper has to be understood as 
part of my journey - moving from justifying autoethnography to just doing and reporting it.  
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Reflecting on: An Insider's Point of View - Auto-Ethnography in the Construction 
Industry (Grosse, 2016a) 
When starting to draft this paper I considered writing about the benefits for the 
practitioner involved. But in conversations with Martin Loosemore, I came to understand 
that writing about the possible contribution of autoethnography to construction management 
research would be better received with the conference I was writing for. Hence, I tried to 
make a case for autoethnographic studies in construction management. The research 
methodology award and the invitation for publication (Grosse, 2018) suggest that my 
argument was well received. However, I had to learn that writing a conference presentation 
– even though it went through a three-stage review process – is only a small portion of the 
work that is needed to place a subsequent article in a journal. Writing about the benefits for 
me as the manager (Grosse, 2017c) and the benefits for my business (Grosse, 2017b) 
followed the year after. 
The other thing that resulted from this conference presentation was an invitation to 
review for this journal. For me, it was voluntary but very rewarding work. On the one hand, 
it is an appreciation of my research, but on the other hand, it is difficult and induces a feeling 
of insecurity. There was insecurity because I was not sure whether my criticism is too harsh, 
whether I am demanding too much from the author, and whether what I write goes down 
well with the editors. Yet the rewarding part is to delve into another perspective, to deeply 
engage with a paper in development, and most importantly to reflect on my own writing. I 
wondered whether I am as tough with my own writing as I have been with this author.  
Would my writing meet the criteria I held against the reviewed article? Probably not, I 
must admit. Reading my own writing and in particular, reading it critically is an extremely 
demanding exercise for me. However, doing it, I spot some flaws in my writing. The first 
thought is about the implied reader. I know what I want to tell and therefore I don’t have to 
understand the content of the text. I read the text with an implied reader in mind. Would my 
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anticipated reader get what I seek to communicate? – it reminded me of Richardson’s work 
about reaching different audiences (1990). Especially when writing for construction 
management researchers about a research approach unfamiliar in the respective field, the 
importance of anticipating what they might know about ethnography in general and 
especially in autoethnography becomes a major issue. I could not assume that my readers 
would know what autoethnography is and what it could provide but also, what it could not 
provide, what limitations it had. In an engineering dominated realm, where positivist and 
realist thinking have a strong foothold presenting postmodernist writing, can be very 
challenging for the author, yet inspiring and thought-provoking for the readers.  
The second thought is about the level of reflexivity. I asked the author of the reviewed 
paper to be more self-critical but am I as critical of myself as I demand from others? Do I 
really deeply question my professional practice? I sought to do that in this paper. Yet in 
other papers, I failed (e.g.; Grosse, 2015a, 2015b). For instance, recognising the missing 
reflexivity in ‘Experiences with Auto-Ethnography’ (Grosse, 2015a) when I depict myself as 
the victim is one thing, yet I suspect there are many other issues I did not spot. As for instance 
to think about forgiveness as one listener suggested. The danger is that I am unable to see 
the obvious because of my insider’s view. In a variety of ways, I am unable to take a step 
back and see myself from another perspective. I tried that in this paper, and I think in some 
respects I succeeded yet I am certain there is much more to discover. But in turn, what am I 
allowed to ask from another author if I know about my own shortcomings?  
During the development of the paper into a journal publication, Paul Chan helped me 
with numerous comments. One comment regarding the relationship to the architect read as 
follows: “You still seem to bear a grudge against the architect. This architect seems to be 
invisible in your observational account. Reflexivity is about asking why, and also examining 
yourself in relation to and in interaction with others.” (Dec. 2016) Only some weeks later I 
read in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, “Men are not easily seen to be brought into evil case 
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by failure to consider what passes in another’s soul, but they who do not read aright the 
motions of their own soul are bound to be in evil case.” (1992, p. 8) The intriguing thing 
about this quote is the self-focus as a point of departure. I think the key to understanding the 
confrontation with the architect lies more in my ‘mind’s movements’ than in understanding 
his thoughts and actions. I may even claim that this is one development within my thinking 
throughout my doctoral journey. First focussing on the other, then understanding myself and 
therefore being only able to appreciate the Other (now capitalised in reference to Lévinas) 
more consciously. I trace this focus on the self in many writings about qualitative research 
but in particular about ethnography and autoethnography (e.g.; Chiseri-Strater, 1996; Ellis, 
2004; Pillow, 2003). Yet in some ways, they were mere primers for reading philosophy.  
Coming back to the paper, the turn to myself is the whole strength of the paper – a 
powerful account of my own thought. It is a vulnerability that turned into a strength. By 
exposing myself, and not analysing others, I provide something unique. This vulnerability is 
the same I exposed in ‘Experiences with auto-ethnography’ (Grosse, 2015a). Recalling the 
talk I gave during the conference, the positive feedback I received was aimed most at 
describing the feeling of being exploited – in Aurelius’ terms observing the movements of my 
own mind. 
This paper contributes only indirectly to the theses. It is a methodological reflection on 
my research and an attempt to demonstrate what autoethnography can provide to a research 
community. It leaves its mark on the thesis but, although I provide some examples, it is more 
a discussion about autoethnography than a demonstration. Certainly, the workshop (Writing 
retreat in Manchester) during which I worked on the draft and subsequent commentaries 
from Paul Chan helped me not only to develop the paper but to enhance my writing skills 
and my thinking about reflexivity in general.  
 Reflections on my Research Journey 241 
 Investigating Trust in the German Construction Industry 
Reflecting on: Trust beyond Reason – Lévinas and Trust (Grosse, 2016b) 
What is fascinating for me is the relation between my experience (fieldnotes) and theory 
(philosophy) – understanding theory in the light of experience and vice versa. Reading Iser 
and Berlin were my introduction to all that followed when I read Emmanuel Lévinas. Writing 
fieldnotes about my experience became less important as I concentrated on reading and 
understanding his work. Although I view this partial retreat from fieldnote writing with some 
remorse, I know that I had only limited time and I had to decide whether to fully delve into 
Lévinas or continue writing fieldnotes with the same intensity. I opted for the former. 
Lévinas gave my understanding of trust a whole new spin. Suddenly, the ideas of Iser and 
Berlin were underpinned by Lévinas’ considerations about ontology. It made even more 
sense for me to pursue my qualitative path of exploration and shortcomings in past trust 
research. His understanding of responsibility as sharply distinguished from accountability 
and his treatment of the Other were the major arguments that reframed my thinking about 
trust. 
My experiences reflected Levinas’ thoughts very well, but more importantly, thinking 
about my experiences in the light of his ideas made it possible to understand his way of 
thinking. Without translating Lévinas into my daily business, I would have been left puzzled 
about his thought. 
Lévinas survived the Shoah and this experience strongly influenced his thinking. 
Consequently, Lévinas calls for a deeply ethical almost altruistic response to the Other(s). 
But at the same time, I am supposed to be selfish for the sake of economic survival. Most of 
the criticism of Lévinas originates from this ambivalence. His critics claim that he demands 
too much responsibility and subsequently this leads to altruism. I also experienced this 
opposition to his thought from colleagues and friends. They argued that one cannot run a 
business and follow Lévinas’ thought. I wondered whether this is really the case. 
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It is disturbing to think of an unlimited responsibility for and to the Other. How can I ever 
run a business on this premise? But pure selfishness does not work either. Hence, it was the 
dilemma of being between both extremes which nurtured my thinking while exploring 
Lévinas. The more I thought about it, the more examples of these struggles I saw in my 
experiences. Yet, I can see how convenient or just feasible it is to retreat into selfish 
behaviour and to justify it with the need for economic survival. And I could also see how 
demanding or even ‘utopian’ (Wright et al., 1988) it is to face one’s responsibility. However, 
I learned that pure selfishness would be as detrimental to my own interests as to the interests 
of the people around me. Hence, both selfishness and responsibility have their place in 
Lévinas’ thought and in the world that I experience.  
However, I also started to see a deeper pattern. This was the distinction between ontology 
and what is beyond ontology. This thinking is more disturbing for an engineer than the 
hermeneutics of Iser (2000) or my limited capabilities as shown by Berlin (2013). It goes 
beyond what could be understood. Lévinas’ ‘beyond being’ escapes the grip of ontology. 
Realising that I am far more limited than I thought and understanding that my knowledge is 
under permanent attack and that no claim can be made without the subsequent nagging 
question is something I, as an engineer, will probably never get used to. This understanding 
in the end leads to a much humbler attitude towards what I claim to know. 
The intention behind writing the paper was to present my thinking about trust to an 
academic audience that is familiar with trust research. This worked insofar as the paper was 
accepted for presentation. However, the audience did not really connect to it since most of 
the people listening had an organisational and management research background and were 
not very familiar with philosophy. They were certainly not familiar with Levinas and only 
one researcher had dealt with him before.  
Yet in retrospect, this should not have surprised me. Apart from Peperzak’s work (2013), 
a few paragraphs in Bauman’s Postmodern Ethics (1993) and three articles of Saevi and 
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Eikeland (Eikeland, 2015; Eikeland & Saevi, 2017; Saevi & Eikeland, 2012) I have not seen 
any published work on trust informed by Lévinas. In particular, apart from Saevi’s and 
Eikeland’s work there is no research on trust in an organisational setting available that is 
informed by Lévinas’ thought. 
Within the paper, I strongly argue in favour of locating trust outside of calculative 
thinking - something that is there before one starts to rationally fathom a situation before 
one rationalises a relation to another person. This thinking is strongly driven by my reading 
of the philosophical works of Lévinas. Yet the connection to autoethnography is very weak. 
I do not support my argument with examples from my business practice and it is, therefore, 
difficult to connect to managerial practice. Hence, the relevance to this research community 
does not come across easily.  
Furthermore, the lack of ethnographic elements makes it difficult to follow. One or two 
examples from business practice could have made a good connection between philosophy 
and business practice. This would not only have demonstrated more relevance for the 
organisational or management research in general but also made it much easier to identify 
hands-on or down-to-earth issues, and in doing so I would have to translate philosophical 
concepts into them. This is especially important since the paper diverges from the 
conference’s main approach to trust –a calculative and utilitarian view. An episode of 
managerial experience which reflected my thinking about trust would have made a far 
stronger case for my approach to trust. 
The paper itself is written very simply. In other words, it does not question or contradict 
the claims it makes. Perhaps that is due to the fact that I spent a lot of time getting into this 
way of thinking – outside of ontology. Yet, the paper appears to be quite immature. Finding 
arguments against my conception of trust and then weighing them against supporting 
arguments would have made my claims and, subsequently, my paper much stronger. But not 
attempting to deconstruct my claims is a clear weakness. 
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For example, one can argue against the concept of good beyond reason which is the idea 
behind Lévinas’, Derrida’s, and Bauman’s thoughts about ethics. I have not considered the 
possibility of evil, which one senior researcher in the audience in Dublin raised. 
Furthermore, my thinking moves beyond ontology. One may argue that this is more 
speculation than serious research because it is not ontologically displayable. One may even 
call it esoteric - which one of my fellow students mockingly does. However, investigating or 
at least raising the possibility of evil should have made a case for my approach and so would 
have made the paper even stronger. 
The paper essentially conveys the main message from the chapter on Emmanuel Lévinas 
[see ‘Emmanuel Lévinas’ p. 84]. I think that trust, like responsibility, is closely connected 
to the encounter with the Other. It is essentially what Lévinas calls Saying. I cannot approach 
and engage with another person – the Other – without being responsible for and to the Other 
and at the very same time trusting her or him and hoping to be trusted too. My interpretation 
of Lévinas thought says that trust must have begun before any conscious decision [see 
‘Preconscious Trust’ p. 130]. To Frederiksen’s (2014) observation that trusting is another 
mode of interaction I may add that trusting is part of Lévinas’ Saying distinguished from 
Said or calculation. Locating trust prior to all rational thought comes with a bunch of 
implication, especially if we think about reciprocity and calculus-based trust. These thoughts 
I developed further in ‘Does Lévinas help us to trust?’ (Grosse, 2017a) and in the following 
chapters [ see ‘Looking Back’ p. 148 and ‘Looking Ahead’ p. 196].  
Within the two subsequent chapters (see above) I sought to connect my interpretation of 
Lévinas’ thought to my managerial practice. This provides feedback to the idea of writing 
something about the benefits of pursuing autoethnography for business people and their 
respective businesses. In ‘Doing Research and Running a Business’ I sought to emphasise 
what autoethnographic research might contribute to the business where it takes place. 
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Reflecting on: Doing Research and Running a Business: Is it just too much? (Grosse, 
2017b) 
The paper is the second of three dealing with my experiences doing autoethnography as 
a construction professional. The first paper (An insider’s point of view (Grosse, 2016a)) 
focussed on what autoethnographic studies might contribute to the construction 
management research. This paper deals with the benefit of the business. The third paper 
(What’s the Benefit? (Grosse, 2017c)) deals especially with the learning of the practitioner 
– in my case the owner/manager of the business. Reading the third paper (Grosse, 2017c) 
one may easily spot the parallels to the present paper. Yet I think taking the three 
perspectives – researcher, business, and practitioner – was a worthwhile exercise. In my 
case, these are three important lenses I use to see my life – needless to mention there are 
numerous others (e.g., being a parent).  
That said, the paper, unfortunately, does not live up to its potential. First of all, it should 
have gone through one or two more revision cycles – I stumbled over numerous typos, which 
feels a bit embarrassing. Perhaps the fact that I had just a month from the day I was asked 
to write the paper for the final submission serves as some excuse. Apart from that, I really 
like some ideas and thoughts in the paper, especially how my management style changed 
over time and how I learnt to use postmodernist thinking to solve or at least ease business-
related problems. Yet it could have gone further and deeper and most of all it did not single 
out the benefit of the business and rather sticks to the learning of the manager. The learning 
of the manager is, of course, an important part in developing the business further, but I did 
not show whether and how I convey the lessons learnt while pursuing ethnographic work to 
my staff members. Hence, I left the opportunity to show that autoethnography might have an 
impact on the business beyond my personal practice. 
Because of missing the wider impact, the central message of this paper is only slightly 
different from the third. Although I wrote the paper at short notice, I could have done a much 
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better job. The quality of this paper reminded me of Zinsser’s notion that revising a piece of 
writing is the most laborious but also the most important part of the writing process (2006). 
Reflecting on: Does Lévinas help us to trust? (Grosse, 2017a) 
I can identify a significant improvement when reading the paper discussed here and 
looking again at ‘Trust beyond Reason – Lévinas and Trust’ (Grosse, 2016b). First of all, 
this paper has a much stronger connection to my managerial practice and therefore to the 
construction industry. Although I presented ‘Trust beyond Reason’ to an audience interested 
in trust in organisational context, the focus on the construction industry would have been 
misplaced, a stronger focus on managerial issues – especially anecdotes from practice – 
would have made it easier for listeners and readers to connect to my argument. In this paper, 
the examples worked well to support the theory. In supporting my concept, the examples 
worked for me and not the other way around (Wolcott, 1990). 
I have dealt here with the asymmetrical or non-reciprocal relationship to the Other and 
hence non-reciprocal trust. On the one hand, I have once more not spent much thought on 
the possibility of evil. That is a blind spot within all the papers on trust I have written so far.  
On the other hand, I connect trust to other related concepts, for instance care, 
forgiveness, and control. However, sometimes the paper is not focussed enough. I get easily 
distracted and go off on a tangent. That in itself is not problematic, but I do so without 
contributing much to the thought and therefore to the value of the paper. It ends up as piece 
rich but significantly underdeveloped thoughts. For example, I talk about the necessity to 
forgive others. Yet, I do not discuss how hard it might be to forgive another person. Although 
it is necessary to forgive, a discussion about whether it is sufficient is lacking. 
But this messiness is part of autoethnography (Ellis & Bochner, 2006) and hence 
somewhat unavoidable. Yet there is still the demand from the implicit reader and from myself 
to advance the thought further and perhaps give them some structure or at least ease the 
confusion one is in, as Adams (2012) writes. Having said that, I see that messiness belongs 
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to autoethnography. However, it should not serve as an excuse for not developing thoughts 
thoroughly but skipping from one idea to another. 
The title suggests advice on how to foster trust (in oneself) and the paper delivers. Yet the 
paper falls back on benefits of trust and does not take trust as a value in itself.  
I articulated my thoughts about trust and Lévinas in this paper and ‘Trust beyond reason’. 
They were stages in the process of forming what is written in the three preceding chapters 
of this thesis. Again, preparing the papers and presenting them helped me to develop my 
thinking.  
It was while working on these two papers that I understood how difficult it to write about 
Lévinas’ thoughts concisely. I initially struggled to read Lévinas’ work but I gradually learnt 
to deal with his language. But when I had to write about his work and to articulate my own 
thoughts about it in connection to trust, I suddenly understood how difficult it is to write 
concisely in a language that can never be concise. It is difficult to describe experiences that 
escape rationality, and which belong to the Saying and not Said. This experience made me 
an even greater admirer of Lévinas’ work. 
The work on these papers revealed to me the deeper meaning of an ethical relationship to 
the Other. During this period, I formed an understanding of this primordial relationship with 
the people I encounter. The reading was essential to get me thinking but writing down my 
thoughts was the most significant point - “the essential moment was that of writing itself" 
(Sartre, 1975, p. 5). 
During the work on this paper and ‘Trust beyond Reason,’ I developed my understanding 
of Levinas’ work. To avoid repetition, I summarise my thoughts on trust, Lévinas, and my 
business practice after working on the last of my conference papers. 
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Reflecting on: What's the Benefit - A Personal Story of a Researching Manager 
(Grosse, 2017c) 
This paper is the third in a row after ‘An Insider’s point of view’ and ‘Doing Research 
and Running a Business’ (Grosse, 2016a, 2017b). Since I had already dealt with the 
contribution to research (Grosse, 2016a) and the benefits for the business (Grosse, 2017b), 
the purpose of writing this paper was to work out whether the ‘whole’ doctorate was worth 
the effort for me as a person and manager. Although I write in the paper about the 
commitment needed to pursue a PhD, I merely concentrate on the outcomes and benefits of 
doing research. I approached the problem like an equation to be solved. Which part was 
bigger or worth more and would my efforts pay off? However, I did not emphasise the cost 
– effort, time spent, missed (other) opportunities etc. – I looked almost entirely at the 
benefits. 
Was this the right way to do it? Should I have admitted to myself that it was all a waste 
of time? Should I have told others that it was not worth the time spent? Should I have said 
that my work had little value regarding the effort needed to produce it? That would surely 
be too much to ask for - perhaps even impossible (at least to me). 
I am a very optimistic person. For me, the glass is never half-empty. It is a quarter-full 
rather than three-quarters empty. I find value in almost everything I do and I seek to 
emphasise the positive aspect of everything. Within this mindset, I create my own reality. My 
truth takes shape within an optimistic and positive framing. I may recognise the hardship 
and suffering of doing a PhD, but I will always shift my emphasis to the things I learnt and 
discovered, regardless of how little and unimportant they might be.  
I may have disregarded some costs of doing a PhD but on the other hand, I cannot tell 
whether it was worth doing as I cannot see the long-term effects. I do not know whether this 
experience will have future pay-offs. But perhaps the whole question is utter nonsense. What 
is ‘benefit’ anyway? How can I measure it? Is personal development a benefit? - probably. 
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Is a new managerial skill a benefit? - certainly. Is solving a problem a benefit? - of course. 
But how do I compare them? Is one worth more than the other and how do I weigh them 
against the so-called cost? And isn’t everything one does not worth doing anyway? 
The speciality of autoethnography is its reflexive aspect. I learned to observe my thoughts 
and not merely indulge them. I am able to shift them. This is particularly helpful in a crisis. 
I recognise myself as being aggressive, defiant and tough but also as weak and suffering. 
The interesting thing autoethnography taught me is to step out, take a seat on the balcony 
and see myself act on the stage. However difficult this distance is to achieve in stressful 
situations, it helps me to understand the impact of my actions. But it also shows the impact 
of my reflections on my own thinking and acting. 
For example, one of my favourite themes is forgiveness. When I am able to forgive, I 
resolve my anger and grudge against another person. This is much more important to me 
than to the other (Lévinas, 1968; 1977). I resolve my aggression, I am re-equipped to think 
more freely and am able to pay much more attention to the other and the situation as a 
whole. If I leave aggression behind, I do not have to think about retaliation and revenge and 
I can focus on what is important to me. I can think of far more options that are available to 
me. This is only one example, although a prominent one, of the way reflexivity works for me. 
Exploring the process of autoethnography from different angles provides different 
perspectives. This is not surprising but it is fascinating how these different perceptions 
influence each other in a hermeneutic manner. An understanding developed using one 
perspective alters the understanding within other perspectives and vice versa. It is the 
crystallisation Richardson and Adams St. Pierre (2005) describe (comparing the different 
perspectives to a crystal turning in one’s hand) but at the same time changing this crystal by 
an hermeneutic process as described by Iser (2000). Before I started this research journey, I 
found this instability frightening but now I feel almost comfortable recognising this 
movement of understanding. 
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Reflecting on An Insider's Point of View - Auto-Ethnography in the Construction 
Industry (Grosse, 2018) 
Recently, I got an email form the editors of the journal ‘Construction Management and 
Economics’, saying: “The contents are fine now, but what is left to do is to have another go 
at the language.” After the initial delight about the message, I realised that it was not just 
the language; there were still some issues about the content, although minor ones. Some 
weeks later I read the lines I had been longing for - “has been accepted for publication”. 
The initial conference version (2016a) developed into something almost entirely new. It 
did not contradict the former version but expanded it as the reviewers’ and editors’ 
comments made me think in new, unanticipated ways. But it is worthwhile to reflect on the 
process I went through personally. The conference paper had elements which read like a 
defence of autoethnography. The reviewers urged me to replace this section with one which 
confidently explained what I was doing. Yet this is a challenging balance between self-
confidence and defensiveness. I needed to be sure to pursue valuable research but not to 
defend it to fiercely, but I was also required to acknowledge the limitations yet not belittle 
what I was doing. I am happy with the balance I struck between the two, however I am sure 
re-reading the paper in the future I may see it differently. 
Perhaps this is what makes a researcher mature; having confidence in what one is doing 
but being open to critique. For the moment I am happy with what I have written but I may 
change my mind on the basis of the views of others. The process of continuous learning 
though being confident in the present applies to me as researcher but even more as a 
practitioner. I need to be confident about what I do when managing my company but also 
open to alternative ways of doing and thinking. 
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Summary 
At the beginning of these reflections, I offered a distinction between papers on trust and 
Lévinas and papers on autoethnographic research in business. I used these two perspectives 
throughout writing the papers. However, as I advanced with research, I understood that these 
two perspectives cannot be separated from each other. The writings about Lévinas and trust 
improved the more I anchored them in practice by using examples from business, and the 
writings about autoethnography and business became stronger the more I supported them 
with ideas from philosophy. Therefore, I think the strength of this work lies neither in the 
thoughts about Lévinas and trust nor the thoughts about autoethnography and the 
construction business but very much on combining the thought about both. I cannot 
overemphasise the mutually fertilising effect of engaging with these two worlds. 
Closing this reflection, I am still moved by the realisation of how much my thinking has 
changed. To use a German metaphor again, I learnt to look beyond the “Tellerrand” (the 
plate’s edge). The plate was my positivist thinking. I believed I could understand everything, 
at least in theory. My initial questions reflected a thinking that my negotiating is 
unambiguously understandable. Abandoning this thinking was perhaps my most important 
learning outcome of the whole journey. Now, positivist thinking has become a part of my 
repertoire – when it suits. But I am able to use other frames of thinking. I know that positivist 
thinking is essential for an engineer, but I am also aware of its limitations. These limitations 
surface especially when dealing with others. In this case, postmodernist thinking is more 
helpful than a deterministic approach. 
The importance of this change in thinking is that it opens new possibilities for me. As I 
have written recently, (Grosse, 2018), the deconstructive journey would have been 
impossible if I had not made this move in thinking. Looking beyond my old positivist ‘plate’ 
and realising that it is only one plate among many feels uncomfortable in the beginning 
because it takes away a certainty (I believed in). However, in the long run, this deconstructive 
252 Reflections on my Research Journey  
Henning Grosse  
process made me more relaxed for two reasons. First, I understood that inconsistencies in 
my understanding are natural or unavoidable. Hence a desperate search for ‘the answer’ was 
unnecessary. Second, I am aware that understanding is not something that could be fixed but 
rather something that defers and differs all the time (Derrida, 1967). 
This is partly the reason why I dropped ‘negotiation styles’ from my research objectives. 
Negotiations almost disappeared from my wording as I deferred my focus to human 
interactions in my business environment (which can be seen as negotiations). The narrow 
focus on negotiation styles suited my narrow positivist vision at the beginning of my journey, 
however, my shift to postmodern thinking forced me to look further - beyond the ‘Tellerand’. 
Therefore, I would now phrase research questions differently, although my objectives 
would be the same. I already noted that it is odd for an autoethnographer to start with such a 
narrow focus [see ‘Trust’ p. 49], but at that time I was yet to become the autoethnographer I 
am now. I brought a history with me to the research setting, which I slowly deconstructed. I 
think to expect a naivety or ‘virginity’ from an established practitioner is illusionary. I even 
have difficulty imagining who could have an untainted and utterly open mind. It is more 
about helping new (auto-)ethnographers to develop and to emancipate from narrow thinking 
than expecting them to start as open thinkers.  
In the end, I answered questions about trust and business practice I could not have even 
thought of when I started researching. There was no ethical component in my initial research 
proposal and there was nothing that diverted from ontological thinking when I began to 
explore my business practices. I thought about constructing a systematic approach to 
negotiations but not of deconstructing my thinking about negotiations.  
Practitioners search for solutions and researchers search for problems (Bartunek, 2007). 
I had to learn the researcher's way of thinking – to problematise (Grosse, 2018). Yet I must 
constantly switch from one way of thinking to the other. I am and I will stay in business, and 
I will also continue researching. Therefore, I may probably never start an exploration with a 
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genuinely open mind. There is always the problem-solving practitioner present. This is a 
limitation which can be turned into an advantage. It is a unique way of seeing from the inside. 
I can connect practitioners’ problems to academic debate because I have learnt to think in 
both ways. 
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VIII. Closing thoughts 
After reflecting on my research journey, in these closing thoughts I will highlight the 
main findings of my research. I will sketch my suggestions for construction management 
and continue summarising my thinking about trust, my experiences of pursuing 
autoethnographic research, and bring together what I learnt about business practice. 
Suggestions for Construction Management 
“Imagine turning your thesis into a book sold on the management shelf at the airport. 
What would you have to tell managers?”, asked David Weir during my viva. It seems 
inevitable that this question would be asked, therefore, I was surprised I had not thought 
about it earlier. One may wonder what kind of practitioner research this is if it does not offer 
any contribution to managerial practice. Since I am a construction industry professional, I 
would like to talk about how my research helped me in my managerial role in the 
construction industry. I leave it to the reader whether my understanding and experiences are 
of value for them. 
The learnings outcomes I present here are interwoven, conflated and contingent. The 
things I have to tell managers come as a huge pile of different interdependent suggestions. 
However, I try to structure them like the thesis. First, I emphasise how autoethnographic 
research can support managers, second what I learnt about trust, and third I provide insights 
I drew from Lévinas. But since all three are connected to each other I try to step into a meta 
perspective to yield the wider insights of doing autoethnography and reading philosophy.  
Autoethnography 
Put simply, autoethnographic practice is observing, writing, and reflecting. It is 
disciplined or even ritualised thinking about oneself and one’s environment. Certainly, 
managers do think about their environment (i.e. the organisation they manage) and 
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themselves – at least that is what they should do. Yet the process of writing about one’s 
thoughts makes deeper insights possible, compared to contemplating and not writing in 
down. In writing we fix our thoughts and we catch the loose ends or as Sartre (1975) says 
about thinking, “the essential moment was that of the writing itself.” Writing clarifies the 
thinking and provides the opportunity to reread one’s thoughts and to develop them further. 
The writing up of observations and the inevitable interpretations and developed 
understandings are core to autoethnographic research. One might easily understand how 
such a deepened understanding might help a manager to deal with a challenge she or he 
faces. A vivid example of such learning by writing ethnographically is how I recognised that 
I had failed to listen to a client and consequently paid more attention in the next meeting 
which I described in Appendix J (Grosse, 2018).  
Autoethnographic practice provides a room (to use a metaphor) for such thinking – room 
in the sense of a ritual (e.g., every workdays’ evening, or once or twice a week) or as tool 
used if one feels it is necessary (e.g. when one comes across a problem difficult to deal with). 
My experience suggests that writing regularly helps to acquire the needed skills. When I 
started researching, I wrestled with the question of what incidents to write, what and how to 
write about them, and so on. But after a while I felt better and learnt to describe events better. 
I learnt to tap into thoughts and feelings and to connect them to earlier writings and past 
events I recollected. 
This process of describing leads to a deeper understanding of the situations I faced and it 
leads to spotting and exploring problems which I was not aware of before. It is the shift from 
practitioner to researcher thinking – from problem solving to problematising (Grosse, 2017c, 
2018). By writing about my daily practice I spotted issues of which I was unaware, but which 
were problematic. Sooner or later I had to address them. Yet this awareness only developed 
through writing about apparently ‘unsuspicious’ matters.  
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However, I also read literature on trust and later on and of Lévinas. This reading 
influenced my vision, which has both advantages and disadvantages. It certainly limited my 
vision. Selectively, I paid more attention to observations that I could relate to trust and 
Lévinas’ thought. However, it helped me to understand situations differently. I could use a 
special lens to make sense of the events I encountered.  
One may reduce autoethnographic research to three main activities: observing, writing, 
and contemplating oneself and one’s environment. Each activity by itself is very valuable 
for a manager in the construction industry. However, coupling the three enlarges and hones 
my vision. Thinking about a problem is one thing but writing up these thoughts is quite 
another. Afterwards, thoughts are clearer, and the observations are qualitatively different. 
My autoethnographic research in this regard was a wonderful training. I look and think 
differently since I am writing about the issues I face in business. It is certainly enough to 
write for oneself and there is no need to publish any of the writings.  
Very early during my research I wrote predominantly for myself – to play, experiment 
and test. At that time, I still focussed on negotiations, but I soon realised trust’s importance 
to most negotiation processes.  
Trust 
The autoethnographic writing made me even more conscious of trust relevance to my 
business relations. Trust is almost everywhere. Without trust one would not get up in the 
morning (Luhmann, 1973; 1975). To keep this in mind prevents me from seeking ultimate 
control over things. I know trust is an essential part of my daily business and I can only 
replace it by control to a very small degree. Furthermore, replacing trust comes with 
enormous costs. Within the existing trust literature these costs are predominantly related to 
control effort but also to a lack of cooperation. However, reading Lévinas, I understood that 
controlling also has strong influence on my relation to the other, beyond what I expected 
before dealing with Lévinas’ thought. I began to be interested in understanding the other, 
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especially while working on ‘Trust and Construction Projects” (Grosse, 2015b). Seeing the 
Other under constraints and pressures certainly influenced my research, but even more my 
practice as manager. I began to understand the limitations of my influence but also spotted 
different ways of dealing with others. 
One of these limitations is that trust cannot be willed (Baier, 1986). Hence, I cannot 
demand trust from customers, business partners, or employees and they are unable to 
deliberately trust me. To ask someone to trust me is as paradox as it is to ask someone to be 
spontaneous, which Watzlawick (1983) so vividly (and humorously) describes.  
The consequence of the inability to will trust is that I must abandon the thought that I 
could force them to trust me, although I may desperately want them to. There is no silver 
bullet, no remedy, nor something particular I have to do so that others trust me. Trust works 
in another dimension. Rational thought is one mode of interaction and trust is another. One 
has to let go of rational explanations – they do not work in regard to trust. This is very 
difficult to accept for a manager in the construction sector, where contracts, claims, invoices, 
Gantt charts, drawings and calculations govern the daily business. But the longer I read about 
and observe trust relationships, the more I understood trusting does not relate to this 
dimension of business. 
However, I recognised the difficulties of letting go of the compulsion to rationalise trust 
in myself. I understood how difficult it was for me not to think in terms of cause and effect 
in relation to trust. And I have to admit I still struggle to leave this thinking behind. To move 
my thinking forward I more or less accidently turned to Lévinas. His thought helped me 
considerably to better understand my relation to Others. His notions of ‘same and Other’ and 
‘said and saying’ offered me a new dimension to localise trust.  
Lévinas 
Reflecting on when I started working on the thesis, I am astonished how I developed my 
thinking. I started my research with the idea to streamline my negotiating to achieve selfish 
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ends. To streamline negotiation to economic ends – for instance the utilisation of game 
theory shows – seems to be a common approach in business in general but also in 
construction management. However beneficial to the economic outcome of a negotiation 
employing such an approach might be, especially in the short term, one must not forget that 
a negotiation is a human encounter which always comprises a rational and a non-rational 
dimension. Lévinas was of great help for me to understand and to learn to deal with the 
resulting tension between these two dimensions.  
I do not deny economic considerations in negotiations. I still care for myself but my 
thinking about negotiations does not solely revolve around how to get the most out of it. 
Now I understand negotiating more as an interaction or an exchange with a genuine Other 
than the attempt to squeeze the most out of him. 
But to arrive there I first. had to embrace Lévinas’ thought.  
As Edward Trezise once explained, his thinking is like a wave on a pebble beach – once it 
hits the pebbles on the shore it gets everywhere – among, above and beneath every single 
stone. On construction projects, I constantly have to deal with Others, but there is hardly any 
aspect of my life in which I do not have to deal with Others. Hence, once I started engaging 
in Lévinas’ thought, the ‘wave of his thinking’ trickled through almost every facet of my 
life. 
To demonstrate how Lévinas influenced my thinking I begin with a simple but far 
reaching statement: “Ethics is first philosophy.” This statement has different implications.  
First, it should not be a philosophy that governs our thinking but the ethical encounter 
with the Other. Or in other words, all what we call philosophy or rational thinking stems 
from facing Others. Hence, encountering the Other governs philosophy rather than 
philosophy governing the encounter.  
Second, I ought to act ethically for no reason, simply because ethics is not founded in 
reason but in the human encounter. If it is for a reason, one cannot call it ethical. 
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Third, since ethics is acting responsibly, I am responsible prior to anything else. I may as 
a manager create rules and contractual provisions in order to limit my accountability but the 
responsibility remains with me and is infinite. Yet there are no reasonable claims to be made 
about the responsibility of others. I discussed these three statements and background in 
Chapter IV on Lévinas. Here, I will dwell on their implications for my professional practice. 
The knowledge about one’s infinite responsibility and its haunting nature, strangely 
enough, does not pose a particular problem to me. In fact, I find it relaxing. When I started 
researching, I believed I could shift responsibility, but responsibility somehow returned to 
me. I could hold someone else accountable, but I realised that the ultimate responsibility 
remains with me and any shift of accountability is an insufficient means to get rid of 
responsibility which can only give temporary relief. The belief that I could get rid of 
responsibility was problematic. Knowing that my efforts are bound to fail, makes me feel 
much more relaxed. I did not know when I started researching that it is an ongoing and 
constant effort to face one’s responsibilities. There is no way of escaping and no need to 
search for one.  
This relates neatly to Aurelius’ stoic attitude to life (1992). I have to adopt my course of 
action and my thinking to my environment and to the Others around me and should not 
expect to change them. For example, I cannot change my clients or business partners. The 
only thing I can do is to adapt to how they act and what they demand from me. It is always 
my responsibility. 
For example, I may tell an architect that the proposed design is not going to work. By 
writing to him about my objections, I could shift accountability to him. However, if I build 
the house using the faulty design, I am probably not accountable but still responsible for 
insufficiencies. The client may ask me why the house has faults. I may reply that I informed 
the architect and in doing so avoided being held accountable. However, a feeling or sense of 
inappropriateness will remain. I will have to ask myself whether I have done enough to avoid 
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the faults. Certainly, I will have doubts about having done enough, spoken out loudly enough 
or having tried everything to avoid building a deficient building.  
I am responsible at the very moment the client confronts me with his complaints. The 
claim that I informed the architect then sounds hollow – it is an inadequate response. This 
example illustrates Lévinas’ quoting of Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov: “We are all 
responsible for all for all men before all, and I more than all the others.” (Lévinas, 1982, p. 
101). One cannot entirely avoid situations like this, yet one must be aware that a shift of 
accountability does not transfer ultimate responsibility. These ethical questions are of 
interest to the wider construction management community, as a recently accepted abstract 
shows. I am responsible for and to the Other. Hence, I am supposed to set the Other centre 
stage: The other should be my main concern.  
Is not management completely meaningless without Others? Whom should I manage and 
for whom? I recall Large’s (2015, p. 44) thought on the ‘community of speakers’. As a 
manager I need the people I work with and without them my work is meaningless.  
This is perhaps the only reason (if one wants to call it reason) on which responsibility 
rests. That is why we need to care about Others. From this end, management starts to make 
sense to me. It is not about me, it is only about the Other and about the Other’s concern.  
One of the first obstacles is to regard the other person as Other - to think about the Other 
as neither for or against me, just different, but fundamentally different. We are not a 
complementary pair (like black and white) - the Other is someone outside of my categories 
who is no threat, no enemy but also no friend or partner. The Other is just another and not 
me.  
The fundamental Otherness is the biggest value of the Other for me. He or she is different, 
and thinks, knows, acts and feels differently - in ways unfamiliar to me. Preserving this 
otherness provides me with an eternal source of inspiration. Clients think in ways I have not 
thought before. For example, they present new ideas which I may integrate in my business. 
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Staff members approach problems differently and hence we may innovate new solutions. 
But I can only tap into this inspiration if I am open, welcoming and receptive to the Other. I 
must not see the Other as a threat or enemy to get this inspiration.  
It is difficult to embrace this way of thinking if one finds oneself under pressure, for 
example, time pressure and budget constraints. To think this way is a challenge and one 
easily gets trapped into thinking of the other as an adversary. In some respects, this might be 
the case – most clients want to pay less, and I usually want to be paid more. But that is only 
one aspect and there are others that are not opposed to each other. I have to focus on the 
latter to see the Other as valuable for me. One should seek each opportunity to embrace a 
positive thinking about the Other and ask what the Other might offer to me. 
To benefit from the Other’s otherness, managing should not be understood as a way of 
directing persons in the direction I determined beforehand. It should rather draw on the 
different people with their different ways of acting and thinking. Hence it is a navigating 
among alternating currents. This poses a challenge to my thinking - the Other puts me in 
question but also enriches me tremendously. 
I faced a lot of disappointments, incidents of being let down and even outright betrayals. 
Holding a grudge about the people involved for too long (for a short while is often natural 
and inevitable) does not lead anywhere apart from bitterness and stagnation. Hence, to 
forgive is essential. Forgiving relieves the one who forgives and is therefore more important 
to the one who forgives than one who is forgiven (Lévinas, 1968; 1977). It takes away the 
negative thoughts and one is able to open oneself up. One may or may not revive the 
relationship with the other person but at least one is able to see the other differently and stop 
wasting energy on aggression and negative thoughts. 
Reflecting on coupling autoethnography and philosophy – writing and reading 
One lesson I have drawn from Lévinas is that the existence of my self is based on my 
encounters with Others. That is perhaps why autoethnographic research complemented 
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reading Lévinas so well. I constantly moved between myself and the Others around me. I 
could see how the thoughts of Lévinas took shape in business (and personal) practice in my 
own experiences. The movement back and forth between reading Lévinas and reflecting on 
personal experience helped me to understand Lévinas better. In turn it offered me a way to 
see myself and Others differently.  
This process is an ongoing deconstruction of concepts. The Other poses a constant 
challenge to me, to my picture of the world and to my thinking. Again, one may regard this 
as aggression, but the way I understood Lévinas, it is the positive scepticism that the Other 
offers me. The constant challenges are the breeding ground for a deconstruction from within 
(Grosse, 2018). Deconstructing and dismantling concepts is closely related to both Levinas 
and autoethnography. As a practitioner, it offers me a much deeper understanding of the 
processes and relationships I find myself in.  
This in turn makes my management more flexible. To know that my concepts are only 
one limited way of interpreting a situation may induce some insecurity but after a while I 
got used to it and drew on this different understanding. I felt much more prepared or 
equipped for change since I understood that nothing is unchallengeable. 
For me autoethnography was the way of translating philosophy and research into 
managerial practice. It was drawing on the two different ways researchers and practitioners 
think (Bartunek, 2007). I could offer a way of translating Lévinas’ thought into practice, yet 
drawing on other thinkers can offer equally valuable insights. As I have emphasised 
elsewhere already (Grosse, 2017b, 2017c, 2018), I think that autoethnographic research 
benefits the researcher first and foremost and only then the wider academic community. This 
is why I recommend (as I do with my students) reading research and writing about personal 
experiences. It is worth every second. 
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Thoughts on Trust 
The literature shows that to trust someone entails taking risks, making oneself vulnerable 
to the action of the trusted, and a lack of knowledge about whether the other acts as trusted. 
However, when trusting one another, both can achieve more together than alone. Despite the 
possible benefits and risks involved, neither trusting or not trusting is rationally defensible. 
Therefore, it is argued that trust is a mode of interaction distinct from rationality [see ‘Trust’ 
p. 49]. 
The treatment of trust as non-rational and as a different mode of interaction requires trust 
not to be objectified. Although common in the literature, it rejects a utilitarian view of trust. 
It is here that the power of Lévinas’ thought becomes apparent. Lévinas makes a strong 
distinction between Saying and Said [see ‘Saying and Said’ p. 112] which is the framework 
I used to think about trust. The Said is rational thought whereas the Saying is interaction 
prior (primordial) to rationality. I think it is this way of interacting which best describes 
trusting. Before I think or rationalise, I trust. Therefore, an objectification of trust is pointless 
and attempts to argue rationally for or against trust are bound to fail. Trust is the urge, the 
desire and what drags or pushes us towards the Other without considering rationality. I trust 
the Other because she or he is there. I speak to the Other and this Saying entails trusting this 
Other. 
Yet the power of this consideration lies in its ramification. For Lévinas, Saying is taking 
responsibility for the Other. I am responsible to and for the Other without being allowed to 
claim reciprocity. This suits my experiences with trust up to a point. I care for the Other 
without hope of getting anything back. Yet this genuine care for the Other, for no particular 
reason, might also make this person trust me. It is, therefore not care without accountability, 
but one that reaches way beyond what I am accountable for. It is exactly this being beyond 
accountability, or more than what is rationally arguable, that makes up a big part of a trust 
relationship.  
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But it is also something else: the desire for the Other. Prior to rationality, humans are 
social. We have an urge to interact with others which drives us to trust them – independent 
of any rational argument. We then willingly accept vulnerability. To care and to take 
responsibility without being able to claim reciprocity makes us vulnerable to the Other’s 
actions. This again connects Lévinas’ thoughts about Saying to the literature on trust. Yet I 
could demonstrate many different examples of the pure desire for being trusted or being 
valued as a person. 
The Saying also entails an inherent scepticism, which has a recurring nature. Something 
strange and non-rational happens during the rational choices we make when interacting with 
other people. As soon as I act and decide rationally, operating within the Said, the encounter 
with the Other sheds doubt over this decision. This encounter is to see the Other as ‘face’ 
(Lévinas, 1961) or as a vulnerable human being. This sensing of the Other touches me 
beyond rational thought. Hence the Saying questions the Said. This mechanism also operates 
when it comes to trust. I may decide not to act trustingly but as soon as I do there is a nagging 
doubt about this decision. This scepticism does not go away but resurfaces again and again. 
I argue that the force behind it is my desire to be with the Other. 
We cannot avoid such decisions, and neither I nor anybody else can care for every Other. 
In order to care for the Other, I have to disappoint the third. I cannot trustingly interact with 
every person, and therefore I must be prepared that my offering is rejected more often than 
not. Still, the desire to be with the Other (or Others) drives me to trust them over and over 
again. 
When I open myself up to the Other and engage in Saying, I can make trust possible and 
vice versa, I can avoid it when I deny the Saying to operate. However, to act trustingly and 
to be rejected can be very painful [see ‘Deadlines’ p. 189]. 
It is difficult to engage the Other in conversation or to trust them, yet actively trying to 
forgive opens up the opportunity for me to trust again and be trusted. I emphasise the 
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contribution of the Saying to understand trust within this play of rational thought – the Said 
– and the non-rational response to the Other. Trust is never pure, and control always comes 
alongside. I would like to trust and I know that together we can make things happen, but I 
make myself vulnerable, and hence I am reluctant to give in to my urge to trust. There is a 
tension between desire, and sociality on the one side and vulnerability, fear, and pain on the 
other. One faces this dilemma in business and perhaps in life in general. Therefore, my 
thinking about business practice focussed on this dilemma and autoethnography was the best 
way to reveal my insights. 
Thoughts on Autoethnography 
I am a practitioner and always will be. Autoethnography is the method that allowed me 
to observe and understand, read and contemplate as I wanted to. I could take action when I 
felt ready to do so but there was no necessity from the very outset of the study as there would 
have been in action research (Grosse & Rose, 2016).  
I might be criticised for following my personal preferences and focusing on my own 
interests and approach to trust. I have a strong inclination to trust others and one could argue 
that it is not surprising that I have seen what I reported here and that I understood Lévinas 
in the way I did. This argument is difficult to reject. However, one could also argue that it is 
the nature of autoethnography to reflect the subjective view of the researcher. I am both 
researcher and researched and cannot be someone else or be neutral. However, I can be 
honest about myself, reflect actively and account for the researcher impact on the study. The 
easiest measure was to write in the first person singular. Therefore the reader is not tricked 
into believing some omniscient person is talking. However, this is by no means sufficient 
and I also tried to weave into the work what I felt, thought, and did to give an impression of 
who I am and where I am coming from. 
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One could also argue, that the whole study is too ‘Lévinasian’. My thoughts are certainly 
strongly influenced by him. It was a choice I made and argued for [see ‘Trust’ p. 49, and 
‘Emmanuel Lévinas’ p.84]. Lévinas’ thought fitted my approach to doing business very well. 
For me it was natural to follow up on his thought. It is another case of the researcher’s 
influence and how to account for this influence.  
Again, I am a practitioner. It is a limitation that this study is written from the distinct 
perspective of a construction industry insider but it can also be regarded as one of its biggest 
assets. To put it bluntly: the only people who have first-hand access to what practitioners 
think and feel are the practitioners themselves. Everybody else relies on secondary sources 
– interviews, observation etc. Elsewhere I could make a case for autoethnographic research 
done by construction practitioners and the insights only practitioners can provide (Grosse, 
2016a, 2018).  
The potential of this approach only surfaces when practitioners engage reflexively with 
their experiences. Only then are the deeper patterns revealed, the questions behind the 
questions asked, and the uncomfortable issues explored. This is when the different modes of 
reflexivity – on, in, and of practice – are at work (Grosse, 2018). The importance of 
reflexivity stems from the deep involvement the practitioner brings. 
My understanding is that being a researching practitioner is completely different from 
being an academic ethnographer (without the ‘auto’ prefix). I always talk as one deeply 
involved in the issues I explore. It is my livelihood, my life, and myself that I am talking 
about and so I will never be detached from the things I explore or the things  that affect me. 
They certainly do more to me than they could do to an outsider ethnographer or anybody 
else. The understandings I gain about my business affect how I see the last 19 years of my 
life because they are closely related to what I did, thought, and felt during that period. I 
cannot imagine that some outsider could establish such a connection.  
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This strong involvement should provide a lot to reflect on for other researchers. I talk 
about my take on trust and how I feel and think about it. I talk about it as one who is 
dependent on others trusting him and vice versa. I talk about my role in my construction 
business and how I feel and think about it and about my engineering background and its 
effect on me. Others may use these insights to enhance their own thinking – whether as a 
previously unexplored route, a contradiction to reflect on or to support and further their own 
ideas. I offer three perspectives to support the thoughts of others: my inclination to trust, my 
emphasis on Levinas and my insider’s view.  
Thoughts on my Business Practice 
I would like to emphasise two points about the impact of my research on my business 
practice. The first is how Lévinas relates strongly to my thoughts on trust and the second is 
an excerpt of my last two conference papers on the benefits of autoethnographic research for 
practitioners and businesses [see ‘Appendix H’ p. 366 and ‘Appendix I’ p. 374]. 
The tension between Saying and Said in Lévinas’ thought is what started my own thinking 
about business practice. On the one hand, there is control, knowledge, accountability, 
rational thinking and calculation, i.e. the Said, and on the other hand there is the pre-
conscious human interaction or the face of the other that demands care and responsibility 
from us, i.e. the Saying. My observations show that both features belong to human 
interaction. However, an overemphasis of the Said at the expense of the Saying is 
detrimental. 
An overemphasis on the Said creates a climate of pure accountability which leads a person 
to strictly abide to the norms and laws required of them. Yet social life is much more complex 
than any set of norms and rules might be able to reflect. In other words, the Said is limited, 
but sociality – human interaction – is the breakthrough or overflow of the infinite Saying 
[see ‘Emmanuel Lévinas’ p. 84]. We simply cannot reduce our interactions with others to 
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the Said. We must be prepared for the fact that we do not understand everything. If we are 
not prepared, we constantly struggle with our limitations. 
But when I realise how limited I am, I cannot expect perfection from others. And so, I 
begin to balance Saying and Said and to forgive others for what I regard as their failure. I 
understand that perhaps it is only me who regards it as a failure. I may begin to see beyond 
the personal traits, be it capability or skills, and see the human being – the face. This is a 
human that seeks to do her or his best yet sees the world differently from the way I see it. 
That is the biggest value of this Other. 
The Other might show me a different view of the world but I must allow for that to 
happen. The Other, for example, a business partner coming up with an apparently odd 
proposal (at first sight), can be a source of creativity for me. He or she gives me inspiration 
as I cannot see the world as the Other does, but I can embrace one or two of the Other’s 
views. For that to happen I have to welcome the Other. I have to open myself up and I have 
to trust. This is when trusting people can achieve more than each on their own.  
Yet one must be aware of the risk involved. The Other might not be welcoming or may 
exploit my offer. That happened to me, and I learned how painful it is. However, I engage 
in Saying and trusting others again as I know that I cannot achieve much on my own and the 
alternative is not promising. Not to trust at all would mean to control everything. This is 
impossible and to set oneself the goal of full control puts immense pressure on this person. 
I am highly critical of ever tighter control measures in management because they push the 
members of the respective organisation towards an emphasis on the Said and suggest that 
full control would be possible. This creates immense stress in these people.  
I suggest a more balanced approach. Some control is of course necessary, but also a 
freedom to reach beyond control. However, this freedom must be accompanied by a strong 
emphasis on responsibility – in Lévinas’ sense - beyond accountability. I have stressed 
throughout this work that there is an underlying sense of responsibility in the people I work 
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with [see ‘The Cracks’ p. 109, ‘Acting Ethically Costs Money’ p. 151, and ‘Pricey Bricks’ 
p. 186]. As I have summarised above, forgiving the Other for their failures inextricably 
belongs to this balancing,  just as the nagging scepticism about my own thoughts does [see 
‘Thoughts on Trust’ p. 263]. Again, my categories - my Saying, is limited and one should 
always be humble about one’s claims and always willing to question one’s thinking. 
The tension remains between making a decision based on the knowledge I have and 
knowing it is based on limited knowledge. Yet decisions have to be taken ‘here and now’, 
even not deciding is a decision which can be unjust.  
This ‘here and now’ also refers to the second point - it stands for a practitioner’s thinking 
– thrown into the situations – as opposed to the reflective stance of an ethnographer. This 
opposition forms the very tension in which my autoethnography took place. When working 
in business I was faced with the immediacy of the situations I was thrown into, whereas the 
ethnographer could sit down in the evenings and reflect on what had happened. I have 
outlined above what a researching practitioner may contribute to research and here I would 
like to suggest what researching might contribute to personal, professional practice.  
While writing my research I inevitably gained insights for my practice because I wrote 
about the very events that touched me as professional. Often, I had the feeling that the 
contribution to my practice was bigger than that to research because I could test the 
knowledge immediately (e.g.; Grosse & Rose, 2016). This side-effect of autoethnography 
makes it a good recommendation for practitioners embarking on a research journey. Yet it 
should also be approached with caution. Autoethnography requires the researcher to question 
almost everything and this is not always comfortable. A deconstruction of assumptions can 
cause some severe insecurities for the practitioner. There is also a need for the researcher to 
problematise rather than to solve the problem. In order to deeply understand a matter, the 
researcher must not jump too fast to a conclusion but rather keep on wondering and asking. 
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This runs against typical business practice where the fast solution is often regarded as the 
best one.  
Yet, although it puts the practitioner (turned researcher) under more pressure, the 
problematizing is helpful as it enables a widening of view. One begins to understand the 
deeper causes and the wider implications of one’s thoughts and actions. And most 
importantly, I understood how little I knew and still know. It is this impact on the practitioner 
doing autoethnographic work that I have sought to emphasise. This view on 
autoethnographic research is unseen so far, at least in the construction industry, but is starting 
to evoke some interest.  
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Final Remarks 
When I started, I wanted to learn something about my business practice. I wondered how 
to negotiate better and more effectively. In some ways I have attained this goal. I think I 
negotiate better now and perhaps more effectively. But it did not work out the way I initially 
thought. In 2012 I believed that I would search for the right way to negotiate and so would 
achieve my desired outcomes (or at least the closest to them). However, throughout the 
journey, I turned more and more to myself. Thinking reflexively about my actions, feelings, 
and thoughts did not reveal the best way to negotiate – like a silver bullet – but a way of 
thinking about, reflecting on, and reframing the situation I find myself in. As my counsellor 
likes to say, one may understand my ethnographic journey as climbing to the balcony in the 
theatre where I can see myself acting on the stage. However, I do not stay at the balcony but 
go back on stage. It is only in the midst of the play that I really begin to understand how 
what I am doing on stage looks from elsewhere.  
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